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LIST    OF    ILLUSTRATIONS 


Claude  Grahame-White    . 
The  Nieuport  Monoplane 
British-built  Scouting  Monoplane  . 
Ready  for  a  Scouting  Flight    . 
Two-seated,  British-built  War  Machine 
The  Engine-in-front  Biplane  . 
Military  Biplane  with  Two  Engines 
Building  War  Aeroplanes 
Weight-carrying  War  Biplane 
War  Monoplane's  *'  Vol  Plan^  " 
Maps  for  Military  Airmen 
The  Pilot's  Seat       . 
Pilot  and  '*  Observer  "     . 
Military   Airman's   Report 
Transport  of  War  Aeroplanes 
Motor  Transport 
Travelling  Workshop 


Frontispiece 
facing  page  8 
x6 

32 

48 

64 

80 

96 

112 

128 

144 

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192 

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XV 


THE 

AEROPLANE 
IN  WAR   .    . 


CLAUDE   GRAHAME-WHITE. 


Winner   of    the   Gordon-Bennett  Aviation  Cup,   1910  ;  author  of  "  The  Story 
of    the    Aeroplane  " ;   and  joint  author,    with   Harry   Harper,   of  "  The  Aero- 
plane:    Past,    Present,   and  Future." 
plane  in  War." 


Heroes  of  the  Air,"   and  "The  Aero- 


THE    AEROPLANE 
IN   WAR 


BY 
CLAUDE  GRAHAME-WHITE 
AND 
HARRY  HARPER 

AUTHORS   OF   "thE   AEROPLANE:   PAST,    PRESENT,    AND    FUTURE 


\^\ 


PHILADELPHIA 

J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY 

LONDON:  T.  WERNER  LAURIE 


M 


(^1 


PREFACE 

Although  it  is  still  a  crude  machine — in  view  of 
the  perfected  apparatus  which  is  the  aim  of  thoughtful 
designers — the  aeroplane  has  demonstrated,  in  a 
conclusive  way,  its  value  as  an  instrument  of  war. 

In  peace  manoeuvres  in  France  and  Germany,  and 
under  actual  war  conditions  in  Tripoli,  scouting 
machines  have  proved  their  ability  to  pierce  most 
effectually  what  is  known  as  "  the  fog  of  war."  Air- 
scouts  have,  indeed,  revealed  the  dispositions  of  an 
enemy  so  precisely  as  to  make  it  necessary  to  alter — 
at  a  moment's  notice — an  entire  plan  of  campaign. 

Ceasing  to  be  fair-weather  craft,  powerful,  modern- 
type  aeroplanes  can  combat  high  and  gusty  winds, 
and  are  already  capable  of  being  used,  for  recon- 
noitring flights,  on  at  least  80  per  cent  of  the  days 
of  the  year.  No  longer  unreHable,  they  have  become 
practical  weapons. 

A  squadron  of  war  aeroplanes,  carrying  pilots  and 
observers,  can,  as  has  been  shown  again  and  again, 
lay  bare  the  disposition  of  a  widespread  battle-front. 
In  one  hour,  they  can  perform  the  reconnoitring  work 
which  has  hitherto  been  carried  out  in  a  day,  and  in 
a  necessarily  hit-or-miss  fashion,  by  cavalry  and  other 
scouts. 

v 

267487 


VI  PREFACE 

The  use  of  well-trained  corps  of  military  airmen 
will  revolutionise  the  tactics  of  war.  No  longer  will 
two  Commanders-in-Chief  grope  in  the  dark.  They 
will  sit,  so  to  speak,  on  either  side  of  a  chess-board, 
which  will  represent  the  battlefield.  Each  will  watch 
the  other's  moves ;  nothing  will  be  concealed.  From 
a  blundering,  scrambling  moving  about  of  masses  of 
men,  modern  warfare  will  become — through  the  ad- 
vent of  the  aeroplane — an  intellectual  process. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  who  has  no  proper  air- 
corps,  in  the  next  great  war,  will  be  in  a  hopeless 
position.  He  will  have  lost  a  batde  practically 
before  it  begins.  Whereas  his  opponent  will  know 
exactly  what  ^^  is  doing,  he  will  be  able  to  obtain 
nothing  but  vague  and  confusing  tidings  as  to  the 
movements  of  the  enemy.  Imagine  two  armed  men 
approaching  each  other,  one  being  blindfolded.  The 
Commander-in-Chief  without  aeroplanes  will  be  like 
a  bhndfolded  man. 

One  nation  stands  head-and-shoulders  above  all 
others  in  the  matter  of  her  aerial  equipment  and  ex- 
perience. That  nation  is  France.  So  far  ahead 
is  she  that  it  will  be  a  long  time  before  other  coun- 
tries will  be  able  to  come  up  with  her ;  but  Germany 
is  now  making  desperate  efforts  to  do  so. 

Until  recently,  it  must  be  said,  England  lagged 
inactively  not  only  behind  France  and  Germany,  in 
the  organising  of  an  air-corps,  but  even  behind 
such  countries  as  Austria,  Italy,  and  Spain. 

Now,  however,  there  are  promises  of  a  change. 

/ 


PREFACE 


vu 


For  this,  mainly,  we  must  thank  the  energy  and 
enthusiasm  of  Colonel  Seely,  Parliamentary  Under- 
Secretary  of  State  for  War.  When  these  lines  are 
being  read,  British  aeroplane  manufacturers  will  be 
preparing  for  an  important  military  trial  of  aero- 
planes, which  is  to  be  held  in  England  during  the 
summer. 

The  War  Office  has  begun  to  buy  aeroplanes, 
although  on  a  small  scale.  We  now  have  a  Royal 
Flying  Corps;  a  body  of  skilled  airmen  is  being 
trained.  But  money  is  spent  very  sparingly.  Our 
equipment,  compared  with  that  of  France,  is  still  a 
negligible  quantity.  In  machines,  and  men,  and, 
above  all,  in  training,  we  are  very  far  behind. 

Only  by  persistent  and  intelligently  directed  work, 
by  the  spending  of  more  money,  by  the  practical 
encouragement  of  manufacturers,  and  by  the  appoint- 
ing of  executive  officers  who  are  experts  in  their  field 
of  work,  can  we  hope  even  to  approach  the  organi- 
sation of  the  air-corps  of  France. 

But  a  beginning  has  certainly  been  made.  By 
the  end  of  the  forthcoming  flying  season,  we  should 
have  in  England  a  small,  but  well-equipped  air 
service.  And  the  work  of  this  corps  will  be  its  own 
advertisement.  Once  the  potentialities  of  the  war 
aeroplane  are  reahsed  adequately,  a  stinting  policy 
will  be  impossible. 

It  is  our  aim,  in  this  book,  to  show  what  the  war 
aeroplane  has  done,  and  can  do.  At  present,  its 
work  has  been  confined  to  scouting.     But  it  has 


viii  PREFACE 

other,  and  grimmer  possibilities.  It  can,  and  with- 
out doubt  will,  be  used  as  an  engine  of  destruction — 
not  by  means  of  the  bomb-dropping  attacks  of  a  few 
aeroplanes,  but  by  the  organised  onslaught  of  large 
squadrons  of  weight-lifting  machines,  which  will  be 
able  to  rain  down  tons  of  missiles  over  any  given  spot. 

And  there  is  another  possibility,  also.  Machines 
are  carrying  heavier  loads  every  day.  Soon  the 
practicabiHty  of  aeroplanes  to  transport  troops — 
particularly  in  regard  to  hurrying  up  reinforcements 
in  an  emergency — will  be  demonstrated. 

When  two  opposing  armies  both  have  large  fleets 
of  war  aeroplanes,  and  these  machines  take  the  air 
in  squadrons,  prior  to  a  battle,  what  will  happen 
when  they  come  in  contact  with  each  other? 

The  question  is  one  which  the  greatest  military 
experts  are  discussing.  Obviously,  there  will  be 
an  aerial  battle,  each  aeroplane  corps  seeking  to 
cripple  the  other.  Each  Commander-in-Chief  will 
in  fact  desire,  above  all  else,  to  obtain  supremacy  of 
the  air.  If  he  can  do  so,  it  will  have  the  effect  of 
seriously  handicapping  his  opponent. 

Thus — probably  waged  with  light  guns  firing 
explosive  shells — the  next  great  war  will  begin,  not 
on  earth,  but  several  thousand  feet  in  the  air. 

Claude  Grahame- White. 

Harry  Harper. 
London,  1912. 


CONTENTS 


FIRST   SECTION 

REVIEW  OF  PROGRESS  PRIOR  TO  THE  FIRST  MILITARY  TESTS 

OF  AEROPLANES 

PAGE 

I.  Dawn  of  flight — Encouragement  in  Europe  and 
America — England's  lost  opportunities — The 
pioneers i-8 

II.  First   practical    flights — The   Wright   brothers;    the 

Voisins;  Farman — The  cross-Channel  flight  .        .         8-11 
III.  Aeroplanes     at     Rheims,      1909 — Wright,      Voisin, 
Farman,    Bleriot,   Antoinette — The   Gnome   engine 
— First  military  orders 11-21 

IV.  The  human  factor — Growing  skill  of  airmen — Feats 
of  19 10,  compared  with  those  of  1909 — Cross- 
country flying 22-26 


SECOND  SECTION 

FIRST    EXPERIMENTS    WITH    AEROPLANES    IN    THE    FRENCH 
AUTUMN   MANOEUVRES,    I9IO 

I.  The  historic  Picardy  tests — First  official  report  upon 

movements  of  troops,  as  gleaned  by  aeroplane        .       27-29 
II.  Second  conclusive  test — Detecting  an  army  in  retreat 

— France's  determination  to  possess  an  air-fleet    .       29-32 


THIRD  SECTION 

THE  GROWING  AIR-FLEETS  OF  FOREIGN  NATIONS 

I.  Activity  in  France — Two  hundred  machines  at  the 

end  of  191 1 ;  a  thousand  promised  by  the  year  1914       33-38 
II.  The    great    French    tests    of   military    aeroplanes— 

ix 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 


Striking    results    obtained— Era    of    fast,     "  air- 
worthy," weight-carrying  machines       .         .         .        38-40 

III.  Germany's  aerial  policy — Secret  energies  in  creating 

a  fleet  of  war  aeroplanes — Rivalry  with  France     .       41-46 

IV.  Progress  in  Russia,  America,  and  other  countries — 

England's  position  in  the  autumn  of  1911      .        .       46-49 


FOURTH  SECTION 

IMPORTANCE  OF  ORGANISATION  IN  THE  USE  OF  WAR 
AEROPLANES 

I.  French  plans  for  the  concerted  use  of  squadrons  of 

machines  in  time  of  war 50-54 

II.  Value  of  air-stations — Selection  of  landing-grounds 

— Preparing  air-maps 54-56 


FIFTH    SECTION 

England's  position  in  regard  to  military  flying 

I.  Lessons  which  were  ignored — Work  of  the  Parlia- 
mentary Aerial  Defence  Committee        .        .        .       57-6o 
II.  Policy  of  "  moving  cautiously  " — Peril  of  lagging 

behind  in  aerial  armament 61-64 

III.  The  financial  aspect — Money  England  is  spending — 

The  airship  policy — Insufficient  provision  for  aero- 
planes          64-67 

IV.  Dangers  of  a  policy  of  "  drift  " — Experience  which 

money  cannot  buy — ^Trained  men,  not  so  much  as 
machines,  the  criterion  of  strength  ....       67-73 
V.  England's    official    awakening — The    training   of   a 
hundred  airmen— The  forthcoming  trials  of  military 
machines 73-77 


SIXTH    SECTION 

war   aeroplanes   at   the   PARIS   AERONAUTICAL   EXHIBITION, 
DECEMBER,    I9II 

I.  Latest- type  military  monoplanes — Two-seated,  recon- 
noitring machines — Single-seated,  high-speed  craft       78-82 


CONTENTS  xi 

PAGE 

II.  Latest    developments    in    biplane    construction— The 

engine-in-front,  weight-carrying  machine       .        .       82-89 
III.  Healthy    position    of    the    French    industry — What 
England  has  lacked— Danger  of  neglecting  home 
builders 89-95 

SEVENTH    SECTION 

WHAT  EXISTING  WAR  AEROPLANES  CAN  ACTUALLY  ACCOMPLISH 

I.  Plight  of  a  Commander-in-Chief  without  an  aero- 
plane corps — The  work  of  cavalry  reconnaissance  .        96-99 
II.  Work  of  a  squadron  of  air-scouts  described — Tasks 
of  the  pilot  and  observer — Combined  reconnaissance 
by    many    machines — Effect    of    aeroplanes    upon 

tactics 99-109 

III.  Other  uses  of  the  war  aeroplane — Surveying — 
Dispatch-carrying — Directing  gun-fire — Transport 
of  staff  officers 109- 115 

EIGHTH    SECTION 

WIRELESS  TELEGRAPHY  AND  PHOTOGRAPHY  AS  AIDS  TO  AERIAL 
RECONNAISSANCE 

I.  First  tests  and  successes  with  wireless  telegraphy — 
Difficulty  of  equipping  an  aeroplane  with  trans- 
mitting plant 1 16- 1 19 

II.  French  triumphs  with  wireless  telegraphy — Messages 

sent  over  a  distance  of  thirty-five  miles  .         .         .120-122 
III.  Practical   uses   of   wireless   upon   aeroplanes — Eng- 
land's lack  of  effort 122-126 

IV.  Photography    from    a    war   aeroplane — The    use    of 

special  automatic  cameras 126-128 

NINTH     SECTION 

DEVOLOPMENT  OF  ALL-WEATHER  WAR  AEROPLANES 

I.  Flights  in  thirty-five-mile-an-hour  winds — Argu- 
ments of  sceptics — What  the  great  contests  of  191 1 

proved         129-135 

II.  Value  of  high  speed,  when  combating  a  wind— Con- 
structional difficulties  of  a  hundred-mile-an-hour 
machine 135-138 


xii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

III.  Variable-Speed  aeroplanes— Plans  for  constructing 
aircraft  of  this  type— Advantages  of  such  a 
machine 138-140 

IV.  Power-plant  of  aeroplanes — Fitting  two  engines  to 

obviate  involuntary  descents 140-143 

J" 
TENTH    SECTION 

THE  TRAINING  OF  ARMY  AIRMEN 

I.  French    thoroughness — An    expert's    tribute — Sound 

training  all-important 144-147 

II.  How  the  military  airman  is  "  schooled  " — His  course 

of  instruction  described 147-15 1 

III.  Rules  for  training — Dummy  aeroplanes — The  pupil's 

first  "  hops  " 151-156 

IV.  Cross-country  flights — The  vol  plan^ — Difficulty  of 

first  observation  tests  from  an  aeroplane        .         .    156-160 
V.  Finishing  work  at  French  schools — Practical  tests — 

German  thoroughness — Energy  of  English  officers    160-168 

ELEVENTH    SECTION 

THE   COST   OF   WAR    AEROPLANES 

I.  Why    manufacturers    charge    high    prices — Cost    of 

experimental  work — Building  of  trial  machines      .    169-173 
II.  Economy  of  a  large  military  order  for  machines — 

The  incidental  expenses 173-177 

III.  Questions  of  renewals — General  cheapness  of  an  air- 
corps,  as  compared  with  other  forms  of  armament    178-180 

OUR   AERIAL   PROGRAMME   FOR    1912-13    .     181-187 
TWELFTH    SECTION 

PROBLEM    OF  ARTILLERY   FIRE  AND  THE  AEROPLANE 

I.  Conflicting   opinions   as   to  an   aeroplane's   vulnera- 
bility— Experiments  which  have  been  carried  out    .    188-195 

II.  Shrapnel  shell— Question  of  hitting  a  vital  part  of 

the   aeroplane— Difficulty   of  identifying   friend   or 

foe 195-201 


CONTENTS  xiii 


THIRTEENTH    SECTION 

DESTRUCTIVE  POTENTIALITIES  OF  WEIGHT-CARRYING 

AEROPLANES 

PAGE 

I.  What   a  modern-type   machine   can   raise — Load   of 

two  men,  and  explosives 202-206 

II.  Effect  of  aerial  bombardment  upon  cities  and  troops 

—German  tests .    207-211 


FOURTEENTH   SECTION 

WAR  IN  THE  AIR  BETWEEN  HOSTILE  AEROPLANES 

I.  Certainty    of    a    combat    between    aeroplanes    in 
actual     warfare — Air-scouts     protected     by     aerial 

**  cruisers " 212-215 

II.  An  encounter  in  the  air — Importance  to  an  army  of 

an  aerial  victory 215-219 

FIFTEENTH    SECTION 

VALUE  OF  THE  AEROPLANE  IN  NAVAL  WARFARE 

I.  Machines  for  coastal  and  high-seas  work — Question 

of  flying  in  winds 220-223 

II.  Interesting  tests — Machines  for  rising  from  water, 

and  landing  on  a  ship's  deck 223-227 

SIXTEENTH    SECTION 

AERIAL   WORK   IN   THE   FRENCH   AND    GERMAN   AUTUMN 
MANCEUVRES,    IQII 

I.  French  successes — Proof  of  the  value  of  organisation 

— Flights  in  high  winds 228-232 

II.  Work  in  the  German  manoeuvres — An  instance  of 
the  utility  of  air-scouts — Reconnoitring  from  high 
altitudes .        .        .    232-236 

III.  Aeroplanes  in  actual  warfare — What  Italian  airmen 

accomplished     in     Tripoli— Scouting     and     bomb- 
dropping  under  service  conditions  ....    236-239 

IV.  A    final     word— Conclusions     to    be    arrived     at — 

Problems  outstanding 239-244 


I 


THE  AEROPLANE   IN  WAR 

FIRST    SECTION 

REVIEW     OF     PROGRESS    PRIOR     TO     THE     FIRST 
MILITARY     TESTS     OF     AEROPLANES 

I 

-^awn  of  flight — Encouragement  in  Europe  and  America 
— England's  lost  opportunities — The  pioneers. 

In  order  to  pave  the  way  for  a  description  of  what 
the  war  aeroplane,  as  we  know  it  to-day,  can  accom- 
plish, it  is  necessary  to  trace — although  only  briefly 
—the  development  of  the  heavier-than-air  machine 
dunng  recent  years. 

One  fact  immediately  claims  the  attention  of  any 
student  of  this  question.  He  sees  that  England  might 
to-day,  had  she  not  shown  initial  apathy,  be  the  first 
nation  in  the  world  in  the  fostering,  and  develop- 
ment, of  aerial  navigation. 

Instead  of  holding  such  a  proud  position,  however 
— and  any  nation  may  well  be  proud  of  having  en- 
couraged this  new  art — we  suffer  for  having  displayed 
a  lack  of  interest  in  the  conquest  of  the  air,  and 
for  having  given  practically  no  help  to  far-seeing 
enthusiasts  who  first  devoted  themselves  to  the  great 
l»roblem, 

A 


2         THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

There  was  no  lack  of  pioneers  in  England; 
but,  instead  of  giving  them  assistance,  we  dis- 
couraged them,  with  the  result  that  such  countries  as 
France  and  Germany — wide  awake  to  all  forms  of 
progress — have  moved  forward  from  one  triumph  to 
another. 

More  than  a  hundred  years  ago,  for  instance, 
England  had  an  opportunity  of  displaying  a  definite 
interest  in  flying.  Sir  George  Cayley,  a  remarkably 
clever  engineer,  turned  his  attention  to  the  design  of 
a  flying  machine,  and  actually  produced,  in  the  year 
1809,  plans  of  a  machine  which  anticipated  many 
constructional  features  of  the  monoplane  as  it  is  built 
to-day.  Of  course  there  was  not,  in  those  days,  any 
such  efficient  motive  power  as  is  now  supplied  by  the 
petrol  engine ;  but  Sir  George  Cayley  lectured  upon 
his  ideas,  and  sought  to  interest  people  in  them. 
Had  his  deductions  been  greeted  with  enthusiasm, 
it  is  not  probable  that  any  successful  flying  machine 
would  immediately  have  been  produced ;  the  difficulty 
of  finding  a  reliable  propeUing  medium  would  have 
prevented  this.  But  what  a  ready  and  encouraging 
acceptance  of  Sir  George  Cayley's  pioneer  work 
would  inevitably  have  done,  would  have  been  to  turn 
the  minds  of  other  inventors  towards  the  problem, 
and  so  pave  the  way  for  a  series  of  discoveries,  each 
more  important  than  its  predecessor. 

The  imaginations  of  those  who  might  have  exer- 
cised a  great  influence  upon  future  progress  were  not 
fired,  however ;  and  the  same  remark  applies  to  the 
efforts  of  those  who  followed  in  Sir  George  Cayley's 
footsteps,  and  endeavoured  to  give  his  ideas  more 
practical  shape. 

Stringfellow  and  Henson,  for  example,  pored  over 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR         3 

the  great  engineer's  drawings,  and  produced  working 
models  of  a  flying  machine.  Their  apparatus  was 
crude,  it  is  true ;  but  this  toil  represented  so  many 
steps  forward  along  the  path  of  progress.  It  had  been 
man's  ambition,  for  centuries,  to  fly;  success  could 
not  be  expected  without  infinite  labour.  Nothing 
definite  came  of  the  work  of  these  pioneers,  however. 
They  had  Httle  encouragement ;  they  were  regarded 
as  "  cranks."  The  importance  of  the  work  they  were 
engaged  upon  was  not,  indeed,  realised. 

Now,  as  a  striking  contrast,  let  us  turn  to  the  re- 
ception which  early  enthusiasts  received  in  other 
countries.  Let  us  take  France,  for  example.  Ader, 
an  electrical  engineer,  devised,  in  1896,  a  very  in- 
genious, bat-like  aeroplane.  With  it,  having  fitted  a 
small  steam-engine,  he  actually  achieved  a  short 
flight — or,  rather,  a  brief  "  hop  "  from  the  ground. 

Instead  of  being  greeted  apathetically,  or  having 
his  sanity  doubted,  Ader  was  promptly  called  to 
appear  before  the  military  authorities.  They,  after 
hearing  his  theories  expounded,  cheerfully  voted  him 
;^20,ooo  in  order  that  he  might  continue  his  experi- 
ments upon  an  adequate  scale.  Thus,  even  at  this 
early  stage,  France  revealed  her  keen  interest  in 
aerial  navigation.  Ader,  lacking  the  petrol  motor, 
could  not  carry  his  investigations  much  further. 
But  the  encouragement  he  received  gave  heart  to 
other  inventors.  And  so  France  went  forward  to 
success. 

America  offers  another  example  of  a  sane,  far- 
seeing  policy.  Professor  Langley,  an  eminent 
scientist,  was  making  a  series  of  wonderfully  interest- 
ing model  aeroplanes  at  about  the  time  Ader  was 
experimenting  in  France.    To  further  his  work,  the 


4        THE   AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

American  authorities  very  promptly  came  forward 
with  a  grant  of  ;^  10,000. 

He,  like  Ader,  was  unable  to  carry  his  individual 
experiments  to  a  successful  issue  ;  but  further  investi- 
gation, on  the  part  of  other  workers,  was  greatly 
stimulated.  It  is  interesting  to  note  what  position 
these  two  countries,  which  first  encouraged  flying, 
afterwards  took  when  the  aeroplane  became  a  reality. 

To  America,  in  the  work  of  the  Wright  brothers, 
has  gone  the  honour  of  the  first  practical  flights  with 
a  heavier-than-air  machine,  while  France  is  to-day 
the  premier  nation  in  the  world  in  the  development 
of  airmanship. 

Thus  it  is  legitimate  to  pass  to  a  consideration  of 
the  first  machines  that  flew,  and  consider  their  capa- 
bilities from  the  military  point  of  view.  The  Wright 
biplane,  naturally,  is  the  first  to  attract  attention, 
because  it  was  as  long  ago  as  1903  that  these  two 
quiet,  determined  Americans  made  their  first  success- 
ful flights.  From  a  military  aspect,  this  aeroplane 
had  many  drawbacks ;  and  to  cite  them  is  instructive, 
seeing  that,  by  this  means,  a  reader  will  be  better 
able  to  judge,  later  on,  what  vast  strides  towards 
perfection  the  aeroplane  has  already  made. 

The  first  Wright  biplane  would,  indeed,  just  fly ; 
that  was  all.  Its  pilot  only  dared  to  leave  the 
ground  when  an  absolutely  dead  calm  prevailed ;  he 
feared  the  overturning  influence  of  even  the  smallest 
gust  of  wind.  His  engine,  being  then  a  novelty  as 
applied  to  the  aeroplane,  required  the  most  patient 
"  tuning  up  "  before  even  a  brief  flight  could  be 
essayed ;  and,  when  it  was  aloft,  the  machine  only 
passed  through  the  air  quite  close  to  the  ground. 

Each   flight   had    to    be    started   by    sliding   the 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN  WAR         5 

aeroplane  forward  along  a  rail;  away  from  this  rail, 
the  machine  was  helpless.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  a  miHtary  expert,  indeed,  this  early  machine  could 
have  been  condemned  upon  several  counts.  It  was 
unreliable.  It  could  not  fly  in  gusty  winds ;  it  was 
not  portable  ;  it  could  only  take  the  air  when  launched 
from  its  rail. 

But  the  true  expert  is  far-seeing.  He  makes 
light  of  present  imperfections  if,  in  any  idea,  he  can 
see  future  developments  of  undoubted  importance. 
Such  an  expert,  for  instance,  was  the  late  Captain 
Ferber,  of  the  French  Army.  He  was  the  first  miH- 
tary ofl[icer  to  whom  the  task  fell  of  reporting,  for 
his  Government,  upon  the  capabilities  of  a  military 
aeroplane. 

Representations  were  made  by  the  Wright 
brothers  to  the  French  Government  in  the  year  1905 
—two  years  after  their  first  flights.  They  had 
improved  their  machine  considerably;  they  were 
now  ready  to  carry  a  passenger ;  and  they  wished  to 
sell  their  secret.  So  Captain  Ferber  was  instructed 
to  go  to  America  and  investigate  their  claims. 

The  Wrights  were  anxious  to  sell  their  secret  for 
a  lump  sum  of  money.  They  had  begun  their  ex- 
periments in  the  humblest  possible  way,  being  small 
cycle-makers  at  Dayton,  Ohio;  and  they  were  unable 
to  protect,  by  patents,  the  machine  which  they  had 
evolved  by  so  vast  an  amount  of  patient  work. 

Thus  they  sought  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
some  Government.  They  asked  for  a  guarantee 
that  their  machine  would  be  bought,  for  a  certain 
price,  were  it  to  perform  a  series  of  stipulated  flights. 
Their  position  was,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  a  somewhat 
awkward  one.     Even  a  brief  examination  of  their 


6        THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

aeroplane,   by  an  expert,   would  have  revealed  its 
principle. 

In  this  quandary,  they  were  led  to  approach  the 
French  Government.  They  chose  France  for  a 
very  good  reason.  Already,  as  has  been  indicated, 
this  country  was  keenly  alive  to  the  possibilities  of 
flying.  The  two  brothers  imagined,  therefore,  that 
they  would  be  able  to  make  their  best  bargain  with 
the  French  Government. 

The  practical  interest  which  the  French  authori- 
ties took  in  the  question  of  military  flying  was 
evidenced  by  their  action  when  they  received  a 
communication  from  the  Wright  brothers.  Although 
reports  of  the  Wrights'  experiments  had  been  greeted, 
in  Europe,  with  great  scepticism,  and  there  was 
reason,  in  view  of  the  failure  of  other  inventors,  to 
doubt  their  claims,  the  French  Government  at  once 
detailed  Captain  Ferber  to  make  the  long  journey 
to  Ohio,  so  as  to  go  into  the  matter  in  a  business- 
like way. 

Captain  Ferber,  w^ho  was  one  of  the  first  oflicers  in 
France  to  become  actively  interested  in  airmanship, 
duly  visited  America,  and  interviewed  the  Wright 
brothers.  They  could  not  show  him  their  machine. 
Had  they  done  so,  their  secret  would  have  been 
revealed.  Regarding  the  flights  which  they  had  made, 
up  to  this  time,  Captain  Ferber  had  to  rely,  for 
testimony,  upon  the  statements  of  certain  responsible 
men  living  in  Dayton,  who  had  witnessed  them. 

The  position,  so  far  as  he  was  concerned,  was 
rather  an  unsatisfactory  one.  It  was  like  buying  "  a 
pig  in  a  poke."  But  this  officer,  being  a  student  of 
character,  and  an  enthusiast  regarding  flight,  saw 
what  manner  of  men  these  two  brothers  were.     He 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR        7 

did  not  doubt  their  word,  nor  the  statements  of  those 
who  had  seen  them  fly.  So,  when  he  returned  to 
France,  he  recommended  his  Government  to  enter 
into  negotiations  with  the  Wrights,  and  buy  their 
invention  before  any  other  nation  took  steps  to 
secure  it. 

It  was  a  tribute  to  his  foresight  that  he  should 
have  done  this;  but,  for  the  time  being,  the  nego- 
tiations fell  through.  The  Wrights,  for  one  thing, 
wanted  a  very  considerable  sum  of  money ;  and  there 
was  difficulty,  also,  in  arranging  what  the  series  of 
tests  of  their  aeroplane  should  be.  Thus  it  was  that, 
after  many  communications  had  passed  between  the 
interested  parties,  the  matter  stood  in  abeyance. 

In  the  meantime,  however,  other  inventors  were 
striving  with  the  great  problem.  In  France,  in 
1906,  Santos  Dumont  effected  "hops"  with  a 
machine  like  an  exaggerated  box-kite ;  and  this  led 
the  way  to  the  remarkable  achievements  of  two 
particularly  clever  brothers,  Charles  and  Gabriel 
Voisin.  They  busied  themselves  with  a  biplane 
which,  at  the  end  of  1907,  they  asked  Henry  Far- 
man,  a  well-known  racing  motorist,  to  test  for  them. 

This  led  to  the  first  famous  flights  of  the  Voisin 
machine  at  the  military  parade-ground  of  Issy-les- 
Moulineaux,  outside  Paris.  France  went  wild  with 
enthusiasm  when  this  big,  clumsy  machine,  piloted 
by  the  quick,  agile  Farman,  succeeded  in  flying  for  a 
mile,  and  in  making  a  turn  while  in  the  air. 

The  Voisin  aeroplane  needed  to  run  along  the 
ground  for  quite  a  hundred  yards  before  it  could  gain 
sufficient  support  from  the  air  to  enable  it  to  rise. 
When  it  did  so,  it  was  only  just  able  to  skim  along 
above  the  ground.    Compared  with  present-day  aero- 


8        THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

planes,  it  was  an  unwieldly,  unsatisfactory  machine ; 
and,  to  make  matters  worse,  its  motor  became  over- 
heated after  only  a  minute  or  so's  running. 

As  a  machine  for  military  purposes,  it  would  have 
been  useless.  But  it  represented  a  definite  stage  in 
the  progress  of  aeroplaning.  From  this  machine  of 
the  Voisin  brothers,  which  Farman  first  flew,  de- 
veloped the  great  school  of  biplane  construction  in 
France. 

Also  experimenting  in  France,  at  the  same  time  as 
the  Voisin  brothers,  was  another  great  master  of 
flight — M.  Louis  Bleriot.  His  methods  were 
original.     He  pinned  his  faith  to  the  monoplane. 


n 


First  practical  flights — The  Wright  brothers;  the  Voisins; 
Farman — The    cross-Channel    flight. 

Hastening  our  review,  in  order  to  reach  matters  of 
more  definite  interest  from  the  military  point  of  view, 
we  find  that,  in  1908,  the  Wright  brothers  made  aerial 
history  by  a  series  of  magnificent  flights  which  were, 
however,  unfortunately  marred  by  a  tragedy. 

Coming  to  France,  Wilbur  Wright  flew  for  a 
couple  of  hours,  without  descending,  at  Le  Mans. 
At  about  the  same  time,  in  America,  Orville  Wright 
was  carrying  out  a  series  of  demonstrations  before 
the  military  authorities.  He  achieved  remarkable 
success,  particularly  from  a  war  point  of  view,  by 
carrying  a  passenger  in  his  machine  for  quite  a 
long  flight. 

Then,  when  taking  up  Lieutenant  Self  ridge,  of  the 


O   -1-1 

o    ., 


T3    c 


>^rt 


c  o 


si- 

o    . 


~  'E. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR        9 

American  army,  he  met  with  disaster.  One  of  the 
propellers  of  his  machine  broke ;  it  crashed  to 
the  ground  from  a  height  of  about  lOO  feet.  Lieu- 
tenant Self  ridge  was  killed,  being  the  first  victim  of 
the  aeroplane,  and  Orville  Wright  broke  his  thigh. 
The  accident,  as  may  be  imagined,  cast  a  gloom  over 
flying  in  America  for  a  long  time. 

Longer  flights  by  Henry  Farman,  on  an  improved 
Voisin  biplane,  were  also  to  be  noted  in  the  year 
1908  ;  and  thus  the  way  is  cleared  for  a  description  of 
the  wonders  achieved  in  1909,  when  it  may  be  said 
that  the  importance  of  the  aeroplane,  from  a  military 
point  of  view,  was  first  demonstrated,  and  the  atten- 
tion of  nations  seriously  directed  towards  the  possi- 
bilities of  this  new  "  arm." 

Early  in  the  summer  of  1909,  after  innumerable 
disappointments,  and  the  breaking-up  of  many  ex- 
perimental machines,  Bleriot  began  to  achieve 
success  with  a  simply-constructed  monoplane,  driven 
by  an  equally  simple  three-cylinder  petrol  motor; 
and,  at  the  same  time,  another  French  monoplane, 
the  Antoinette,  larger  than  Bleriot's,  and  having  an 
eight-cylinder  motor  developing  sixty  horse-powet, 
was  also  flying  surprisingly  well. 

It  was  in  July,  1909,  that  these  two  machines, 
representing  a  distinct  type,  when  compared  with 
the  biplane,  were  brought  down  to  the  French  coast 
at  Calais  with  the  intention  of  invading  England  by 
air,  and  winning  a  prize  of  ^1000  offered  by  the 
Daily  Mail,  Piloting  his  small  monoplane  was  M. 
Bleriot  himself,  while  the  Antoinette  was  flown  by 
Mr  Hubert  Latham,  an  airman  already  famed  for 
his  daring. 

The  method  of  Bleriot's  arrival  at  Calais  gave 


\ 


10      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

promise  of  the  eventual  utility  of  his  machine  from 
the  military  point  of  view.  The  two  wings  of  his 
monoplane  could  easily  be  detached.  They  were 
then  folded  on  either  side  of  the  body  of  the  machine ; 
and,  thus  dismantled,  it  could  be  placed  for  trans- 
port upon  an  ordinary  railway  truck. 

In  this  fashion  it  reached  Calais,  greatly  to  the 
surprise  of  those  who  had,  hitherto,  only  been 
familiar  with  the  huge  cases  needed  for  the  transport 
of  biplanes.  When  taken  from  the  railway  van,  the 
monoplane  was  tied  with  ropes  behind  a  motor-car, 
and  ran  upon  its  own  pneumatic-tyred  wheels  to  the 
shelter  prepared  for  it  near  the  sand-hills  of  Les 
Baraques,  a  mile  or  so  from  Calais. 

Bleriot,  as  history  records,  won  the  ;^iooo  prize  by 
flying  across  the  Channel  from  France  to  England, 
just  after  the  dawn  on  25th  July,  1909.  He  landed 
near  Dover  Castle,  after  a  flight  of  thirty-seven 
minutes.  Latham,  unfortunate  with  his  engine,  made 
two  attempts  at  the  crossing,  but  fell  into  the  sea  on 
both  occasions. 

Bleriot's  feat  made  a  deep  impression  upon  all 
thoughtful  men,  and  particularly  upon  the  military 
authorities  in  France.  If  such  a  flight  could  be 
achieved  with  a  small,  crude  machine,  what  might 
not  be  possible  with  a  perfected  apparatus?  This, 
naturally,  was  the  question  which  was  asked. 

In  the  next  important  demonstration  of  the  possi- 
bilities of  flight,  v/hich  was  made  at  the  Rheims  flying 
meeting,  held  in  August,  1909,  the  French  Govern- 
ment took  a  very  active  interest.  They  sent  special 
representatives  to  this  meeting — the  first  of  its  kind 
— to  study  the  various  types  of  flying  machines  which 
took  part  in  the  contests  organised.     As  a  further 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN  WAR       11 

instance  of  the  practical  ideas  already  being  displayed 
by  military  men  in  France,  it  may  be  mentioned  that 
one  of  the  competitors  at  this  memorable  flying  meet- 
ing was  the  French  officer  whose  work  has  previously 
been  mentioned — Captain  Ferber.  He  flew  a  Voisin 
biplane.  It  was  not,  unfortunately,  very  long  after 
the  Rheims  meeting  that  this  enthusiastic  military 
airman  met  with  his  death  at  Boulogne,  his  loss  being 
sincerely  mourned  by  the  French  Government.  His 
biplane  overturned  in  a  ditch,  and  he  was  killed  by 
the  heavy  motor,  which  was  torn  from  its  bed,  and 
fell  upon  him. 


HI 


Aeroplanes  at  Rheims,  1909 — Wright,  Voisin,  Farman, 
Bleriot,  Antoinette— The  Gnome  engine — First 
military  orders. 

Seeing  that  the  Rheims  meeting  of  1909  was  the 
first  occasion  upon  which  a  definite  military  inspec- 
tion of  aeroplanes  was  made,  it  should  be  interesting 
to  describe  the  machines  which  were  then  available. 
Let  us  take,  for  example,  the  Wright  biplane,  of 
which  we  have  previously  spoken.  This  machine, 
as  piloted  at  Rheims  by  Lefevre,  Tissandier,  and 
the  Comte  de  Lambert,  undoubtedly  proved  itself 
one  of  the  best  all-round  machines  then  in  existence. 

The  aeroplane  represented  the  usual  biplane 
form  of  building,  having  one  sustaining  plane  fixed 
above  another,  the  two  being  held  apart  by  wooden 
struts,  made  taut  by  cross-wiring. 

In  front  of  these  main-planes,  upon  outriggers,  was 
a  small  double-plane  elevator.     At  the  rear  of  the 


12       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

main-planes,  also  carried  upon  outriggers,  was  a 
double-plane  vertical  rudder.  The  engine  of  the 
machine,  set  upon  a  wooden  bed  on  the  lower  plane, 
actuated  two  wooden  propellers,  which — driven  by 
chains — revolved  in  opposite  directions  behind  the 
main-planes. 

The  pilot's  seat  was  on  the  front  edge  of  the  lower 
main-plane,  and  his  control  of  the  aeroplane,  when 
in  flight,  was  effected  by  means  of  two  levers.  One, 
moved  forward  and  backward,  actuated  the  elevating 
planes,  and  the  other  was  given  a  dual  motion. 
Moved  to  and  fro,  it  operated  the  rudder  of  the 
aeroplane.  Shifted  from  side  to  side,  it  warped  the 
rear  extremities  of  the  main-planes,  and  so  controlled 
the  lateral  stability  of  the  aeroplane. 

This  wing- warping  mechanism  was,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  one  of  the  salient  features  of  the  Wright  biplane. 
The  system  is  considered  to  be  the  most  efficacious 
method  of  combating  the  effect  of  wind-gusts  when 
an  aeroplane  is  in  flight. 

In  operation,  this  wing-warping  device  was  simple. 
When  the  airman  discovered  that  his  machine  was 
tilting  over  one  side,  owing  to  a  sudden  inequality 
in  wind  pressure,  he  quickly  warped  down  the  plane- 
ends  on  the  side  of  the  biplane  that  was  depressed. 
The  result  was  that  there  was  increased  wind- 
pressure  under  the  plane-ends  warped  down,  thus 
tending  to  force  the  machine  back  again  upon  an 
even  keel. 

The  pilot  who  distinguished  himself  greatly  at 
Rheims,  when  flying  the  Wright  biplane,  was 
Lefevre ;  but  this  daring  airman  was,  unfortunately, 
killed  shortly  afterwards  at  Juvisy,  when  testing  a 
new  machine.     At  Rheims  he  circled  in  the  air,  and 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       13 

effected  sharp  turns,  in  an  altogether  remarkable 
way,  demonstrating  an  absolutely  complete  control 
over  his  machine.  So  impressed  were  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  French  Government  by  the  per- 
formance of  the  Wright  biplane,  that  they  ordered 
several  machines  for  military  use.  This  represented 
their  first  definite  order  for  aeroplanes  for  war 
purposes. 

The  chief  drawback  of  the  Wright  biplane,  in 
comparison  with  other  machines  flown  at  this  time, 
was  that  it  needed  to  make  a  start  into  the  air  from  a 
launching  rail,  as  has  previously  been  mentioned. 

The  advantage  of  this  system  of  starting — in  which 
a  weight,  dropped  from  a  derrick,  gave  the  aero- 
plane its  initial  impetus  along  the  rail — ^was  that 
the  machine  could  be  fitted  with  a  lower-powered 
engine. 

But  the  disadvantages  were  obvious.  Were  an 
involuntary  descent  made  at  a  point  some  distance 
away  from  the  machine's  rail,  it  had  to  be  carted 
back  to  the  starting-point,  or  a  rail  and  derrick 
brought  to  the  place  where  it  lay.  However,  the 
French  Government  did  not  regard  any  aeroplanes 
at  this  time  as  representing  serviceable  war  weapons. 
They  took  the  wise  view  that  they  were  purely  in- 
structional craft,  upon  which  miHtary  airmen  could 
gain  experience,  and  so  fit  themselves  for  the  use  of 
the  more  perfect  machines  which  were  likely  to  be 
evolved  as  time  went  on. 

After  describing  the  Wright  biplane,  we  may  now 
consider  the  Voisin  machine.  This  aeroplane  repre- 
sented an  improvement  upon  the  type  first  piloted 
by  Farman  at  Issy-les-MouHneaux.  It  had  two 
main  supporting  planes,  Hke  those  of  the  Wright 


14      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

biplane,  fitted  one  above  another.  In  front  of  the 
main-planes  was  a  single  horizontal  elevating  plane. 
At  the  rear  of  the  biplane  was  a  large  cellular 
stabilising  tail,  made  up  of  horizontal  and  vertical 
planes,  and  resembling  a  box-kite.  In  the  centre  of 
this  cellular  tail  was  the  rudder,  a  single  vertical 
plane. 

Instead  of  adopting  a  wing-warping  device,  for 
maintaining  lateral  stability,  the  Voisin  brothers  fitted 
vertical  planes,  or  curtains  as  they  were  called,  be- 
tween their  main-planes.  These,  when  the  machine 
was  in  flight,  resisted  any  sideway  roll  and,  in 
conjunction  with  movements  of  the  rudder,  gave 
the  aeroplane  a  certain  amount  of  automatic 
stability. 

The  biplane  rested  upon  a  chassis  made  of  hollow 
metal  tubing.  It  had  pneumatic-tyred  bicycle  wheels, 
mounted  in  connection  with  heavy  springs,  to  resist 
the  shock  of  landing  after  a  flight.  Small  wheels 
bore  the  weight  of  the  tail  when  the  aeroplane  was 
running  along  the  ground. 

An  engine  of  sixty  horse-power,  fitted  upon  the 
lower  plane,  drove  a  two-bladed  metal  propeller, 
placed  behind  the  main-planes.  The  pilot,  seated 
midway  between  the  planes,  operated  a  wheel  Hke 
that  of  a  motor-car.  He  pushed  it  away  from  him, 
or  drew  it  back,  to  operate  the  elevating  plane,  and 
turned  it  sideways  to  actuate  the  rudder. 

This  machine  had  the  advantage  over  the  Wright 
biplane  that  it  was  not  dependent  upon  a  starting 
rail.  But,  in  general  comparison  with  the  Wright 
machine,  it  was  heavy  and  sluggish.  It  required  a 
long  run  before  it  would  lift  into  the  air,  and  its 
engine-power,   although  twice  that  of  the   Wright 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       16 

biplane,  was  only  just  sufficient  to  make  it  fly.  In 
a  side  wind,  owing  to  the  influence  which  the  gusts 
exerted  upon  the  vertical  panels  which  were  fitted 
between  the  main-planes,  it  made  an  appreciable 
amount  of  "  lee-way,"  which  rendered  steering 
difficult. 

Altogether,  regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of 
experts  to-day,  it  was  a  heavy,  awkward  machine. 
But  it  flew,  and  flew  steadily.  And  anything  that  flew, 
in  the  year  1909,  represented  a  triumph.  Several 
famous  airmen  were  piloting  the  Voisin  biplane  at 
the  Rheims  meeting,  notably  M.  Louis  Paulhan  and 
M.  Rougier. 

From  a  mihtary  aspect,  the  Voisin  biplane  had 
many  drawbacks.  It  was  not  at  all  portable;  it 
could  not  rise  quickly;  it  was  slow-flying.  But, 
with  the  very  laudable  intention  of  encouraging  such 
ardent  pioneers  as  the  Voisin  brothers,  the  French 
Government  gave  orders  for  certain  mihtary  machines 
of  this  type. 

Now  we  may  turn  to  what  was  undoubtedly  the 
most  successful  biplane  at  the  great  Rheims  carnival 
— that  designed  and  flown  by  Mr  Henry  Farman. 
This  famous  airman  had,  it  will  be  remembered,  first 
learned  to  fly  upon  a  Voisin  biplane.  After  piloting 
this  machine  in  1908,  he  turned  his  attention,  early 
in  1909,  to  the  design  of  a  biplane  which  should  be 
lighter  and  more  efficient. 

In  this  endeavour,  he  certainly  succeeded.  The 
biplane  which  he  first  flew  in  public  at  the  Rheims 
meeting  represented  a  distinct  step  forward  in  the 
development  of  this  type  of  machine.  In  general 
construction,  it  was  hghter  than  the  Voisin  machine, 
and  it  had  other  excellent  features  as  well.     Instead 


16       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

of  the  heavy,  cellular  tail,  as  fitted  to  the  Voisin 
biplane,  it  had  a  lightly-constructed  tail  made  up 
of  two  horizontal  planes,  with  a  vertical  rudder 
fitted  between  them.  In  front  of  the  main-planes, 
upon  light  wooden  outriggers,  was  placed  the  hori- 
zontal elevating  plane. 

One  of  the  features  of  this  machine,  was  its  method 
of  obtaining  lateral  stability.  Farman  recognised 
the  disadvantages  of  the  vertical  planes,  as  used  in 
the  Voisin  machine.  So  he  fitted  small  flaps,  or 
horizontal  planes,  at  the  rear  extremities  of  his  main- 
planes.  These  were  hinged  to  the  main-planes,  and 
were  termed  "  ailerons." 

Their  operation  produced  the  same  result  as  in 
the  application  of  the  wing-warping  device  of 
the  Wright  brothers.  When  the  biplane  tilted 
sideways  in  flight,  the  "  ailerons  "  were  drawn  down, 
by  means  of  controlling  wires,  on  the  side  that  was 
depressed.  The  air  pressure,  acting  upon  the 
surfaces  of  the  "  ailerons,"  forced  the  aeroplane  back 
upon  an  even  keel.  When  not  in  operation,  the 
"  ailerons  "  flew  out  straight  in  the  wind,  on  a  level 
with  the  main-planes. 

The  control  of  the  Farman  biplane  was  effected  by 
means  of  a  hand  and  foot  lever.  The  hand  lever, 
when  moved  forward  or  backward,  operated  the 
elevating  plane.  When  shifted  from  side  to  side, 
it  actuated  the  "ailerons."  The  pilot's  feet  rested 
upon  a  pivoted  bar,  which  he  swung  from  side  to 
side  to  move  the  rudder  of  the  machine. 

Another  constructional  feature  of  this  first  Farman 
biplane  was  notable.  This  was  the  landing  chassis. 
Appreciating  the  disadvantages  of  the  Wright 
launching    rail,    and    recognising   that    the    Voisin 


::/:??0"?I.J>^ 


THE  AEROPLANE   IN  WAR       17 

chassis   was    heavy,    Farman   aimed   at   something 
Hghter,  and  at  the  same  time  more  efficient. 

Again  he  succeeded.  He  devised  a  chassis  which 
was  a  combination  of  wooden  skids  and  bicycle 
wheels.  Below  his  biplane,  upon  wooden  uprights, 
were  fitted  two  long  wooden  skids.  On  either  side  of 
each  skid,  were  two  little  pneumatic-tyred  bicycle 
wheels,  connected  by  a  short  axle.  The  wheels 
were  held  :n  position  on  the  skid  by  stout  rubber 
bands,  which  passed  over  the  axle. 

Normally,  the  skids  were  raised  off  the  ground  by 
the  wheels,  upon  which  the  biplane  actually  ran. 
But,  in  the  case  of  a  rather  abrupt  descent,  the  chassis 
was  so  designed  that  the  wheels  were  forced  up 
against  their  rubber  bands,  thus  allowing  the  skids  of 
the  machine  to  come  into  contact  with  the  ground. 
Then,  when  the  force  of  the  shock  had  been 
absorbed,  the  wheels  came  into  play  again.  With 
this  biplane,  Farman  achieved  fine  flights  at  Rheims. 

Apart  from  its  constructional  excellence,  the 
biplane  was  fitted  with  a  motor  which  was  destined 
to  have  a  remarkable  influence  upon  the  develop- 
ment of  flying — and  upon  military  aviation  in 
particular.  This  was  the  seven-cyHnder,  revolving 
"  Gnome."  To-day,  the  application  of  this  wonder- 
ful engine  is  practically  universal.  In  August,  1909, 
it  was  regarded  quite  as  a  freak,  and  was  seen  for 
the  first  time  upon  Henry  Farman's  biplane. 

Up  to  the  time  when  this  motor  was  introduced, 
makers  had,  in  designing  aeroplane  engines,  followed 
very  largely  upon  motor-car  design,  constructing 
motors  with  fixed  cylinders,  either  upright,  or  in  "  V  ** 
shape,  and  with  their  parts  lightened  wherever  pos- 
sible.    Some  were  water-cooled;   others  air-cooled. 

B 


18       THE   AEROPLANE  IN   WAR 

But  with  both  systems,  and  particularly  with  the 
latter,  the  tendency — owing  to  the  high  speeds  at 
which  the  engines  had  to  turn — was  to  overheat, 
and  either  lose  power,  or  stop  altogether. 

The  specially-lightened  water-cooHng  systems 
which  were  devised  gave  a  great  deal  of  trouble; 
and,  in  the  case  of  air-cooled  engines,  it  was  usually 
found  almost  impossible  to  prevent  overheating, 
after  the  engines  had  been  running  for  ten  minutes 
or  a  quarter  of  an  hour. 

In  the  case  of  the  "  Gnome,"  the  designer  struck 
out  in  a  new  Hne.  Instead  of  making  his  cylinders 
fixed,  and  his  crank-shaft  revolving,  as  was  the 
method  with  other  engines,  he  set  his  seven  cylinders 
revolving  around  the  crank-shaft.  Petrol  and  oil  he 
fed  to  the  cylinders  by  way  of  the  stationary  hollow 
crank-shaft. 

The  internal  complications  of  this  engine,  in  the 
opinion  of  experts  who  first  saw  it,  were  such  that 
it  could  not  be  expected  to  achieve  reliability. 

But  it  did,  nevertheless ;  and  it  ran  so  well,  in  fact, 
that,  at  the  Rheims  meeting,  Henry  Farman  re- 
mained in  the  air,  while  using  it,  for  more  than  three 
hours,  and  won  the  prize  for  the  longest  flight. 

The  advantages  of  this  remarkable  engine  proved 
to  be  many.  In  the  first  instance,  its  method  of  con- 
struction enabled  it  to  be  built  remarkably  light ;  and 
the  fact  that  the  seven  cylinders  revolved,  generally 
at  a  speed  of  looo  revolutions  a  minute,  effectually 
disposed  of  cooHng  difficulties.  In  fact,  the  engine 
automatically  cooled  itself;  and  its  fly-wheel  effect, 
as  it  flew  round,  gave  a  smooth,  even  thrust  to  the 
propeller. 

From  the  very  day  of  its  first  introduction,  the 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN  WAR       19 

"  Gnome  "  motor  gained  overwhelming  success.  It 
represented  a  piece  of  mechanism  made  specially  for 
the  work  in  hand,  and  not  a  motor-car  engine 
adapted  to  aerial  purposes.  This  fact  was  the  secret 
of  its  success. 

As  rapidly  as  they  could  acquire  them,  other  aero- 
plane makers  fitted  "  Gnomes  "  to  their  machines. 
It  proved  all-conquering.  Fixed-cylinder  engines 
did  not  languish  completely,  however.  Some  of 
them  were  steadily  improved,  and  performed  rehable 
work.  But  the  "  Gnome  "  was  then,  and  is  now, 
regarded  as  the  aeroplane  engine. 

The  Farman  biplane,  being  so  good  a  machine  in 
itself,  and  being  equipped,  in  addition,  with  so  excel- 
lent a  motor,  naturally  aroused  keen  mihtary  interest ; 
and  it  was  not  long  before  the  inventor  received 
Government  orders  for  his  machine.  At  this  time, 
before  the  monoplane  had  assumed  the  commanding 
position  which  it  now  holds,  the  Farman  biplane 
certainly  represented  the  premier  aeroplane  of  the 
day. 

Two  more  machines,  which  were  flown  at  the  first 
carnival  of  flight  at  Rheims,  merit  careful  descrip- 
tion. These  were  the  Bleriot  and  Antoinette  mono- 
planes. Bleriot's  machine,  of  the  type  upon  which 
he  crossed  the  Channel,  was  especially  interesting. 

Its  simplicity  was,  as  has  been  stated,  its  great 
recommendation.  Upon  either  side  of  a  tubular 
body,  built  up  of  light  woodwork,  and  partly  covered 
in  with  fabric,  were  the  two  supporting  planes,  out- 
stretched like  the  wings  of  a  bird,  and  supported  by 
wires,  above  and  below. 

In  the  front  of  the  body  was  the  engine,  which 
developed  about  twenty-five  horse-power,  and  had 


20       THE   AEROPLANE   IN  WAR 

three  air-cooled  cylinders.  At  the  rear  extremity  of 
the  body,  which  projected  some  little  distance  behind 
the  lifting  planes,  was  a  small  stabilising  and  weight- 
carrying  plane,  the  end  portions  of  which,  on  either 
side,  were  capable  of  being  moved  up  and  down. 
Behind  this  plane,  fitted  to  the  end  of  the  body,  was 
a  small  vertical  rudder. 

The  pilot  sat  in  the  body  of  the  machine,  a  little 
behind  the  engine,  and  on  a  level  with  the  rear 
extremities  of  his  wings.  His  method  of  control 
was  extremely  simple.  Rising  up  between  his  knees 
was  a  metal  cloche,  or  lever.  This  he  shifted  for- 
ward or  backward  to  make  his  machine  rise  or  fall, 
the  movement  of  the  lever  actuating  the  extremities 
of  the  rear  stabiHsing  plane. 

For  maintaining  the  lateral  stability  of  the  mono- 
plane, he  moved  the  same  lever  from  side  to  side. 
This  action  drew  down,  or  warped,  the  rear  portion 
of  the  supporting  planes — effecting  the  same  action, 
in  fact,  as  produced  in  the  case  of  the  Wright  biplane. 
When  wishing  to  make  a  turn,  the  pilot  pushed  from 
side  to  side  a  bar  upon  which  his  feet  rested.  This 
moved  the  rudder  at  the  rear  of  the  body. 

Already,  as  can  be  seen,  the  control  of  an  aero- 
plane in  flight  had  become  more  or  less  standardised. 
One  lever  was  usually  employed  for  elevating  and 
lowering  the  machine,  and  also  for  controlling  lateral 
movements.  Steering  was  effected,  as  a  rule,  by 
movements  of  the  pilot's  feet. 

Another  machine,  representing  these  first  types, 
which  it  will  be  necessary  to  describe,  is  the 
Antoinette  monoplane.  This  machine  had,  and  has 
still,  many  original  features.  It  was,  to  begin  with, 
a  very  ambitiously-designed  machine.     It  had  very 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       21 

large  and  strongly-built  wings.  These  were  set  at 
a  dihedral  angle,  so  as  to  increase  the  machine's 
stability.  The  engine,  developing  sixty  horse-power, 
was  fixed  in  the  bow.  The  body  of  the  machine, 
which  was  appreciably  longer  than  that  of  the  Bleriot 
monoplane,  ended  in  fixed  horizontal  and  vertical 
planes,  or  "  fins,"  rather  resembling  the  feathering 
of  an  arrow.  Hinged  horizontal  planes,  at  the  ex- 
tremity of  the  tail,  provided  means  for  elevating  or 
lowering  the  machine.  Vertical  rudders  were  also 
fitted. 

The  controlling  mechanism  was  original.  On 
either  side  of  the  pilot,  as  he  sat  well  back  in  the  body 
of  the  monoplane,  was  a  wheel.  These  wheels  he 
turned  when  he  wished  to  rise  or  descend,  or  correct 
the  lateral  stability  of  the  monoplane. 

By  means  of  this  wheel  control,  which  locked  the 
planes  in  any  desired  position,  a  very  fine  adjustment 
was  possible.  But  the  manipulation  of  the  wheels, 
with  which  separate  movements  had  to  be  made  with 
each  hand,  was  declared  by  many  airmen  to  be  diffi- 
cult to  learn.  On  the  first  of  the  Antoinette  machines, 
it  should  be  mentioned,  "  ailerons,"  or  balancing  flaps, 
were  used  to  control  lateral  stability.  Afterwards, 
however,  wing-warping  was  adopted,  and  adhered  to. 

Such  were  the  first  aeroplanes,  as  seen  at  Rheims 
in  the  year  1909.  Other  more  experimental 
machines  there  were,  too,  which  did  not  figure 
prominently  at  the  time,  but  which  were  destined 
to  play  a  prominent  part  in  future  work.  In  this 
regard  should  be  mentioned  the  R.E.P.  monoplane, 
designed  and  built  by  M.  Esnault  Pelterie,  and  the 
Breguet  biplane,  designed,  built,  and  flown  by  M. 
Louis  Breguet. 


22      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 


IV 

The  human  factor — Growing  skill  of  airmen — Feats  of 
1910,  as  compared  with  those  of  1909 — Cross-country 
flying. 

What  the  aeroplanes  which  we  have  been 
describing  could  not  do  was  to  combat  a  wind.  No 
flight  was  essayed,  indeed,  unless  weather  condi- 
tions were  quite  favourable.  A  notable  exception 
must,  however,  be  made  in  the  favour  of  the 
Antoinette  monoplane.  This  aircraft,  owing  to 
its  weight  and  stability,  and  the  skilful  and  daring 
handling  of  Mr  Latham  was,  on  several  occasions 
in  1909,  and  notably  at  the  Blackpool  flying  meet- 
ing, able  to  remain  aloft  in  very  high  and  gusty 
winds. 

Apart  from  the  question  of  wind-flying,  which  was, 
of  course,  all-important,  there  were  grave  structural 
drawbacks  in  connection  with  many  of  these  early 
machines.  Some  were  too  light;  others  too  heavy. 
Save  with  those  upon  which  the  "  Gnome  "  engine 
was  fitted,  there  was  almost  constant  engine  trouble. 

Above  all,  however,  the  human  factor  entered  into 
the  question.  Men  were  learning  to  fly.  Apart 
from  any  consideration  of  the  good  or  bad  points  of 
their  machines,  they  were  invading  a  new  element. 
As  one  shrewd  observer,  at  this  time,  remarked: 
"  The  men  who  fly  now  are  like  those  who  first 
ventured  upon  the  sea  in  frail  cockle-shells.  They 
tremble  at  their  own  daring." 

More  might  have  been  aceompHshed  in  1909, 
in   fact,    had    men    possessed   greater    confidence. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       23 

Take,  for  example,  the  attempts  which  were  made, 
at  the  Rheims  meeting,  to  win  the  altitude  prize. 
To  the  amazement  of  spectators,  one  pilot  rose 
until  he  flew  slightly  more  than  500  feet  high. 
This  feat  was,  in  1909,  considered  a  marvellous  one. 
In  191 1,  only  two  years  later,  a  man  rose  to  an 
altitude  of  nearly  two-and-a-half  miles !  The  heights 
attained  in  1909  could,  indeed,  have  been  appreci- 
ably increased  had  men  possessed  the  necessary 
confidence  in  themselves,  and  in  their  machines,  to 
force  them  higher. 

But,  in  these  pioneer  days,  a  height  of  1 50  feet  or 
200  feet  from  the  ground  was  considered  quite  an 
appreciable  altitude.  Nowadays,  when  carrying  out 
a  long  cross-country  flight,  an  airman  will  fly  several 
thousand  feet  high.  Thus  it  can  be  seen  what  defi- 
nite progress  has  been  made  in  this  aspect  of  flying 
alone. 

High-flying  has  considerable  importance.  The 
airman  who  does  not  soar  high,  when  going  across 
country,  meets  the  worst  of  whatever  wind  is  blowing. 
It  eddies  from  hill-tops,  and  around  woods.  The 
higher  he  flies,  therefore,  the  steadier  the  wind  blows, 
because  it  is  unaffected  by  any  inequalities  of  the 
ground.  This  is  why  the  great  cross-country  flyers 
invariably  ascend  to  a  considerable  altitude. 

In  the  year  1909,  it  may  truly  be  said,  men  were 
really  learning  to  fly.  Their  machines  were  crude, 
and  they  were  invading  a  new  element.  Therefore 
they  made  comparatively  short  flights,  and  confined 
nearly  all  their  operations  to  aerodromes,  where 
there  was  always  a  smooth  place  of  descent  below 
them,  should  the  failure  of  their  engines  compel  a 
hasty  landing. 


24       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

But,  in  1 910,  a  new  and  more  daring  spirit  de- 
veloped. With  growing  confidence,  airmen  soared 
higher  and  higher.  Breezes  no  longer  made  them 
hasten  to  descend;  and,  with  this  new  spirit  of 
adventure,  came  the  desire  for  cross-country  flying, 
instead  of  monotonous  circling  round  the  aerodrome. 

With  the  commencement  of  long  flights  across 
country  from  point  to  point,  came  the  first  practical 
opportunity  for  applying  the  aeroplane  to  military 
reconnoitring  work.  The  first  cross-country  flights 
marked,  indeed,  a  very  definite  stage  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  aeroplane;  and  it  was  in  19 10  that  the 
possibilities  of  the  flying  machine,  in  this  regard, 
were  demonstrated,  on  a  convincing  scale,  by 
such  aerial  contests  as  the  flight  from  London  to 
Manchester,  and  the  Circuit  de  L'Est  in  France — the 
first  taking  place  early  in  the  flying  season  of  19 10, 
and  the  latter  towards  its  end. 

Two  machines  had,  by  this  time,  emerged  as 
representing  the  best  of  their  type.  One  was 
the  Farman  biplane,  with  the  invincible  "  Gnome  " 
motor;  the  other  was  the  Bleriot  monoplane,  now 
also  equipped  with  the  "  Gnome."  So  far  as  dis- 
tinction can  be  made,  the  Farman  machine  stood 
for  ease  of  manipulation  and  general  "  air-worthi- 
ness " ;  while  the  Bleriot  represented  the  develop- 
ment of  a  small,  portable,  high-speed  machine. 

It  was  on  the  Farman  biplane  that  M.  Louis 
Paulhan  flew,  with  one  halt,  the  183-miles  aerial 
journey  from  London  to  Manchester;  and  Mr 
Grahame-White  (one  of  the  joint  authors  of  this 
book),  who  also  piloted  a  Farman,  had  the  dis- 
tinction of  competing  against  him  in  what  is  now 
regarded  as  an  historic  contest. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       25 

In  the  Circuit  de  L*Est  in  France,  Leblanc,  the 
winner,  flew  some  400  miles  on  his  Bleriot  mono- 
plane, passing  over  all  sorts  of  country,  and  finding 
his  way  accurately  from  point  to  point  by  means  of 
his  map  and  a  special  compass.  He  made  frequent 
landings,  without  damaging  his  machine,  and 
demonstrated  its  reliability  in  a  most  convincing 
way. 

One  question  naturally  arises,  in  any  consideration 
of  such  flights  as  these,  seeing  that  they  were  so 
greatly  superior  to  anything  that  had  been  done  in 
1909.  Had  the  aeroplanes  which  these  pilots  used 
been  improved  to  any  remarlTable  extent?  In  reply, 
it  is  certainly  accurate  to  say  that  they  had  not. 
The  "  Gnome  "  engines  with  which  they  were  fitted 
had,  it  is  true,  been  strengthened  in  small  ways, 
and  perfected  in  the  manufacture  of  certain  dehcate 
parts,  the  result  being  an  even  greater  reliability  in 
running  than  had  first  been  attained. 

As  regards  the  aeroplanes,  they  were,  in  essentials, 
the  same  which  had  been  flown  in  1909.  Their 
controlling  mechanism  was,  for  instance,  unaltered. 
Their  method  of  construction  was  practically  the 
same,  although  experience  had  taught  manufacturers 
the  need  of  strengthening  certain  parts.  Landing 
devices  had  been  slightly  improved,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  everyday  wear. 

Although  aeroplanes  and  engines  had  both  been 
improved  a  Httle,  neither  had  been  altered  sufficiently 
to  account  for  such  a  vast  stride  forward  as  was  made 
in  1 9 10.  It  was  not  to  the  machines,  indeed,  so 
much  as  to  the  men,  that  this  striking  progress 
was  due. 

Practice  had  begun  to  make  perfect.     Pilots  now 


26       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

felt  more  comfortable  when  they  were  in  the  air. 
They  had  growing  confidence  in  their  aeroplanes. 
They  had  learned  how  to  maintain  stability  when 
assailed  by  wind-gusts.  Thus,  they  were  ready  to 
attempt  far  more  ambitious  flights. 


SECOND    SECTION 

FIRST  EXPERIMENTS  WITH  AEROPLANES  IN  THE  FRENCH 
AUTUMN  MANOEUVRES,    I9IO. 


The   historic   Picardy    tests — First    official    report   upon 
movements  of  troops,  as  gleaned  by  aeroplane. 

After  these  introductory  notes,  incentionally  brief, 
we  are  led  to  a  consideration  of  the  first  practical 
tests  to  which  aeroplanes  were  put,  so  far  as  their 
military  use  is  concerned. 

During  the  summer  of  19 10,  the  French  authorities 
were  instructing  officers  in  the  handling  of  machines. 
They  had  purchased  several  Voisin,  Wright,  and 
Farman  biplanes,  and  possessed  also  a  few  mono- 
planes, including  Bleriots  and  Antoinettes. 

For  the  autumn  army  manoeuvres  of  19 10,  which 
were  due  to  take  place  in  Picardy,  it  was  decided  to 
make  as  complete  a  test  as  possible  of  the  value  of 
the  aeroplane  as  a  scout  in  time  of  war.  Ten  or 
fifteen  machines  were  requisitioned  for  the  experi- 
ments, some  being  stationed  with  each  of  the 
manoeuvring  forces. 

To  augment  the  mihtary  pilots,  several  civilian 
airmen  readily  gave  their  services,  notably  Mr 
Hubert  Latham  with  his  Antoinette,  and  M.  Louis 
Paulhan,  flying  a  Farman. 

27 


28       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

Although  this  was  the  first  time  aeroplanes  had 
been  used  in  mimic  warfare,  and  although  the  airmen 
themselves,  and  the  military  authorities,  were  natur- 
ally unacquainted  with  the  best  methods  of  utiHsing 
the  new  "  arm,"  astonishing  results  were  neverthe- 
less obtained. 

Two  French  officers.  Lieutenant  Sido  and  Adju- 
tant Menard,  were  highly  successful  in  their  work. 
This  was  due  to  the  fact  they  had  gone  through  a 
careful  course  of  training  and  were,  in  consequence, 
familiar  with  the  task  of  compiling  precise  and  in- 
forming reports  of  all  that  they  saw  when  upon  a 
reconnoitring  flight. 

Lieutenant  Sido  acted  as  observer  upon  the 
Farman  biplane  which  they  were  using,  and  Adjutant 
Menard  undertook  the  work  of  pilot.  The  former 
carried  maps  with  him,  and  made  frequent  notes  as 
the  machine  flew  from  point  to  point. 

The  value  of  the  work  these  two  officers  were  able 
to  perform,  is  best  indicated  by  setting  forth  the  actual 
result  of  two  of  their  reconnoitring  flights.  On  the 
first  occasion,  acting  under  definite  instructions,  they 
left  a  place  named  Poix  at  6  a.m.,  and  flew  over  a 
sixty-kilometre  course,  being  an  hour  and  five  minutes 
in  the  air,  before  returning  to  their  starting-point. 

This  is  the  form  in  which  they  presented  their 
report  to  Headquarters: — 

6.5  A.M. — At  Thieuloy,  three  squadrons  of 
chasseurs-a-cheval,  hidden  behind  the 
southern  edge  of  the  village  on  the 
road  from  Thieuloy  to  St  Maur. 

6.30  A.M. — At  Feuquieres,  a  brigade  of  in- 
fantry on  the  march  eastward  on  the 


THE  AEROPLANE   IN  WAR       29 

road  from  Feuquieres  to  Brombos. 
Head  of  main  body  just  leaving 
Feuquieres.  Six  batteries  of  artillery 
parked  south  of  Feuquieres. 

6.32  A.M. — At  point  1800  metres  north  of 
Feuquieres,  two  companies  on  outpost, 
one  facing  north  and  the  other  north- 
east, astride  the  Feuquieres-Sarcus 
road.  One  company  has  dug  rifle-pits 
to  the  west,  and  the  other  company 
section  trenches  to  the  east  of  the  road. 
A  Bleriot  monoplane  has  just  landed 
behind  the  company  west  of  the  road. 
We  followed  its  flight  for  three 
minutes. 

6.40  A.M. — Agneres — A  company  in  column 
of  route  marching  from  Agneres 
towards  Mereaucourt  along  the  Saint 
Martin-de-Ponsis  ravine. 

The  completeness  and  detail  of  this  statement 
certainly  surprised  the  officers  who  received  it.  No 
one,  save  a  well-trained  military  observer,  could 
have  presented  such  a  report.  Its  value  was  self- 
evident.  It  revealed,  indeed,  in  a  manner  that 
was  undeniable,  the  extremely  useful  work  which 
could  be  done,  in  time  of  war,  by  a  well-handled 
scouting  aeroplane. 

II 

Second  conclusive  test — Detecting  an  army  in  retreat — 
France's  determination  to  possess  an  air-fleet. 

On  another  early-morning  flight,  during  these 
same    Picardy    manoeuvres,    Lieutenant    Sido   and 


30       THE   AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

Adjutant  Menard  made  a  second  important  aerial 
reconnaissance,  surveying  a  specified  tract  of  country 
occupied  by  the  "  enemy." 

This  was  how  they  presented  their  report: — 

5.56  A.M. — At  Halloy,  a  cycHst  company. 

5.59  A.M. — Thieuloy — Sixteen  squadrons  of 
cavalry  and  six  batteries  at  the  south- 
west entrance  to  the  village. 

6.5  A.M. — South-west  of  Rothois — At  the 
north  point  of  Malmifet  wood,  a 
company  and  two  batteries  of  artillery 
on  the  march  towards  MarseiUe-le- 
Petit. 

6.7  A.M. — Haute-Epine — Northern  entrance 
to  the  village,  one  company  of  in- 
fantry to  the  right  and  one  to  the  left 
of  the  road.  One  company  at  point 
188.  One  company  in  the  village  of 
Haute-Epine. 

6.9  A.M. — At  the  cross-road  to  Lihus,  a 
squadron  of  dragoons  concealed  be- 
hind the  edge  of  the  wood. 

6.14  A.M. — On  the  road  Cievecoeur-Marseille 
south  of  Lihus,  a  squadron  on  the 
march  towards  Marseille-le-Petit,  and 
a  troop  in  the  village  of  Lihus. 

6.16  A.M. — On  the  Lihus-Potangy  road,  a 
squadron  and  two  machine-guns 
marching  towards  Marseille-le-Petit. 

6.19  A.M. — South-west  entrance  to  Cieve- 
coeur,  three  regiments  of  cavalry, 
including  cuirassiers,  and  six  batteries 
of  artillery,  in  assembly  formation. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       31 

"  The  value  of  these  two  reports,"  declared  one  of 
the  chief  French  miHtary  experts,  "  cannot  be  over- 
estimated. Each  one  exposed  the  dispositions  of 
the  enemy,  and  the  information  was  obtained  in  a 
remarkably  short  space  of  time.'* 

As  regards  the  second  report  of  the  two  air- 
scouts,  it  provided  one  remarkable  instance  of  the 
practical  value  of  the  aeroplane  in  time  of  war.  Upon 
the  night  before  the  airmen  carried  out  their  recon- 
naissance, the  troops  they  were  observing  had  been 
heavily  attacked,  and  the  Commander-in-Chief  for 
whom  they  were  acting  was  particularly  anxious  to 
know  whether  his  enemy  intended  to  hold  its  ground, 
or  was  about  to  fall  back. 

The  aerial  report,  when  received,  threw  a  clear 
light  upon  this  point.  Mainly  cavalry  and  rear- 
guards had  been  detected  during  the  flight.  It  was 
obvious,  therefore,  that  the  enemy  was  in  retreat. 
Such  results  as  these  convinced  the  military  experts 
who  were  studying  the  manoeuvres  that  the  future  of 
the  aeroplane,  at  any  rate  from  the  reconnoitring 
point  of  view,  was  practically  assured. 

For  the  splendid  work  which  he  had  accomplished, 
Lieutenant  Sido  received  promotion,  and  his  pilot, 
Adjutant  Menard,  was  presented  with  the  Cross  of 
the  Legion  of  Honour.  Lieutenant  Sido,  explaining 
afterwards  how  he  succeeded  in  setting  out  such 
terse  and  informing  reports,  made  several  interest- 
ing observations  regarding  the  work  of  a  military 
observer. 

At  first,  he  said,  the  man  who  attempted  aerial 
scouting  could  not  distinguish  things  below  him  with 
sufficient  clearness.  He  himself  had  found  that 
quite  a  number  of  flights  were  necessary  before  he 


32      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

could  make  anything  like  satisfactory  or  accurate 
observations.  But  practice,  he  added,  was  every- 
thing. Granted  plenty  of  this,  and  sharp  eyesight, 
he  considered  that  an  aerial  observer  should  make 
few  mistakes  in  reporting  what  he  saw  when  in  an 
aeroplane. 

A  military  correspondent  of  The  Times,  who  went 
through  these  manoeuvres  in  Picardy,  and  thus  had 
ample  opportunity  of  studying  the  work  of  the  air- 
scouts,  declared  afterwards :  "  In  my  belief  the  aero- 
plane, given  a  trained  pilot,  and  a  skilled  observer, 
must  revolutionise  the  whole  service  of  reconnais- 
sance."   No  statement  could  be  more  definite. 

This,  as  has  been  said,  was  the  first  practical 
revelation  of  what  an  air-scout  might  accomplish  in 
time  of  war.  France  was  not  slow  to  profit  by  the 
lesson.  Without  delay,  she  began  to  create  an  efficient 
aeroplane  fleet.  If  feats  such  as  those  recorded  in  the 
Picardy  manoeuvres  could  be  carried  out  with  a  few 
aeroplanes,  what  could  not  be  achieved  with  highly- 
organised  squadrons  of  machines?  This,  in  effect, 
was  the  question  which  France  asked  herself. 


THIRD    SECTION 


THE     GROWING     AIR-FLEETS     OF     FOREIGN     NATIONS 


I 

Activity  in  France — Two  hundred  machines  at  the  end  of 
191 1 ;  a  thousand  promised  by  the  year  1914. 

Practically  all  leading  nations,  with  the  exception 
of  Great  Britain,  are  now  equipping  themselves,  on 
an  adequate  scale,  with  the  war  aeroplane. 

At  the  time  of  the  autumn  manoeuvres  in  19 10, 
France  possessed  about  a  dozen  aeroplanes.  But 
she  soon  increased  this  number,  being  full  of 
enthusiasm,  and  determined  upon  a  strong  aerial 
policy. 

Thus,  an  official  report,  which  was  presented  at 
the  end  of  19 10,  showed  that  the  French  authorities 
had  increased  their  fleet  of  machines,  in  two  or  three 
months,  from  a  dozen  to  thirty-two.  The  list  of  the 
French  war  aeroplanes  at  this  time  was,  it  is  interest- 
ing to  note,  made  up  as  follows : — 


Wright  biplanes 
Bleriot  monoplanes  ... 
H.   Farman  biplanes 
M.   Farman  biplanes 
Breguet  biplanes 
Sommer  biplanes 
Antoinette  monoplanes 
33 


5 

4 

II 

4 
2 

4 
2 


84       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 


To  pilot  these  thirty-two  aeroplanes,  there  were, 
at  this  time,  thirty-four  fully-qualified  military  air- 
men. 

The  activity  which  prevailed,  at  the  end  of  1910, 
among  the  aeroplane  manufacturers  in  France,  is 
revealed  in  the  report  of  one  well-known  maker,  Mr 
Henry  Farman. 

He  stated,  on  6th  December,  1910,  that  he  had 
received  orders  for  military  machines  as  follows : — 


French  Government 

..     35 

aeroplanes 

Russian 

..     20 

»i 

Spanish 
Italian 

•  3 
2 

i} 
ft 

Belgian 

Japanese 

British 

I 
I 
I 

The  commanding  position  of  France,  in  this  one 
list,  as  compared  with  the  single  order  of  Great 
Britain,  forms  an  illustration  of  the  attitude  of  the 
two  countries,  at  this  time,  towards  military  air- 
manship. 

At  M.  Bleriot's  flying  school  at  Pau,  early  in 
February,  191 1,  the  French  Government  had  more 
than  twenty  officers  learning  to  become  airmen.  No 
more  striking  indication  could  be  found  of  the  deter- 
mination of  this  country  to  be  in  the  forefront  in 
aviation. 

Early  in  the  summer  of  191 1,  the  French  War 
Minister  authorised  the  purchase  of  close  upon  a 
hundred  and  fifty  aeroplanes.  Of  these  machines 
nearly  a  hundred  were,  at  this  time,  actually  in  the 
possession  of  the  military  authorities.  Among  the 
orders  placed  with  French  manufacturers  was  one 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       35 

for  eighty  monoplanes.  This  was  secured  by  M. 
Louis  Bleriot.  Two  types  of  machine  were  r^e- 
sented  in  this  large  commission,  one  being  a  two- 
seated  machine,  and  the  other  a  single-seated  craft, 
capable  of  high  speed. 

To  Mr  Henry  Farman,  whose  biplane  had  per- 
formed so  meritoriously  in  the  1910  Picardy 
manoeuvres,  an  order  was  placed  for  forty  war 
machines ;  and  the  French  Government's  large  order 
was  made  up  of  a  number  of  other  machines. 

With  her  energetic  method  of  sending  officers  in 
squads  to  learn  flying  at  the  various  schools,  it  was 
not  long  before  France  found  herself  in  posses- 
sion of  a  corps  of  at  least  a  hundred  fuUy-quaHfied 
airmen.  These,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  she  possessed 
quite  early  in  the  summer  of  191 1. 

The  business-like  way  in  which  she  set  herself  the 
task  of  becoming  the  premier  nation  in  the  develop- 
ment of  flying  was  especially  notable  at  this  time. 
Military  commissions  were  appointed  to  visit  the 
various  aerodromes  throughout  France,  and  inspect 
all  aeroplanes  built.  In  the  case  where  a  machine 
had  been  purchased,  one  of  these  military  com- 
missions came  to  the  flying  ground  on  a  specified 
date,  and  passed  the  aircraft  through  a  series  of 
tests,  "^hese  experiments  had  to  be  carried  out  by 
the  consuuctor  of  the  aeroplane  before  the  Govern- 
ment would  take  delivery  of  his  machine. 

One  instance  of  this  excdlent  policy  is  sufficient. 
In  April,  191 1,  a  military  commission  of  several 
officers  made  a  journey  to  the  Brayelle  aerodrome. 
Here,  awaiting  their  inspection,  were  a  couple  of 
Breguet  biplanes  which  the  French  authorities  had 
decided  to  buy. 


36       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

After  the  officers  had  examined  the  machines,  the 
professional  pilots  of  the  flying  school  carried  out 
a  series  of  manoeuvres.  The  officers  noted,  for 
example,  how  long  it  took  a  machine  to  ascend 
to  an  altitude  of  looo  feet.  A  specified  load  had  to 
be  lifted  by  each  aeroplane.  It  was  also  necessary 
that  it  should  attain  a  stipulated  speed.  When  these 
conditions  were  fulfilled,  and  not  before,  the  officers 
formally  took  over  the  aeroplanes  on  behalf  of  their 
Government. 

With  what  determination  this  task  of  increasing  the 
aerial  armament  of  France  was  pressed  forward  may 
be  gauged  by  the  work  of  one  of  these  military  com- 
missions, which  visited  the  Pau  aerodrome  during  the 
summer  of  191 1.  No  fewer  than  eight  two-seated 
war  monoplanes  v/ere  waiting  for  their  inspection; 
and  all  eight  machines  were  tested  and  passed  in 
the  course  of  a  day's  flying. 

The  spirit  which  animated  France,  in  regard  to 
this  question  of  military  aviation,  is  evidenced  by 
the  words  of  M.  Clementel,  when  placing  an  official 
report  before  the  French  Chamber.  He  declared: 
"  The  aeroplane  has  proved  that  it  is  a  marvellous 
instrument  of  war — a  new  arm  in  our  military 
organisation.  We  now  possess  an  incontestable 
superiority  in  aviation,  and  this  we  hope  to  continue 
for  a  long  period.  We  must  maintain  this  advance. 
The  sacrifices  imposed  on  us  in  this  matter  are  as 
useful  as  they  are  necessary." 

This,  indeed,  supplies  the  keynote  to  the  enthu- 
siasm of  the  French  for  war  aeroplanes.  By  the  end 
of  the  year  191 1  the  War  Minister  possessed  a  fleet 
of  more  than  200  war  aeroplanes  and  a  corps  of  officers 
fully  trained  to  pilot  them,  and  act  as  observers. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       37 

After  French  tests  of  military  aeroplanes  in 
October,  191 1 — which  will  be  described  in  the  next 
section — there  was  a  generous  distribution  of  orders 
for  machines. 

Early  in  191 2,  the  French  military  authorities  had 
234  war  aeroplanes  at  their  disposal;  and  the  finan- 
cial grant  for  the  year  placed  ^920,000  for  the  pur- 
poses of  military  flying.  In  addition,  there  was  a 
scheme  on  foot  to  augment  the  number  of  war 
machines.  By  the  aid  of  pubHc  subscription  this, 
quite  soon,  approached  a  sum  of  ^100,000. 

The  latest  plan  of  the  French  Government  is  to 
form  a  large  regiment  of  military  airmen,  and  in  this 
connection  more  than  300  new  aeroplanes  have  been 
ordered  for  delivery  before  the  end  of  191 2.  Sheds, 
to  accommodate  machines,  are  springing  up  all  over 
the  country.  Quite  early  in  191 2,  nearly  300  officers 
had  obtained  pilot's  certificates  from  the  French 
Aero  Club. 

So  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  the  military  aero- 
planes in  France  will  number  appreciably  more  than 
400  at  the  end  of  this  year ;  and  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that,  in  time  of  war,  this  country  could  call 
upon  nearly  a  thousand  privately-owned  machines. 

The  policy  in  France  may  be  summarised  in  the 
statement  that  the  Government  aim  to  create  an 
air-fleet  of  at  least  1000  machines  by  the  end  of  the 
year  19 14.  In  191 7,  it  is  anticipated,  the  French 
air-fleet  will  approach,  in  numbers,  several  thousand 
machines.  Eventualities,  of  course,  govern  such 
a  programme.  It  may,  for  example — should  any 
remarkable  development  of  aviation  take  place — be 
appreciably  augmented. 

What  the  limit  of  utility  of  an  air-fleet  may  be, 


33       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

only  the  practical  work  of  war  will  show.  For  recon- 
noitring, it  is  clear  that  very  large  squadrons  of 
machines,  divided  amongst  the  various  sections  of  an 
army,  will  be  employed. 

Then  there  is  the  question  of  using  aeroplanes  for 
dispatch-carrying,  and  for  directing  artillery  fire,  to 
say  nothing  of  their  probable  employment  for  destruc- 
tive work,  and  perhaps  in  the  transport  of  troops. 

Another  crucial  point  must  also  be  borne  in  mind, 
to  which  detailed  reference  will  be  made  later.  If, 
as  is  practically  certain,  a  conflict  takes  place  between 
the  aerial  forces  of  two  armies,  it  is  likely  to  be  the 
larger  of  two  fleets  of  machines — other  things  being 
equal — which  will  emerge  victorious. 

Therefore,  it  is  impossible  at  present  to  lay  down 
any  rule  as  to  limiting  the  number  of  war  aero- 
planes. No  country  can  stay  its  hand.  The  wise 
policy,  surely,  is  to  be  well  armed  in  view  of 
eventualities.  If  a  great  war  comes — then,  and 
only  then,  can  the  strength  of  an  air-fleet  be  tested 
adequately. 


II 

The  great  French  tests  of  military  aeroplanes— Striking 
results  obtained — Era  of  fast,  ''  air-worthy,"  \y eight- 
carrying  machines. 

Any  account  of  the  splendid  progress  in  military 
flying,  which  has  been  made  in  France,  would  not 
be  complete  without  a  reference  to  the  trials  of  war 
aeroplanes  which  were  carried  out  at  Rheims  in 
October,  191 1. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       39 

In  prizes,  and  prospective  orders  for  machines, 
more  than  ;^ 50,000  had  been  set  aside;  and  an 
astonishingly  large  number  of  French  makers — 
bearing  striking  testimony  to  the  progress  of  aviation 
in  that  country — brought  their  machines  together. 
Despite  bad  weather,  a  series  of  tests  which  were 
highly  instructive  and  important  were  carried  out. 

One  of  the  French  aims,  in  the  organisation  of 
these  contests,  was  to  encourage  the  construction  of  a 
speedy,  "  air-worthy "  machine,  capable  of  carrying 
a  pilot  and  passenger,  and  flying  long  distances  when 
fully  loaded. 

The  tests  were  most  interesting,  as  showing  the 
high  state  of  efficiency  to  which  aeroplanes  had 
attained.  Quite  a  number  of  machines,  for  example, 
were  able  to  effect  a  regular  series  of  non-stop  flights 
of  300  kilometres  (187.5  miles),  when  carrying  a 
pilot  and  observer. 

A  surprising  number,  also,  were  able  to  ascend  to 
^  height  of  1640  feet  in  fifteen  minutes — a  re- 
markable indication  of  the  reserve  of  power  they 
possessed. 

One  difficult  feat  was  set  the  competing  machines. 
This  was  that  they  should  rise,  when  fully  loaded, 
from  a  ploughed  field.  Hitherto,  of  course,  only 
smooth  ground  had  been  considered  suitable  for 
the  ascent  of  a  machine.  An  appreciable  number 
passed  even  this  test  successfully.  Their  ability  to 
do  so  was  due  to  the  fitting  of  exceptionally-strong 
landing  devices  of  the  wheel  and  skid  type,  and  to 
ample  engine-power. 

In  all,  seven  aeroplanes  emerged  triumphantly 
from  all  the  trials  imposed.  The  winning  machine, 
which   owed   its   final   triumph   to   its   high   speed, 


40      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

was  the  Nieuport  monoplane.  Even  when  heavily 
laden  with  pilot,  passenger,  and  fuel,  it  flew  across 
country  at  the  rate  of  more  than  seventy  miles  an 
hour. 

One  of  the  most  impressive  features  of  the  trials 
was  the  reliability  shown  by  the  competing  machines. 
They  made  voyage  after  voyage  with  the  regularity 
of  express  trains.  The  striking  aspect  of  the  tests, 
indeed,  was  the  practical  demonstration  of  the  fact 
that  not  one  French  builder,  but  dozens,  could  make 
a  thoroughly-efficient  war  aeroplane. 

It  was  shown  conclusively,  also,  that  it  is  no 
longer  necessary  to  wait  for  calm  weather  before  em- 
barking upon  aeroplane  flights.  In  astonishingly- 
high  winds — blowing,  in  some  cases,  at  a  velocity  of 
approximately  forty  miles  an  hour — the  large  mili- 
tary machines  went  out  and,  ascending  looo  or  1500 
feet,  battled  triumphantly  against  vicious  gusts. 

A  striking  point  in  connection  with  the  competi- 
tion was  the  big  horse-power  of  the  engines  em- 
ployed. There  was  a  vivid  contrast,  indeed, 
between  the  motors  now  used  and  the  little  three- 
cylindered,  twenty-five  horse-power  engine  with 
which  Bleriot  crossed  the  Channel  in  1909. 

Many  of  the  machines  taking  part  in  the  contest 
were  fitted  with  fourteen-cylinder  hundred  horse- 
power "  Gnome  "  motors ;  and  some  employed  even 
higher  power  than  this,  being  equipped  with  engines 
developing  a  hundred  and  forty  horse-power.  Such 
big  power  was,  of  course,  necessary  in  view  of  the 
loads  which  were  carried,  and  the  arduous  nature 
of  some  of  the  tests. 

To  indicate  the  weights  raised,  it  may  be  men- 
tioned that  the  Breguet  biplane,  which  was  driven  by 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       41 

a  hundred  and  forty  horse-power  "  Gnome,"  weighed, 
with  pilot,  two  passengers,  and  fuel  aboard,  2420  lb. 

Representatives  from  all  the  great  countries  in  the 
world,  including  Great  Britain,  visited .  Rheims  to 
witness  these  military  tests,  and  the  French  manu- 
facturers who  produced  successful  machines  were 
quickly  supplied  with  sufficient  orders  to  keep  their 
factories  busy  for  a  long  time  to  come. 

The  value  of  the  flying  work  accomplished  in  these 
trials,  and  the  obvious  practicabihty  of  military 
machines,  stimulated  interest  not  only  in  France,  but 
in  Russia,  Germany,  and  other  countries.  It  was, 
undoubtedly,  the  means  of  determining  our  War 
Office  to  make  a  move.  In  view  of  what  was 
achieved  at  Rheims,  in  fact,  there  no  longer  remained 
any  possible  excuse  for  refraining  from  a  construc- 
tive policy  in  military  aviation. 


Ill 

Germany's  aerial  policy — Secret  energies  in  creating  a 
fleet  of  war  aeroplanes — Rivalry  with  France. 

Leaving  France  for  the  moment,  we  may  now  turn 
to  a  consideration  of  Germany's  advance  in  the 
matter  of  military  flying.  Here,  first  of  all,  we  shall 
need  to  consider  an  interesting  question.  It  con- 
cerns the  relative  merits  of  the  dirigible  balloon  and 
the  aeroplane.  Although,  in  this  book,  we  are  con- 
cerned exclusively  with  the  heavier-than-air  machine, 
it  is  certainly  necessary  to  mention  the  dirigible  at 
this  point,  in  explanation  of  the  fact  that  Germany 
almost  abandoned  her  airship  poHcy,  after  the  French 


4^2       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

manoeuvres  in  the  autumn  of  19 lo,  in  favour  of  tibe 

aeroplane. 

She  was  not  led  to  take  this  step,  after  spending 
many  thousands  of  pounds  upon  dirigibles,  with- 
out mature  consideration.  Among  her  advisers  in 
matters  of  aviation,  Germany  possessed  many  parti- 
cularly-staunch and  even  obstinate  supporters  of  the 
airship.  These  refused  at  first  to  admit  the  enor- 
mous strides  which  the  aeroplane  was  making.  But 
soon  it  was  impossible  to  turn  a  blind  eye  towards 
them ;  and  so  came  a  reversal  of  German  policy. 

The  facts  of  the  case  could  not,  indeed,  be  contro- 
verted. While  the  aeroplane  leaped  to  the  front 
during  1910,  the  airship  made  practically  no  forward 
strides  at  all.  In  comparison  with  the  aeroplane,  it 
was  ruinously  costly.  It  required  large  crews  of 
men  to  handle  it.  It  needed  huge  garages  dotted 
about  the  country  at  all  strategic  points.  It  was 
slow-flying,  as  compared  with  the  aeroplane.  It 
offered  a  far  easier  target  to  artillery  fire  from  below. 
The  advantages  which  were  claimed  for  it,  over  the 
aeroplane,  were  that  it  could  remain  in  the  air  longer, 
and  that  observations  could  be  carried  out  from  it 
in  a  more  leisurely  fashion  than  from  the  heavier- 
than-air  machine. 

But  the  German  War  Office  is  notoriously  shrewd 
in  all  matters  appertaining  to  modern  warfare.  When 
it  was  seen  that  a  mistaken  poHcy  was  being  pur- 
sued in  spending  large  sums  upon  unwieldy  diri- 
gibles, a  new  plan  was  quickly  evolved — and  that  was 
to  overtake  France  in  the  creation  of  a  fleet  of  war 
aeroplanes. 

It  was  in  November,  19 10,  that  the  German  mili- 
tary authorities  began  to  purchase  machines.    They 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       43 

then  placed  orders  for  five  or  six  aeroplanes,  mostly 
biplanes.  This  was  quickly  followed,  a  month  later, 
by  an  order  for  nearly  twenty  Etrich  monoplanes — 
strongly-built,  extremely-efficient  machines,  con- 
structed in  Austria. 

Military  experts  in  Germany  had,  by  this  time, 
arrived  at  an  approximate  estimate  of  what  should 
be  the  salient  features  of  an  aeroplane  for  war  pur- 
poses. They  stated  that  machines  should  be  of  as 
simple  a  construction  as  possible,  and  very  strong. 
They  declared  high  speed  to  be  an  essential,  and 
they  demanded,  also,  that  machines  should  be  able 
to  carry  appreciable  weights. 

Tt  was  characteristic  of  Germany  that  she  should 
make  steady  progress,  once  a  decision  had  been 
arrived  at  to  develop  the  aeroplane.  Thus,  in 
February,  191 1,  it  became  known  that  seven  military 
airmen  had,  in  one  week,  obtained  their  certificates 
of  proficiency  at  the  Johannisthal  and  Bork  aero- 
dromes. Three  of  these  pilots  were  using  Wright 
biplanes.  It  was  just  about  this  time,  too,  that  Ger- 
many placed  an  order  in  France  for  several  Farman 
biplanes. 

By  the  spring  of  191 1,  the  German  War  Office  had 
assembled  a  fleet  of  close  upon  fifty  aeroplanes. 
Nearly  half  of  them  were  Etrich  monoplanes,  of 
the  type  previously  mentioned.  Metal  now  entered 
very  largely  into  the  framework  of  these  machines. 
They  were  heavily-engined,  and  fast  in  flight,  and 
could  easily  raise  a  reconnoitring  officer,  in  addition 
to  the  pilot,  and  an  engineer  to  attend  to  the  motor 
as  well. 

In  March,  191 1,  so  as  to  hasten  forward  the  work 
of  training  officers  to  fly,  the  German  Minister  of 


44      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

War  sent  fifty  or  sixty  unmarried  lieutenants  to  the 
Doebritz  military  aviation  camp.  Here,  while  they 
were  learning  to  fly,  these  officers  received  a  special 
allowance.  The  military  authorities  also  came  to 
the  conclusion,  at  this  time,  that  it  would  be  wise  to 
arrange  for  an  aviation  section  at  all  the  garrisons 
in  Germany  which  had  suitable  parade-grounds 
attached  to  them. 

It  was  decided  in  May,  191 1,  to  spend  large  sums 
of  money  upon  the  purchase  of  new  types  of  military 
aeroplanes ;  and  the  officers  who  had  already  learned 
to  fly  were  encouraged  to  design  machines,  embody- 
ing ideas  formed  during  their  period  of  tuition.  At 
the  same  time,  in  order  to  encourage  a  general  study 
of  flying  in  Germany,  the  War  Office  made  up  its 
mind  to  contribute  special  prizes  to  the  various 
cross-country  contests  then  in  process  of  arrange- 
ment. 

Going  ahead  with  such  determination,  it  was  not 
surprising  to  find  that,  in  August,  191 1,  Germany 
had  estabHshed  a  fleet  of  nearly  eighty  aeroplanes ; 
and  the  total  of  her  officer-airmen,  a  month  later, 
approached  the  same  figure. 

The  Kaiser  himself  had,  by  this  time,  become 
greatly  interested  in  the  development  of  heavier-than- 
air  machines  for  war  purposes,  and  he  thoroughly 
approved  of  the  forward  policy  which  had  been 
initiated.  At  the  end  of  the  summer  of  191 1  Ger- 
many had  quite  a  hundred  aeroplanes  either  on  hand, 
or  in  order ;  and  her  list  of  army  airmen  had  grown 
appreciably. 

Recently,  however,  development  in  Germany, 
so  far  as  aeroplanes  are  concerned,  has  been  kept 
more  or  less  secret.       Information  regarding  tests 


THE  AEROPLANE   IN  WAR       45 

which  have  been  carried  out  has  been  carefully  with- 
held. The  results  of  several  carefully-organised 
reconnoitring  flights  have  not,  for  instance,  been 
allowed  to  leak  out. 

But  this  much  is  known.  During  191 2,  Germany 
will  spend  a  sum  of  ^640,000  upon  the  development 
of  her  aeroplane  service.  The  Kaiser  himself  now 
offers  a  prize  of  ;^2500  for  the  best  aeroplane  motor 
of  German  construction. 

It  seems  fairly  clear,  indeed,  that  Germany  has 
now  set  herself  the  task  of  keeping  pace  with  France 
in  the  development  of  military  airmanship.  A  great 
point  is  made  by  the  German  War  Office  of  encour- 
aging the  production  of  entirely  German-built  aero- 
planes, and  much  experimental  work  is  now  being 
conducted. 

This  much  is  certain :  there  is  the  greatest  activity 
in  Germany  in  regard  to  military  aeroplaning.  No 
stone  is  being  left  unturned,  indeed,  to  produce  a 
thoroughly-efficient  military  machine ;  and  the  train- 
ing of  army  airmen  is  steadily  pursued. 

Many  estimates  have  recently  been  made  as  to 
the  strength  of  the  German  air-fleet.  One  credits 
Germany  with  300  war  aeroplanes;  another  with 
nearly  200.  The  most  reliable  figure  would  appear 
to  be  a  little  in  excess  of  100  machines. 

Dirigible  balloon  work,  also,  still  continues.  It 
has  been  reported,  in  fact,  that  German  military  ex- 
perts have  overcome  some  of  the  difficulties  of  the 
rigid  type,  and  that  heights  of  over  6000  feet  are  now 
attained  with  them.  It  was,  indeed,  only  in  January 
that  France  was  warned,  by  a  well-known  advocate  of 
dirigible  balloons,  to  beware  of  the  secret  develop- 
ment of  lighter-than-air  craft  in  Germany.       The 


46       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

destructive  possibilities  of  a  fleet  of  hostile  dirigibles, 
sailing  across  the  German  frontier  into  France,  and 
raining  down  missiles,  were  pictured;  but,  in  this 
regard,  it  is  certainly  pertinent  to  inquire  what  the 
French  fleet  of  aeroplanes  would  be  doing  while  such 
an  attack  was  in  progress. 


IV 

Progress    in    Russia,    America,    and    other    countries- 
England's  position  in  the  autumn  of  191 1. 

The  country  which  next  merits  attention,  as  a 
keen,  observant  student  of  the  value  of  the  aeroplane 
for  war  purposes,  is  Russia.  The  Russian  military 
authorities  recognised  the  importance  of  this  new 
weapon  early  in  191 1,  and  the  steps  taken  to  deal 
with  the  question  were  eminently  practical.  The 
Duma  Committee  of  National  Defence  approved 
an  expenditure  of  nearly  ^1,000,000  upon  military 
aviation. 

Since  then,  Russia  has  been  acquiring  aeroplanes, 
and  training  airmen,  at  a  great  rate.  A  sum  of 
;^ 2 5,000  a  year,  for  three  years,  was  voted  exclu- 
sively for  the  building  of  experimental  machines  of 
a  military  type,  in  order  that  aircraft  on  original  lines 
might  be  evolved.  It  was  also  decided  to  spend 
;^25oo  a  year  in  employing  skilled  instructors. 
Military  air-stations  were,  at  the  same  time,  estab- 
lished at  Keifl^,  Odessa,  Sebastopol,  and  Tiflis. 

Having  thus  made  the  first  move  towards  creating 
an  efficient  air-corps,  the  Russian  Government  sent 
a  commission  of  military  officers  on  a  tour  of  the 


THE   AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       47 

French  flying  grounds,  in  order  that  they  might  see 
the  best  work  being  produced  by  the  aeroplane 
manufacturers. 

While  in  France,  this  commission  purchased  a 
number  of  machines  of  various  types.  They  visited 
England,  also,  and  after  inspecting  the  biplanes  built 
by  the  British  and  Colonial  Aeroplane  Company 
at  Bristol,  ordered  several  military-type  machines  of 
this  make. 

By  May,  191 1,  Russia  had  acquired  forty  machines, 
and  was  using  them  to  teach  a  large  number  of 
officers  to  fly.  A  determination  has  been  expressed 
to  have  a  fleet  of  several  hundred  aeroplanes  by  the 
forthcoming  flying  season. 

The  activities  of  other  nations  also  present  an 
interesting  study.  Take  America,  for  example.  In 
this  country,  despite  the  wonderful  example  set  by 
the  Wright  brothers,  military  flying  languished  until 
towards  the  end  of  19 10.  Then  came  a  somewhat 
tardy  vote  for  the  purchase  of  a  few  machines,  and 
general  development. 

In  the  beginning  of  191 1,  Mr  Dickinson,  the 
United  States  War  Secretary,  returned  from  a  visit 
to  France,  where  he  had  seen  what  the  French  war 
aeroplanes  were  accompHshing,  and  had  enjoyed  a 
flight  upon  a  miHtary  machine  at  Chalons.  He 
promptly  recommended  a  more  generous  money 
grant,  and  the  result  has  been  that  machines  have 
been  bought,  while  officers  are  now  learning  to  fly. 

In  a  recent  speech,  Brigadier-General  James 
Allen,  of  the  American  Signal  Corps — in  connection 
with  which  the  Air  Corps  is  operated — said :  "  It  is 
the  ultimate  intention,  I  believe,  to  teach  aviation 
to  several  thousand  Army  men." 


48       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

For  the  year  ending  June,  191 2,  a  sum  of  125,000 
dollars  was  voted  for  the  aeronautical  work  of  the 
American  Army. 

Austrian  ^mihtary  experts  have  been  very  energetic 
in  their  study  of  flying.  In  November,  19 10, 
war  aeroplanes  were  ordered,  and  it  was  then 
specified  that  each  machine  must  fly  for  two  hours 
without  descending,  at  the  rate  of  forty-four  miles 
an  hour.  It  was  also  stipulated  that  the  aeroplanes 
should  be  dismantled  in  an  hour,  and  rebuilt  in  two 
hours.  During  191 1,  Austria  operated  two  military 
air-stations,  and  now  possesses  an  excellent  fleet  of 
war  aeroplanes. 

Italian  interest  in  military  aviation  has  been 
keen  from  the  outset.  In  the  summer  of  191 1,  at 
the  Centocelle  mihtary  aerodrome,  a  number  of 
officers  were  training,  and  a  variety  of  machines  were 
in  use.  Since  then,  also,  definite  progress  has  been 
made,  and  Italy  quickly  reaped  the  reward  of  her 
aeronautical  labours  in  the  war  with  Turkey.  A 
reference  to  the  work  of  aeroplanes  in  Tripoli  will, 
however,  be  found  in  a  later  section. 

In  March,  191 1,  Japan  placed  orders  in  France 
for  nearly  twenty  war  aeroplanes.  This  was  in  addi- 
tion to  a  previous  purchase,  in  Berlin,  of  a  number 
of  Wright  biplanes.  Japanese  officers  have  been 
learning  to  fly  in  large  numbers  lately,  both  in 
France  and  Germany. 

Spain  must  not  be  forgotten.  She  has  bought 
a  number  of  machines  in  France,  and  is  now  training 
a  corps  of  officer-airmen. 

And  what  about  England?  It  is  sufficient  to  say, 
for  purposes  of  direct  comparison  in  this  section,  that 
for  the  autumn  manoeuvres  of   191 1 — which  were 


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THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       49 

abandoned  owing  to  the  drought — the  War  Office 
had  only  half  a  dozen  quaHfied  army  aeroplanists, 
in  comparison  with  the  well-trained  squadrons  of 
France  and  Germany.  As  regards  machines,  we 
possessed  at  this  time  about  a  dozen — most  of  them 
obsolete — being  hopelessly  out-matched  by  France, 
Germany,  and  Russia. 


FOURTH    SECTION 

IMPORTANCE    OF    ORGANISATION    IN    THE  USE    OF 
WAR    AEROPLANES 


French   plans    for   the   concerted   use    of    squadrons   of 
machines  in  time  of  war. 

After  describing  the  air-fleets  with  which  far-seeing 
nations  are  now  arming  themselves,  another  point 
arises — and  a  point  which  is  of  supreme  importance. 
This  concerns  the  organisation  of  the  military  air 
service. 

In  organisation,  it  is  clear,  will  lie  the  secret  of 
success  when  aeroplanes  are  used  in  time  of  actual 
war. 

France  has  certainly  more  right  to  speak  on  this 
subject  than  any  other  country,  because  she  knows. 
Her  experience  has,  indeed,  been  unique.  She  has 
bought  machines,  trained  men,  and  has  already 
dissected  the  results  obtained  from  many  experi- 
ments. And  her  greatest  authorities  affirm,  defi- 
nitely, that  it  is  not  sufficient  to  have  a  large  number 
of  machines,  or  a  big  corps  of  men.  What  any 
nation  must  possess,  they  say,  in  order  to  make  its 
air-fleet  really  efficient,  is  faultless  organisation. 

Aeroplanes,  either  for  scouting  or  destructive  work, 
cannot  be  operated  in  haphazard  style.     Combina- 

50 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       51 

tion  is  essential.  Every  requisite  of  the  air  service 
must  be  in  its  place,  and  ready  to  hand ;  and  every- 
one must  know  his  work,  and  do  it  with  precision, 
from  the  aeroplane  pilot  to  the  humble  mechanic. 

It  is  upon  this  question  of  organisation  that  the 
French  authorities  have  been  concentrating  them- 
selves. They  see  its  vital  importance,  and  are 
determined  to  formulate  definite,  practical  schemes 
for  the  employment  of  large  squadrons  of  machines. 
In  this  work,  M.  Milleraud,  the  French  Minister  of 
War,  has  been  most  active. 

It  is  held  that  a  fleet  of  aeroplanes  should  be 
divided  up  into  separate  aviation  squadrons,  each 
complete  in  itself,  and  that  these  depots  should  be 
attached  to  the  various  Army  Corps. 

Thus  each  squadron  would  act  with  its  own  Army 
Corps,  performing  its  scouting  and  other  work,  and 
moving  from  place  to  place  with  the  Corps. 

In  command  of  an  aviation  squadron,  without 
doubt,  should  be  an  officer  of  great  experience. 
Already,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  such  men  are  being 
produced.  They  are  officers  who  have  gone  through 
the  whole  routine  of  flying,  and  know  every  practical 
detail  of  the  work,  besides  possessing  a  general 
knowledge  of  tactical  operations. 

Such  a  Commander  of  Aeroplanes  should  be  con- 
stantly in  touch  with  the  officer  in  charge  of  the 
whole  Army  Corps.  When  military  operations  reach 
a  stage  that  demands  a  rapid  aerial  reconnaissance, 
this  officer  in  charge  of  aeroplanes  will  be  called  into 
conference,  and  told  exactly  what  is  required.  He, 
in  his  turn,  will  indicate  how  his  airmen  can  go  to 
work;  and  he  will  then  transmit  orders  to  the  pilots 
and  observers,  and  also  summarise  their  reports,  for 


52       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

the  benefit  of  Headquarters,  after  a  reconnaissance 
has  been  carried  out. 

The  value  of  such  an  officer,  possessing  complete 
practical  experience,  would  be  very  great.  The 
question  might  arise,  for  example,  as  to  whether  the 
wind  was  too  high  to  allow  a  scouting  expedition  to 
be  made.  The  Commanding  Officer  would,  in  such 
circumstances,  promptly  consult  the  Commander  of 
Aeroplanes,  who  would  come  to  an  expert  decision 
without  any  misunderstanding  or  delay. 

Operating  with  the  Commander  of  Aeroplanes 
should  be  other  officers,  all  experienced  men,  and 
each  specialising  in  one  branch  of  aerial  work. 
There  should  be  an  officer  immediately  in  charge 
of  the  airmen.  To  this  officer  would  fall  the  task  of 
seeing  that  each  scout  thoroughly  understood  the 
work  that  he  had  in  hand,  that  he  was  adequately 
equipped,  and  that  his  reports  were  presented  in 
proper  form. 

Then  should  come  an  officer  in  command  of  the 
engineers.  His  would  be  important  work.  The 
engineers  in  charge  of  aeroplanes  represent  highly- 
skilled  men,  whose  work  is  vital  to  the  success  of 
aerial  operations.  Several  of  them  are  usually 
detailed  to  each  machine. 

When  aeroplanes  are  on  active  service,  replace- 
ments and  repairs  will  need  constantly  to  be  made ; 
and  the  officer  in  charge  of  engineers  will  be  called 
upon  to  superintend  this  work,  and  to  see  that  all 
machines  in  the  corps  are  in  first-class  condition. 
An  aeroplane,  at  any  rate  as  at  present  constructed, 
is  a  machine  that  needs  unremitting  attention  in  a 
variety  of  small  ways.  The  use  of  a  fleet  of  machines 
in  time  of  war  will  mean  that  a  very  highly-organised 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       53 

staff    of    mechanics,    under    the    supervision    of    a 
thoroughly-competent  officer,  will  be  required. 

Then  there  may  be  a  third  officer,  whose  duty 
will  be  to  take  charge  of  all  the  baggage,  suppUes, 
and  transport  of  the  air  service.  His  task  will,  it  is 
clear,  be  no  light  one.  There  should  be  a  number 
of  motor  repair-cars  in  connection  with  each  aero- 
plane squadron,  ready  to  move  out,  at  a  moment's 
notice,  and  succour  an  airman  who  may  have  come 
down  through  mechanical  defects.  These  break- 
down gangs  will  form  a  very  important  adjunct  to 
the  work  of  the  aeroplane  in  war-time. 

The  question  of  transport  is  very  important.  As 
an  army  marches  from  point  to  point,  so  the  aero- 
planes attached  to  it  will  have  to  move  also.  Airmen 
will,  in  many  cases  no  doubt,  fly  their  machines  from 
point  to  point ;  but  there  will  probably  be  occasions 
when  machines  will  need  to  be  dismantled,  and 
transported  by  road  or  rail. 

In  such  circumstances  the  transport  officer  will  be 
a  busy  man.  In  his  hands,  also,  will  lie  the  work 
of  bringing  up  the  supplies  of  petrol  and  oil  which 
the  aeroplanes  will  need. 

The  French  organisation  already  strives  to  be  as 
perfect  as  is  possible,  seeing  that  active  service  con- 
ditions are  yet  to  be  encountered.  Motor  waggons 
are  provided  for  the  transport  of  aeroplanes.  Other, 
and  slower  waggons,  bring  up  portable  hangars. 
Then  come  heavier  lorries  carrying  spare  parts,  and 
similar  equipment.  Bringing  up  the  rear  are  motor 
waggons  in  the  form  of  portable  workshops. 

The  mere  detaiHng  of  any  such  scheme  as  that 
outlined  above,  affords  an  indication  of  the  necessity 
for  perfect  organisation  in  the  use  of  war  aeroplanes. 


54       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

With  machines  improperly  employed,  with  airmen 
carelessly  instructed,  and  with  repair-depots  badly 
equipped,  no  nation  can  hope  to  make  a  success  of 
its  air  service. 

The  determination  of  France,  in  this  regard,  is 
beyond  all  praise.  Aeroplanes  are  being  allocated 
to  frontier  forts.  Practical  discussions  are  taking 
place,  frequently,  at  the  Ministry  of  War.  It  is  in- 
tended to  establish  an  annual  overhaul  of  war  aero- 
planes, so  that  obsolete  machines  may  be  removed 
from  the  active  list,  and  relegated  to  the  flying 
schools. 

In  all  this,  France  is  finding  things  out  for  herself. 
She  has  no  precedent  to  guide  her.  This  makes 
the  work  she  has  already  accomplished  all  the  more 
valuable.  How  far  advanced  the  French  air  service 
is,  and  how  admirably  arranged  is  its  scheme  of 
operation,  only  the  practical  work  of  war  will 
reveal. 


II 

Value    of    air-stations — Selection    of    landing-grounds — 
Preparing  air-maps. 

A  very  important  feature  of  the  organisation  of  an 
air-corps,  especially  in  times  of  peace,  is  the  per- 
manent air-station.  Here  one  finds  machines,  men, 
and  the  whole  equipment  of  military  aviation  work. 
Of  such  stations,  France  now  possesses  quite  a 
number. 

An  essential  of  such  an  air-station  is  a  good 
manoeuvring  ground  for  aeroplanes.  Then  comes 
the  need  to  erect  a  number  of  sheds  for  the  machines. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       66 

Also  necessary  is  a  completely-equipped  repair-shop, 
in  which  damages,  generally  brought  about  by  experi- 
menting with  machines,  may  be  repaired.  At  one  or 
two  of  the  chief  French  air-stations,  the  equipment  is 
so  complete  that  there  are  commodious  shops  for 
the  building  of  aeroplanes,  in  addition  to  any  repair 
work  undertaken. 

Another  and  very  important  feature  of  a  well- 
organised  air-station  is  the  school  for  mihtary  pupils, 
under  the  charge  of  an  officer  of  experience. 

Another  detail  of  aerial  organisation,  regarding 
which  both  France  and  Germany  are  concerning 
themselves,  is  the  selection  of  a  number  of  landing- 
places  for  aeroplanes,  pieferably  in  the  vicinity  of 
large  towns.  Military  authorities  in  France  are  en- 
listing municipal  aid  in  this  matter. 

The  idea  is  to  fix  upon  an  aerodrome,  or  suitable 
landing-place,  outside  all  cities  or  towns  of  impor- 
tance. Once  chosen,  the  ground  will  be  set  aside 
for  the  arrival  and  departure  of  aircraft;  and,  in 
connection  with  it,  there  will  be  a  small,  permanent 
repair-shop. 

Apart  from  their  use  for  military  flying,  and  par- 
ticularly in  connection  with  long  reconnoitring  flights, 
such  landing-places,  scattered  all  over  the  country, 
should,  it  is  contended,  do  a  great  deal  towards 
popularising  touring  by  air,  seeing  that  an  aerial 
voyager  would  have  some  definite  alighting  point  in 
view,  when  flying  from  point  to  point. 

Besides  such  general  aspects  of  organisation  as 
have  already  been  touched  upon,  France  has  foreseen 
the  need  for  providing  her  air-corps  with  suitable 
maps  to  use  when  flying  across  country,  and  particu- 
larly when  on  reconnoitring  work.    The  officers  who 


66      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

flew  in  the  autumn  manoeuvres  of  1910  were  able  to 
report  the  need  for  such  maps — a  clear  indication 
of  the  value  of  practical  flying  in  revealing  exactly 
what  is  required. 

The  Geographical  Department  of  the  French  Army 
went  to  work  with  characteristic  promptitude.  The 
result  is  that  special  air-maps  are  being  prepared  so 
as  to  cover,  in  sections,  the  whole  of  France.  In  con- 
nection with  these  maps,  the  plan  is  to  eliminate  all 
unnecessary  detail.  When  flying  fast  and  high,  an 
airman  sees  only  the  bold  outhne  of  what  lies  below 
him;  and  so,  when  glancing  quickly  at  a  map,  he 
seeks  to  find  on  it  some  prominent  landmark  which 
will  tell  him  where  he  is. 

On  French  military  maps  the  roads — which  an 
airman  always  sees  well — are  coloured  white.  Woods 
are  green ;  and  railway  lines,  which  always  form  an 
excellent  aerial  guide,  are  prominently  marked.  So 
are  such  landmarks  as  spires  and  towers.  Good 
alighting  grounds  and  air-stations  are  shown;  and 
the  presence  of  telegraph  wires,  a  menace  when 
making  a  descent,  are  also  indicated. 

With  the  help  of  such  maps  as  these,  French 
military  airmen  are  now  making  long  cross-country 
flights  almost  daily,  without  fear  of  losing  their  way. 
It  is  now  possible,  also,  to  fit  a  reliable  compass  to 
aeroplanes.  The  result  is  that,  with  a  special  map 
and  a  good  compass,  an  airman  can  fly  with  accuracy 
from  point  to  point,  even  over  strange  country. 


FIFTH    SECTION 

England's   position   in   regard   to    military 

FLYING 

I 

Lessons  which  were  ignored— Work  of  the  Parliamentary 
Aerial  Defence  Committee. 

So  far  as  the  position,  at  the  present  time,  is  con- 
cerned, England  is  far  behind  other  great  nations 
in  the  matter  of  aerial  armament,  and  our  deficiency 
is  open  to  the  greatest  criticism.  But  it  is,  in  all 
things,  necessary  to  be  fair.  Therefore,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  War  Office  has  pledged  itself 
to  a  definite  move. 

A  scheme,  to  which  further  reference  will  be  made, 
has  been  brought  forward  to  obtain  the  services  of 
a  hundred  army  airmen.  More  aeroplanes  have 
recently  been  bought;  and  a  sum  of  ;^ii,ooo  is 
to  be  spent  upon  a  military  competition  in  England, 
which  will  probably  be  held  in  July  next. 

Thus,  although  our  present  position  is  perilously 
weak,  we  have  the  promise  of  a  firmer,  more  reason- 
able policy.  By  the  end  of  the  forthcoming  flying 
season,  if  the  War  Office  maintains  its  new  attitude, 
we  should  have  laid  the  corner-stone,  at  least,  of  an 
efficient  air-corps. 

Therefore,  in  the  criticisms  of  Government  policy 

57 


58       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

which  it  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  avoid,  the  fact 
must  be  remembered  that  at  last  something  is  to  be 
done — nothing  very  ambitious,  it  is  true,  nothing  that 
will  put  us  on  a  level  say  with  France,  but,  at  any 
rate,  something.  A  very  unpretentious  poHcy  is 
better  than  no  poHcy  at  all. 

In  this  section,  we  propose  to  deal  with  those 
circumstances,  and  representations,  which  have 
led  to  the  dispelling  of  official  apathy  in 
England. 

Compared  with  the  work  being  done  in  France 
and  Germany,  we  have  still  practically  no  organisa- 
tion; and  yet  such  organisation  as  has  been 
described  will  spell  all  the  difference  between 
success  and  failure,  when  aeroplanes  are  actually 
used  in  war. 

All  that  has  been  definitely  established  in  England, 
so  far,  is  the  Air  Battalion,  which  is  not  in  a  position 
to  give  all  its  time  and  attention  to  the  development 
of  the  war  aeroplane.  Within  its  scheme  of  duties, 
in  addition  to  aeroplaning,  comes  the  manipulation 
or  dirigible  balloons,  and  also  of  ordinary  balloons, 
and  kites. 

It  was  in  April,  191 1,  that  the  Air  Battalion  came 
into  existence.  One  or  two  aeroplanes  had,  by  this 
time,  been  purchased.  A  flying  school  was  opened 
on  Salisbury  Plain;  and  there  was  much  talk, 
in  the  House  of  Commons,  as  to  the  start  which 
this  country  had  begun  to  make  in  regard  to 
military  aviation.  This,  as  has  been  said,  was  in 
April. 

Four  months  later,  however,  there  were  only 
half  a  dozen  officers  of  the  Air  Battalion  who  were 
competent   to    handle    aeroplanes   in    reconnoitring 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       59 

work;  the  remainder  had  been  either  without 
machines,  or  had  been  engaged  upon  airship  or 
balloon  duties. 

Thus,  despite  repeated  demonstrations  of  the 
value  of  the  aeroplane  for  war  purposes,  and  in  face 
of  the  activity  in  France  and  Germany,  we  found 
ourselves,  in  September,  191 1,  with  half  a  dozen 
military  airmen  who  were  ready  to  take  part  in 
the  autumn  manoeuvres.  As  it  happened,  the 
manoeuvres  were  cancelled ;  but,  had  they  not  been, 
six  air-scouts  would  have  been  altogether  insufficient 
to  make  any  adequate  test  of  the  value  of  aerial 
reconnoitring. 

In  sharp  contrast  to  our  lethargy,  France  was,  at 
this  time,  ready  to  put  thirty  aeroplanes,  with  highly- 
skilled  pilots  and  observers,  at  the  disposal  of  the 
troops  in  her  autumn  manoeuvres.  More  could 
have  been  obtained,  if  necessary;  but  this  number 
was  considered  sufficient. 

It  must  not  be  thought  that  our  military  airmen 
lack  either  initiative  or  experience :  they  do  not.  In 
the  limited  opportunities  they  have  had  of  showing 
what  they  can  do,  their  performances  have  been 
highly  meritorious.  They  are  enthusiastic,  and  full 
of  aptitude  for  their  work.  But  they  have  lacked 
facihties,  and  also  encouragement.  Instead  of  there 
being  purpose,  and  a  genuine  spirit  of  progress 
behind  them,  they  have  found  neither  energy  nor 
interest,  to  say  nothing  of  a  persistent  stinting  of 
money. 

A  question  inevitably  arises.  It  is  this:  why 
has  England  lagged  behind  such  alert  nations  as 
France  and  Germany  in  the  matter  of  aerial  arma- 
ment?    The    answer    lies    in    the    fact    that,    until 


60      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

recently,  the  importance  of  the  aeroplane  in  warfare 
was  denied. 

EnHghtened  views  have  been  expressed,  it  is 
true ;  many  men,  even  in  official  positions,  have  pro- 
nounced progressive  opinions.  But  results  are  all- 
important  ;  and  it  is  a  fact  that  no  really  satisfactory 
step  has  yet  been  taken  to  place  this  country  on  an 
equality  with  other  nations  in  regard  to  an  air-fleet. 

Lessons  have  been  ignored.  The  whole  subject 
has  been  neglected,  and  it  has  only  been  as  the 
result  of  determined  agitation  that  anything  at  all 
has  been  done. 

In  view  of  the  apathy  prevailing,  it  was  in  May, 
191 1,  that  the  Parliamentary  Aerial  Defence  Com- 
mittee, a  body  comprising  members  of  ParHament 
of  all  poUtical  views,  organised,  at  the  Hendon 
aerodrome — which  had  been  placed  at  their  disposal 
by  the  courtesy  of  Mr  Claude  Grahame-White — a 
special  display  of  airmanship,  to  which  they  invited 
military  experts. 

So  far  as  it  was  possible  to  do  so,  in  a  one-day 
programme,  a  most  convincing  demonstration  was 
given,  both  of  the  reliability  and  controllability  of  the 
modern  aeroplane.  Many  famous  people  were  pre- 
sent; a  long  programme  of  flying  was  carried  out. 
Dispatches  were  borne  across  country  ;  reconnoitring 
flights  were  made;  aeroplanes  were  quickly  dis- 
mantled, and  speedily  reassembled.  In  every  pos- 
sible way,  in  fact,  the  practicability  of  the  new 
"  arm  "  was  demonstrated. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       61 


II 

Policy  of  '*  moving  cautiously  '* — Peril  of  lagging  behind 
in  aerial  armament. 

After  this  display,  the  Parliamentary  Aerial  De- 
fence Committee,  feeling  that  the  lesson  taught 
should  be  pushed  home,  sought  an  interview  with 
Lord  Haldane,  at  the  War  Office.  He  readily  saw 
the  members  of  the  Committee ;  but  his  reply  to  their 
representations — which  were  that  we  should  keep 
abreast  of  other  nations — indicated  the  spirit  which 
then  existed  regarding  the  war  aeroplane. 

The  chief  point  made  by  the  Secretary  for  War 
was  that  it  was  "  desirable  to  move  cautiously."  The 
War  Office  should  not,  in  his  opinion,  "  commit  itself 
to  an  idea  which,  in  the  present  rapid  development 
of  aviation,  might  become  obsolete  in  a  few  months." 

This  statement  was  made  to  explain  the  fact 
that  England's  supply  of  war  aeroplanes  was  inade- 
quate. But  the  argument  was  not  tenable.  Natu- 
rally there  has  been,  and  will  be,  improvement  in 
aeroplane  construction  from  year  to  year.  Such  will 
always  be  the  case.  It  is  the  same,  for  instance,  in 
regard  to  battleships.  Yet  warships,  despite  their 
enormous  cost,  are  built  from  year  to  year,  in  the  full 
knowledge  that  they  will  be  superseded  by  more 
modern  types,  and  may  even  become  obsolete  while 
they  are  being  constructed. 

As  regards  aeroplanes,  the  machines  which  France 
bought,  early  in  191 1,  are  most  certainly  made  to 
appear  somewhat  out-of-date  by  more  perfect  craft 
now  obtainable.     But  these  earlier  machines  will  still 


62       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

be  serviceable;  and  France  will,  above  all,  have 
acquired  an  immense  amount  of  experience  while 
using  them. 

In  this  connection,  it  may  be  mentioned  that,  so 
far  as  can  be  ascertained  at  present,  the  aeroplane  is 
likely  to  proceed  along  fairly  steady  lines  of  develop- 
ment— at  any  rate  for  the  next  year  or  so.  There 
may  be  some  revolutionary  idea  brought  forward, 
of  course;  but,  generally  speaking,  the  immediate 
future  seems  to  indicate  a  slow  but  sure  improvement. 

There  is  no  excuse  for  a  country  to  hold  back 
upon  the  argument  that  aeroplanes  may  become 
obsolete  soon  after  they  are  built.  In  the  first 
place,  the  cost  of  such  machines,  when  compared 
with  any  other  form  of  armament,  is  ridiculously  low. 

To  "  scrap  "  a  fleet  of  fifty  or  sixty  aeroplanes 
would  be  an  insignificant  item  in  our  general  expen- 
diture upon  warlike  instruments.  But,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  there  would  be  no  need  to  abandon  any  type 
purchased.  Out-of-date  machines  could  still  be 
employed,  and  made  thoroughly  useful,  too,  by 
being  converted  into  "  school "  craft. 

Lord  Haldane  gave  the  impression,  in  his  conver- 
sation with  the  members  of  the  Parliamentary  Aerial 
Defence  Committee,  that  the  War  Office  was  holding 
back  from  the  expenditure  of  money  upon  war  aero- 
planes until  some  fixed  type  of  military  machine  was 
introduced.  But  it  is  not  likely  that  any  such 
machine  will  be  designed — at  any  rate  for  some  time 
to  come.  It  is  probable  that  progress  will  be  repre- 
sented by  a  succession  of  improving  types,  develop- 
ment taking  place,  chiefly,  in  regard  to  speed  and 
stabiHty. 

During  this  period  of  progress,  there  is  no  pos- 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       68 

sible  excuse  for  Great  Britain  to  lag  behind  other 
countries.  To-morrow,  if  a  war  broke  out,  France 
and  Germany  would  have  the  full  use  of  their  ade- 
quate squadrons  of  machines.  And  what  would  our 
position  be?  We  should  have  no  proper  fleet  of 
machines,  because  we  had  been  waiting  for  some 
ideal  type  to  be  evolved. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  neither  France  nor  Germany 
consider  that  the  aeroplanes  they  are  at  present 
using  are  anything  but  purely  experimental 
machines.  But  they  certainly  represent  the  best 
obtainable  at  the  moment ;  and,  recognising  the  vital 
importance  of  keeping  abreast  of  this  new  science, 
these  two  countries  buy  such  machines,  and  will  be 
quite  ready  to  purchase  more,  as  the  process  of  im- 
provement continues. 

In  1909,  Lord  Haldane  said  in  the  House  of 
Commons : — 

"In  war  there  is  little  use  for  anything  unless 
it  can  be  applied  with  some  certainty  that  it 
would  do  what  we  want  it  to  do,  and  unless  you 
have  some  exactness  in  results.  Now  that  stage 
(referring  to  aeroplanes)  has  not  been  reached." 

That,  as  has  been  said,  was  in  1909.  At  this 
time,  certainly,  aeroplanes  were  unreliable,  although 
the  promise  of  their  practicability  was  such  that  there 
was  no  excuse  for  ignoring  them,  from  the  military 
point  of  view. 

But  now  let  us  turn  to  matters  as  they  stand  to- 
day. The  modern  aeroplane,  with  its  engine  as 
reliable  as  that  in  a  motor-car,  can  be  used  with 
the  greatest  certainty  for  military  work,  and  can  fly 
long  distances — heavily  laden — without  descending. 


64      THE  AEEOPLANE  IN  WAR 

besides  attaining  a  speed  through  the  air  exceeding 
that  of  an  express  train. 


Ill 

The  financial  aspect — Money  England  is  spending — ^The 
airship  policy — Insufficient  provision  for  aeroplanes. 

In  the  year  ending  31st  March,  191 2,  a  sum  of 
;^ 1 13,000  will  have  been  expended  by  our  autho- 
rities upon  military  aeronautics.  Of  this  sum,  an 
appreciable  amount  is  devoted  to  estabKshment 
charges,  and  such  items;  and  a  sum  of  ;^2 8,000 
was  earmarked  for  building  a  new  dirigible  balloon 
shed  at  Farnborough,  and  in  making  improvements 
to  the  one  at  Wormwood  Scrubs. 

This  leaves  ;^  85,000;  and  this  sum  of  money, 
quite  inadequate  as  it  is,  is  free  to  be  spent 
upon  airships  and  aeroplanes.  Quite  an  active  air- 
ship poHcy  is  pursued,  and  a  large  percentage  of 
this  money  remaining  is  dribbled  away  upon  these 
costly  machines — in  building  new  ones,  and  in 
repairing  old  ones. 

Criticising  this  poHcy  trenchantly,  soon  after  the 
announcement  of  the  manner  in  which  the  War  Office 
proposed  to  spend  its  money,  Mr  Arthur  du  Cros, 
M.P.,  the  Hon.  Secretary  of  the  Parliamentary  Aerial 
Defence  Committee,  remarked :  "  We,  almost  alone 
among  nations,  are  developing  the  lighter-than-air 
type  of  machine  to  the  exclusion  of  aeroplanes. 
France  and  Germany,  formerly  two  of  the  staunchest 
advocates  of  the  dirigible  balloon,  have  almost 
ceased  its  development,  in  favour  of  the  aeroplane. 


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?:  ^ 

THE  AEROPLANE   IN  WAR       65 

"  In  a  year,  in  regard  to  these  two  machines,  the 
tables  have  been  turned,"  added  Mr  du  Cros.  "  Now 
the  aeroplane,  which  costs  so  much  less  than  the 
dirigible,  is  infinitely  its  superior.  One  aeroplane, 
costing  say  ;^iooo,  would,  in  the  case  of  actual  aerial 
warfare,  have  completely  at  its  mercy  a  dirigible 
balloon  costing  perhaps  ;^5o,ooo." 

Defending  their  policy,  soon  after  Mr  du  Cros' 
attacks,  and  responding  to  the  definite  statement  that 
"aeroplanes  have  become  immeasurably  superior  to 
airships  for  military  purposes,"  War  Office  experts 
advanced  the  argument :  "  There  would  be  work  in 
war-time,  such  as  very  detailed  reconnaissance,  that 
an  airship  could  perform  better  than  an  aeroplane. 
Both  types  should,  therefore,  be  developed." 

It  may  be  agreed,  in  this  connection,  that  the 
airship  would,  in  a  number  of  cases,  allow  of  a 
more  detailed  reconnaissance  being  made  than  from 
an  aeroplane ;  its  slower  speed,  and  the  fact  that  it 
could  hover  over  one  spot,  would  give  it  this  advan- 
tage. But,  to  set  against  this,  there  is  one  very 
obvious  disadvantage.  The  size  of  the  airship,  and 
the  fact  that  it  is  moving  slowly,  makes  it  an  admir- 
able target  for  artillery.  In  actual  warfare,  it  would, 
without  doubt,  very  soon  be  hit. 

In  this  connection,  too,  the  fact  must  be  remem- 
bered that,  whereas  a  wrecked  aeroplane  would 
represent  a  comparatively  small  financial  loss,  the 
destruction  of  a  dirigible  would  be  as  great  a  calamity 
as  the  loss  of  a  whole  aeroplane  fleet. 

The  expenses  entailed  in  organising  a  dirigible 
balloon  fleet  are  enormous,  and  altogether  out  of 
proportion  to  the  useful  work  which  these  vessels 
could  accomplish  in  time  of  war. 

E 


66       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

If  an  airship  service  is  to  be  of  practical  value, 
monster  sheds  must  be  erected  all  over  the  country, 
so  that  a  vessel  may  be  able  to  run  to  one  or  other 
of  them  for  shelter,  when  caught  in  a  high  wind. 
Apart  from  the  expenditure  which  these  sheds 
entail,  the  need  arises  to  spend  other  large  amounts 
upon  the  crews  of  trained  men  necessary  to  handle 
the  aircraft  when  they  leave  the  ground,  or  return 
from  a  flight. 

There  is  another  formidable  item — the  cost  of  the 
hydrogen  gas  necessary  to  inflate  the  huge  enve- 
lopes ;  and,  added  to  this,  there  is  constant  expendi- 
ture in  effecting  repairs,  caused  by  the  trifling  acci- 
dents which  are  always  occurring  in  handling  these 
aerial  monsters.  Thus,  a  ruinous  bill  of  cost  is 
quickly  arrived  at. 

And,  as  against  all  these  disadvantages,  the  air- 
ship, as  has  been  shown,  has  few,  if  any,  definite 
advantages  over  the  aeroplane.  It  can  remain  in 
the  air  longer,  it  is  true ;  and  it  can,  at  the  moment 
at  any  rate,  carry  heavier  loads.  But  the  great  size 
of  its  envelope  has,  so  far,  made  it  the  plaything 
of  any  high  wind ;  and  its  bulk,  in  addition,  renders 
it  apparently  impossible  to  force  it  through  the  air  at 
anything  like  the  speed  attained  by  the  aeroplane. 
Under  favourable  conditions,  airship  speeds  of  from 
thirty  to  thirty-five  miles  an  hour  seem  to  represent 
the  best  results  yet  attained. 

Practical  comparisons,  between  dirigible  balloons 
and  aeroplanes,  were  possible  in  the  famous  French 
manoeuvres,  in  the  autumn  of  1910,  which  have  been 
previously  referred  to.  On  this  occasion,  the  aero- 
planes were  out,  and  at  work  in  gusty  winds,  when 
the  dirigibles  were  compelled  to  remain  in  their  sheds. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       67 

And,  when  the  airships  did  emerge,  it  was  a  subject 
of  comment  that,  in  comparison  with  the  aeroplanes, 
they  offered  quite  an  easy  mark  for  gun-fire. 

This  fact  must  be  remembered,  also.  In  actual 
warfare,  the  dirigible  balloon  would,  inevitably,  fall 
a  prey  to  an  attack  by  aeroplane.  Aided  by  their 
greater  speed,  and  by  the  fact  that  they  could 
probably  approach  quite  near  to  a  dirigible  without 
being  seen,  aeroplanes  would  be  able  to  rise  above 
its  gas-containing  envelope,  and  wreck  the  craft  by 
dropping  a  destructive  bomb. 

Such  points  as  these  have,  of  course,  weighed 
with  the  experts  of  Germany  and  France.  Neither 
country  has  abandoned  research  work  in  regard  to 
dirigibles.  It  is  quite  likely,  in  fact,  that  further 
improvements  may  be  made  with  these  machines, 
which  will  better  fit  them  for  use  in  warfare.  But,  at 
the  present  time,  when  any  contrast  of  utiHty  is  made, 
the  aeroplane  is  immeasurably  the  more  practical 
weapon;  and,  whereas  a  limited  expenditure  upon 
experimental  work  with  lighter-than-air  machines  is 
not  to  be  questioned,  it  is  to  the  aeroplane  corps 
that  any  War  Department  must  look  for  reliable, 
everyday  service  in  war-tim.e. 


IV 

Dangers  of  a  policy  of  *'  drift '' — Experience  which  money 
cannot  buy — Trained  men,  not  so  much  as  machines, 
the  criterion  of  strength. 

In  connection  with  military  airmanship,  there  is 
no  policy  more  dangerous  than  that  which  may  be 
summed  up  in  the  word,  "  drift." 


68      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

It  must  be  admitted  that,  until  quite  recently,  the 
official  policy  in  England,  as  regards  the  war  aero- 
plane, could  thus  be  summarised: 

There  is  no  danger  in*  shirking  the  responsibility 
of  a  definite  aerial  programme — despite  the  strides 
made  abroad — because  a  fleet  of  war  aeroplanes  can 
be  bought  or  constructed  at  any  time,  should  urgent 
need  arise. 

It  was  not  a  policy  such  as  this  that  the  Admiralty 
pursued  in  connection  with  submarines.  Here  was 
a  new  and  untried  addition  to  naval  armament 
Without  hesitating,  or  waiting  while  some  other 
country  proved  its  value  in  actual  tests,  the  Admiralty 
used  common  sense,  and  spent  money  willingly  upon 
a  fleet  of  submarines.  A  full  test  of  their  use,  in 
actual  naval  warfare,  has  yet  to  be  made;  but  the 
experimental  nature  of  the  machines  has  not  deterred 
the  Admiralty  from  making  definite  advancement 
with  them. 

Had  the  War  Office  pursued  such  a  poHcy  as  this 
in  regard  to  aeroplanes,  we  should  now  have  a  fleet 
of  aircraft  as  large  as  that  of  any  other  nation. 

It  is  an  undignified  attitude  to  watch  other  nations 
at  work  upon  the  aeroplane  problem,  without  spend- 
ing money,  and  then  to  step  in  at  the  last  moment, 
and  profit  by  their  experience. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  strict  economy,  and 
setting  all  other  considerations  aside,  such  a  policy 
might  find  acceptance,  were  it  not  for  circumstances 
over  which  those  who  advocate  it  have  no  control. 

At  any  moment,  for  instance,  while  one  country  is 
waiting  for  another  to  evolve  an  ideal  aeroplane,  a 
war  may  break  out.  In  such  an  event,  a  cheese- 
paring policy  would  place  its  advocates  in  an  awk- 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       69 

ward  position.  Even  granting  that  they  were  using 
experimental  machines,  the  nation  which  actually 
possessed  a  well-equipped  aerial  fleet,  at  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities,  would  have  an  immense  advantage 
over  the  country  which  did  not. 

Wars,  when  they  do  break  out,  generally  come 
quickly.  There  would  be  little  opportunity  for  a 
laggard  nation  to  rush  together  an  aerial  fleet  at  the 
last  moment;  or,  even  if  it  could  do  so,  lack  of 
organisation  would  render  such  an  air-force  prac- 
tically inoperative. 

Even  setting  aside  the  danger  of  war  suddenly 
arising,  and  assuming  that  a  waiting  policy  has 
no  immediate  risks,  the  negative  programme  has 
another  fatal  drawback.  Even  if,  at  the  last 
moment,  large  sums  of  money  were  expended  upon 
an  air-fleet,  and  there  was  time  to  provide  both 
machines  and  men,  the  nation  which  had  neglected 
aviation  would  still  be  lacking  in  the  one  essential  for 
success. 

That  essential  is  experience.  No  money,  how- 
ever lavishly  spent,  can  buy  the  experience  which 
France  and  Germany  are  obtaining,  day  by  day,  in 
their  pioneer  work  in  handHng  war  aeroplanes. 

Any  form  of  aerial  work  is  new  to  man;  and  at 
first,  when  he  attempts  it,  he  is  a  fumbler.  He  has 
no  confidence  in  himself,  and  so  he  makes  mistakes. 
But,  if  he  is  given  an  opportunity  of  being  in  the  air 
a  good  deal,  and  has  a  chance  of  handling  aircraft, 
not  once  or  twice,  but  practically  all  day  long,  for 
months  on  end,  he  becomes,  gradually,  quite  accus- 
tomed to  his  work. 

Instead  of  being  anxious,  and  inclined  to  get  into 
trouble  through  an  excess  of  caution,  he  acquires  a 


70      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

cool,  firm  judgment,  and  soon  astonishes  even  him- 
self by  his  feeling  of  security  when  in  the  air. 

This  is  the  opinion  of  all  skilled  airmen;  an 
ounce  of  practice  is  worth  a  ton  of  theory.  How 
was  it  that  the  quiet,  unassuming  French  naval 
officer,  Lieutenant  Conneau,  was  able  to  win  all  the 
great  flying  prizes  during  the  season  of  191 1  ?  There 
is  only  one  answer:  he  was  more  experienced  than 
his  rivals. 

With  absolute  thoroughness,  this  man  began  at  the 
very  beginning.  He  studied  the  laws  of  the  air  first 
of  all ;  then  he  made  himself  acquainted  with  the  con- 
struction of  machines,  and  of  motors.  Afterwards 
he  began  to  fly.  He  progressed  from  stage  to  stage, 
with  no  impatience,  or  haste. 

He  undertook  cross-country  flights  to  note  exactly 
what  climatic  conditions  prevailed.  He  studied 
maps  very  closely,  and  tested  compasses.  He  grew 
accustomed  to  being  in  the  air ;  and  he  learned  how 
to  combat  adverse  winds.  He  acquired  the  skill 
necessary  to  steer  a  straight  course  across  country, 
and  to  make  landings  upon  all  sorts  of  ground. 

And  then,  so  equipped,  he  entered  for  the  prin- 
cipal long-distance  races.  Because  he  was  absolutely 
competent  in  every  way,  he  astonished  everyone  by 
the  perfection  of  his  flying.  He  made  no  mistakes. 
He  flew  correctly  from  one  control  to  another.  He 
did  not  fear  gusty  winds.  He  did  not  damage  his 
machine.     And  so  he  won. 

There  are,  in  the  air  service  of  France,  many 
such  men  as  this.  Neither  France  nor  Germany, 
for  the  matter  of  that,  are  content  with  buying 
and  building  machines.  These  they  regard  as 
being   experimental,   and   hkely  to   be   superseded 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       71 

by  faster,  stronger  aircraft.  What  they  do  consider 
of  vital  importance  is  the  steady,  irresistible  growth 
in  the  number  of  their  airmen,  and  the  fact  that, 
every  day,  these  men  are  becoming  more  expert  in 
the  handling  of  their  machines,  and  in  the  carrying 
out  of  their  duties  as  pilots  and  observers. 

The  lead  which  France  and  Germany  have 
obtained  in  military  airmanship  should  not,  indeed, 
be  reckoned  so  much  in  machines,  as  in  men;  and 
England's  backwardness  should  be  gauged  in  a 
similar  way. 

In  considering  the  danger  of  a  laggard  position 
in  regard  to  men,  rather  than  machines,  a  point  of 
great  importance  arises.  It  concerns  the  length 
of  time  required  to  make  a  military  airman 
thoroughly  proficient. 

The  experience  of  France  and  Germany  has  now 
proved,  fairly  definitely,  that  a  completely  competent 
military  flyer  can  only  be  produced  after  an  arduous 
period  of  tuition,  and  practical  tests.  It  has  been 
laid  down,  in  fact,  that  to  produce  a  military  airman 
who  thoroughly  understands  his  work,  a  year  or 
eighteen  months'  hard  training  is  required.  The 
importance  of  this  point  is  self-evident.  Apathy  may 
place  a  nation  years  behind. 

A  great  deal,  when  the  international  relations  of 
Europe  are  concerned,  can  happen  in  a  year;  and  it 
is  a  perilous  thing  for  any  country  to  be  far  behind 
in  regard  to  what  is,  admittedly,  a  vitally-important 
weapon. 

Thus  it  is  clear  that  England  cannot  hope  to 
make  up  for  a  laggard  policy  even  by  the  expen- 
sive method  of  acquiring  aeroplanes,  post-haste, 
at   the   last   moment.     We    might    buy    machines, 


72       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

it  is  true,  but  we  could  not  buy  airmen  of  the  type 
that  France  and  Germany  are  rapidly  training,  in 
well-organised  squadrons. 

It  has  been  assumed  that  machines  might  be 
bought  in  a  hurry;  but  there  is  some  doubt  even 
on  this  score.  Little  encouragement  has  been  given 
to  home  manufacturers.  They  would  scarcely  have 
facilities  for  producing  machines  in  large  numbers, 
even  if  it  were  a  matter  of  urgency.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  makers  in  France  and  Germany,  always 
well  supported  by  Government  orders,  have  most 
complete  workshops. 

It  might  easily  happen,  in  a  case  of  urgent  need, 
that  we  should  be  compelled  to  go  abroad  in  an 
endeavour  to  obtain  machines.  In  such  a  case,  we 
might  obtain  them ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  we  might 
not.  Whatever  the  result,  it  would  be  highly  un- 
satisfactory for  a  country  to  be  dependent  upon 
foreign  makers  for  its  war  aeroplanes. 

In  the  matter  of  aeroplane  engines,  the  fact  that 
we  have  no  motor  in  England  to  equal  the 
"  Gnome  "  is  because  no  financial  support  has  been 
forthcoming,  in  this  country,  for  aviation.  To  con- 
struct a  successful  engine,  means  the  laying  down 
of  a  large  sum  of  money  in  preliminary  tests.  A 
number  of  experimental  motors  have  to  be  made, 
and  then  "scrapped"  again.  As  much  as  ;^  10,000 
may  be  spent,  before  success  is  attained. 

In  France,  with  a  Government  eager  to  encourage 
progress,  by  the  practical  method  of  buying  machines, 
men  with  capital  have  been  found  to  finance  the 
constructor  who  has  ideas.  This  is  why  France  has 
the  best  motors  and  the  best  aeroplanes,  and  why  we 
have  to  buy  French-built  engines  and  machines. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       73 

Instances  such  as  this  throw  into  clear  relief  the 
fact  that  Government  apathy,  concerning  such  a  new 
industry  as  that  of  building  aeroplanes  and  engines, 
has  an  evil  effect  which  is  widespread,  and  lasting. 


England's  official  awakening — The  training  of  lOO  airmen 
— The  forthcoming  trials  of  military  machines. 

Having  dealt  with  England's  backwardness,  it  is 
now  only  fair  that  the  authorities  should  be  given 
credit  for  their  recent  promise  of  a  changed 
programme. 

In  the  first  place,  attention  may  be  directed  to 
the  official  scheme  for  training  a  corps  of  lOO  mili- 
tary airmen.  This,  announced  towards  the  end  of 
last  year  by  Colonel  Seely,  Parliamentary  Under- 
Secretary  of  State  for  War,  has  already  been  put 
into  operation  in  a  limited  degree. 

The  officers  chosen  for  aerial  work  are  picked 
from  various  regiments.  They  are  allowed  to  attend 
any  flying  school  they  select,  and  the  authorities 
pay  their  tuition  fees.  When  they  have  passed  the 
tests  for  their  certificates  as  airmen,  they  are  taken 
in  hand  at  the  military  flying  school  on  Salisbury 
Plain,  and  are  given  instruction  as  military  pilots  or 
observers. 

When  they  have  attained  proficiency  in  this 
direction,  they  return  to  their  regiments,  and  are 
afterwards  called  upon,  from  time  to  time,  to  undergo 
"  refresher  "  courses  of  military  flying. 

The    criticism    which    is    levelled    against    this 


74       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

scheme  is  that  officers  should  be  permanently 
attached  to  the  air-corps,  and  should  never  be 
allowed  to  reHnquish  their  flying  duties.  Experts 
who  hold  this  view  affirm  that  "  refresher  "  courses 
are  not  sufficient  to  keep  a  man  thoroughly  au  fait 
with  such  special  work  as  military  aviation. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  relief  which  has  been 
expressed  at  the  taking  up  by  the  War  Office  of  any 
definite  programme,  has  had  the  effect  of  robbing 
such  criticisms  as  these  of  their  sting.  If  the  plan 
described  were  to  be  adopted  as  a  permanent  poHcy 
there  would,  indeed,  be  grave  cause  for  complaint. 
French  and  German  military  pilots  are  placed  once 
and  for  all  in  the  air-corps,  and  are  not  withdrawn. 

But  the  scheme  of  our  authorities  must  only 
be  regarded  as  a  beginning.  Directly  any  really 
definite  work  is  done,  the  value  of  a  well-equipped 
air-corps  will  be  so  strikingly  demonstrated  that 
there  should  be  little  difficulty  in  extending  the 
Government  programme. 

The  ideal,  undoubtedly,  is  a  large  and  extremely 
skilful  corps  of  pilots  and  observers,  who  do 
nothing  save  perfect  themselves  in  their  aerial 
duties.  An  airman  cannot  have  too  much  actual 
flying  practice ;  in  every  aerial  voyage  he  makes,  he 
learns  some  useful  lesson.  The  French  policy  is: 
once  a  military  airman,  always  a  miHtary  airman. 

Naturally,  with  the  avowed  policy  of  training 
these  lOO  military  pilots,  the  War  Office  has  found 
it  necessary  to  acquire  more  machines.  From 
time  to  time,  therefore,  since  the  announcement  of 
this  scheme,  machines  have  been  bought  from  famous 
French  firms — notably  a  Breguet  biplane,  a  Nieu- 
port  monoplane,  and  a  Deperdussin  monoplane. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       75 

But  such  purchases  have  only  been  made  to  meet 
the  most  pressing  needs  of  the  flying  school.  What 
will  precede  any  large  orders  for  war  aeroplanes 
is  a  carefully-conducted  and  stringent  test  of  military 
machines,  which  will  be  thrown  open  to  the  world. 

The  conditions  for  these  trials,  which  will  be  held 
in  England  under  the  auspices  of  the  War  Office, 
probably  some  time  in  July  this  year,  were  issued  in 
December  last.  Critical  comment  has  granted  their 
practicability,  and  it  is  agreed  that  the  successful 
machines  will  represent  all  that  is  best  in  military 
aviation. 

One  criticism,  however,  is  that  the  sum  of  money 
which  will  be  expended  in  prizes,  ^ii,ooo,  is  not 
sufficiently  generous.  In  connection  with  the  191 1 
French  military  trials,  a  sum  of  more  than  ;^5o,ooo 
was  earmarked  by  the  Government  to  be  expended 
in  prizes,  and  in  orders  for  successful  machines. 

But,  in  the  forthcoming  English  contests,  there  is 
no  definite  financial  offer  save  the  ;^  11,000  men- 
tioned. It  is  stipulated,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that 
the  War  Office  shall  have  the  option  of  purchasing 
successful  machines  for  a  sum  of  ;^iooo;  but  there 
is  no  guarantee  expressed  that  such  purchases  shall 
be  made.  Of  course,  it  is  expected  that  winning 
machines  will  be  ordered  in  certain  quantities,  and 
no  doubt  such  will  be  the  poHcy  adopted.  But 
makers  cannot  count,  definitely,  upon  this  being 
done. 

However,  moderate  though  the  financial  induce- 
ments are,  there  is  little  doubt  but  that  a  satisfactory 
number  of  machines  will  be  entered  for  the  tests. 
EngHsh  manufacturers,  whose  inducements  to  spend 
money  have,  in  the  past,  been  so  few,  are  determined 


76      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

to  make  a  good  show.  Both  in  connection  with  the 
main  prize,  and  also  in  a  subsidiary  contest  for 
British-built  machines,  in  which  the  principal  award 
is  ;^i5oo,  the  home  manufacturers  are  keen  to 
demonstrate  what  their  machines  can  do. 

Already,  it  has  been  proved  that  English  work- 
manship has  nothing  to  fear  from  foreign  competi- 
tion. All  that  the  industry  in  this  country  lacks  is 
the  steady,  regular  production  which  is  maintained 
in  France.  The  building  of  machines  teaches 
lessons  which  are  invaluable.  What  English  manu- 
facturers have  not  yet  been  able  to  acquire,  is  the 
confidence,  and  intimate  knowledge  of  their  business, 
which  only  come  from  a  healthy  state  of  demand  and 
supply. 

The  details  of  the  War  Office  contest  have  already 
been  so  fully  discussed  that  it  is  only  necessary,  here, 
to  refer  to  their  principal  features.  One  of  the  most 
important  requirements  is  that  the  aeroplanes  should 
be  able  to  carry  a  live  load  of  350  lb.,  in  addition  to 
their  equipment  of  instruments,  and  raise  this  weight, 
as  well  as  sufficient  fuel  for  a  four-and-a-half  hour's 
flight. 

A  three-hour's  non-stop  flight,  fully  loaded,  will 
be  required.  Machines  will  also  be  called  upon  to 
maintain,  for  an  hour's  voyage,  a  height  of  4500  feet. 
They  will,  in  addition,  have  to  ascend  to  an  altitude 
of  1000  feet,  at  the  rate  of  200  feet  a  minute. 

These  requirements  are  certainly  hard  to  fulfil.  A 
machine,  very  greatly  in  advance  of  anything  yet 
produced,  will  be  needed  to  pass  through  such  ordeals 
successfully. 

As  regards  speed,  the  competing  aeroplanes  will 
need  to  attain  a  rate  of  fifty-five  miles  an  hour,  when 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       77 

fully  loaded.  Another  requirement  is  that  they  should 
plane  down  to  the  ground,  in  a  calm,  from  a  height 
of  not  more  than  looo  feet,  and  traverse  a  horizontal 
distance  of  not  less  than  6000  feet  before  touching 
ground.  They  will  be  called  upon  to  rise  from  long 
grass,  clover,  or  harrowed  land  in  a  distance  of  100 
yards,  when  fully  loaded. 

The  silencing  of  engines  is  to  be  regarded — and 
quite  rightly — as  an  important  advantage.  Minor 
points  are  that  machines  must  be  easily  dismantled ; 
that  parts  must  be  interchangeable;  and  that  the 
observer's  view,  from  a  machine,  must  be  as  unob- 
structed as  possible. 

The  importance  of  this  interesting  contest,  to  be 
held  in  England,  cannot  be  over-estimated.  It  will 
be  a  revelation,  to  all  concerned,  as  to  the  capabilities 
of  the  modern-type,  war  machine,  and  should  open 
up  a  new  and  satisfactory  era  in  military  flying  in 
this  country. 


NOTE 

The  aerial  programme  of  the  War  Office,  for  the 
year  191 2-13,  is  dealt  with  on  fages  1 81-187. 


SIXTH    SECTION 

WAR    AEROPLANES    AT    THE    PARIS    AERONAUTICAL 
EXHIBITION,     DECEMBER,    I9II 

I 

Latest-type  military  monoplanes — ^Two-seated,  reconnoi- 
tring machines — Single-seated,  high-speed  aircraft. 

At  the  Paris  aeroplane  salon,  which  marked  the 
close  of  the  aeronautical  season  of  19 ii,  a  striking 
display  of  war  machines  was  made.  The  year,  as 
has  been  indicated,  was  full  of  progress;  and  the 
result  of  all  the  experience  gained  was  clearly  seen 
in  the  aircraft  exhibited,  and  particularly  in  the 
miHtary  monoplanes  staged. 

As  a  type,  the  two-seated  scouting  machine, 
capable  of  high-speed  flight  for  several  hours,  when 
carrying  pilot  and  observer,  was  most  interestingly 
represented.  Many  difficulties  had  been  overcome 
in  connection  with  this  machine — primarily  that  of 
affording  the  observer  a  fairly-unobstructed  view  of 
the  land  below.  In  early-type  military  monoplanes, 
the  spread  of  the  wings  had  curtailed  seriously  the 
reconnoitring  officer's  scope  of  vision.  But,  in  the 
monoplanes  seen  at  the  Paris  show,  the  wings  had 
been  so  set  back,  and  the  observer's  seat  so  arranged, 
that  it  was  possible  for  him  to  secure,  when  in  flight, 
a  thoroughly  practical,  bird's-eye  view  of  the  country 
below  him. 

78 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       79 

Another  problem  solved,  was  in  regard  to  engine- 
power.  In  the  first  instance,  with  fifty  horse-power 
"  Gnomes,"  two-seated  monoplanes  had  been  under- 
engined ;  and  their  flying  capabilities  had  suffered  in 
consequence.  But  the  machines  built  towards  the 
end  of  191 1  were  equipped  with  seventy  horse- 
power "  Gnomes,"  and — in  some  instances — ^with 
motors  of  a  hundred  horse-power.  The  result  was 
that  a  reserve  of  power  was  obtained,  to  say  nothing 
of  a  very  desirable  increase  in  speed. 

As  regards  the  landing-chassis,  a  somewhat  weak 
point  with  early-type,  two-sleated  monoplanes,  an 
improvement  was  observable  in  the  machines  con- 
structed towards  the  close  of  the  flying  season  of 
191 1.  Not  only  had  the  landing  gear  been 
strengthened,  but — in  many  cases — simplified  as  well, 
which  meant  a  commendable  lessening  of  head  resis- 
tance, when  in  rapid  flight.  But,  in  this  regard, 
miHtary  critics  did  not  admit  that  they  were  altogether 
satisfied— even  by  the  machines  seen  at  the  Paris 
show.  A  stronger,  more  rough-and-ready  chassis  is 
demanded  ;  but  it  must  be  remembered,  in  fairness  to 
existing  military  monoplanes,  that  they  succeeded, 
in  the  French  trials,  in  landing  upon,  and  rising 
from,  ground  which  was  fairly  rough. 

So  far  as  personal  comfort  is  concerned,  a  point 
certainly  worth  consideration  in  long  flights,  the 
latest-type  reconnoitring  machine  reveals  interesting 
features.  Pilot  and  observer  are,  for  example, 
screened  so  far  as  is  possible  from  the  rush  of  wind. 
Their  seats  are  comfortably  placed.  Map-holder, 
compass,  engine-revolution  indicator,  and  other 
fitments  are  neatly  arranged.  Dual  control  has  be- 
come almost  a  standard  device,  thus  enabling  either 


80       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

occupant  of  the  machine  to  take  charge,  while  in 
flight,  without  change  of  seats. 

Of  two-seated,  miHtary  monoplanes  at  the  Paris 
exhibition,  it  is  probable  that  the  Nieuport,  Bleriot, 
and  Deperdussin  attracted  most  serious  attention; 
and  genuine  interest  was  also  aroused  by  the  lonely 
prominence  of  one  British  exhibit — that  of  the 
Bristol  passenger  monoplane.  As  definite  evidence 
of  the  capabilities  of  this  machine,  Mr  James 
Valentine  had,  a  day  or  so  prior  to  the  exhibition, 
piloted,  in  a  flight  over  Paris,  a  sister  monoplane  to 
that  which  was  shown. 

Military  authorities,  who  visited  the  Paris  salon, 
directed  very  serious  attention  to  the  single-seated, 
high-speed  war  monoplanes  which  were  on  view. 
Here  is  to  be  found  the  emergence  of  a  machine  of 
a  very  definite  and  important  type. 

It  was  with  great  interest,  and  some  surprise, 
during  the  progress  of  the  French  military  trials,  in 
October,  191 1,  that  those  interested  in  airmanship 
read  of  the  ordering,  by  the  French  authorities,  of 
a  large  number  of  single-seated  monoplanes.  The 
surprise,  it  should  be  mentioned,  was  occasioned  by 
the  fact  that  single-seated  machines  should  have  been 
purchased  just  at  a  time  when  passenger  monoplanes 
were  arousing  most  interest. 

But  the  French  military  experts  knew  their  own 
needs.  They  had  mapped  out,  for  the  single-seated, 
almost  racing-type  machine,  an  important  field  of 
activity  in  war-time.  They  saw  that,  under  actual 
service  conditions,  there  would  be  definite  demand 
for  a  scouting  aeroplane  which  would  make  a  very 
rapid,  general  survey  of  the  position  of  the  enemy's 
troops. 


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THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       81 

In  such  a  machine,  they  decided,  speed  would  be 
the  all-important  requirement;  and,  seeing  that  the 
survey  to  be  made  would  be  comprehensive,  and  not 
detailed,  it  was  reckoned  that  the  pilot  would  be 
able  to  do  all  that  was  required,  thereby  saving  the 
carrying  of  a  passenger,  and  enabling  greater  pace 
to  be  obtained. 

In  several  of  the  single-seated,  high-speed  mono- 
planes, as  seen  at  the  Paris  show,  it  is  possible  to 
attain  a  flying  rate  of  approximately  eighty  miles 
an  hour.  In  such  a  machine,  it  is  intended  that  the 
officer-pilot  should,  in  war-time,  effect  a  swift  dash 
over  the  enemy's  lines,  and  fly  back,  without  an  in- 
stant's delay,  with  whatever  observations  he  has  been 
able  to  make.  Apart  from  being  able  to  return  very 
rapidly  to  Headquarters,  the  airman's  high  speed 
would,  of  course,  be  an  appreciable  factor  in  his 
favour,  when  subjected  to  artillery  fire. 

Such  quick  reconnoitring,  carried  out  by  the  pilot 
of  a  fast-flying  monoplane,  will  only  be  effica- 
cious in  detecting  the  movements  of  considerable 
bodies  of  troops.  For  detailed  reconnaissance, 
without  doubt,  the  two-seated  monoplane,  carrying 
its  highly-skilled  observer,  will  be  relied  upon — as, 
also,  will  the  weight-carrying  biplane,  to  which  refer- 
ence will  be  made  in  our  next  section. 

It  may  now,  perhaps,  be  permissible  to  summarise 
some  of  the  advantages  of  the  latest-type  military 
monoplanes.  Primarily,  of  course,  their  value  lies 
in  their  speed.  In  war-time,  some  reconnoitring 
flights  will  be  more  urgent  than  others ;  but  it  may 
be  taken  for  granted  that,  in  practically  all  circum- 
stances, the  speedy  completion  of  a  reconnaissance 
will  be  greatly  to  be  desired.     Thus,  in  the  eyes  of  a 

F 


82       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

Commander-in-Chief,  the  fast-flying  monoplane  will 
find  the  highest  possible  favour. 

A  definite  advantage  of  the  monoplane's  speed 
will  lie  in  its  ability  to  fly  in  high,  gusty  winds.  It 
will,  indeed,  require  very  adverse  conditions  to  pre- 
vent the  flight  of  a  bold  and  expert  airman,  piloting 
an  eighty-mile-an-hour  machine.  This  point,  natu- 
rally, will  have  especial  significance  during  the 
progress  of  an  actual  campaign. 

In  the  forthcoming  trials  of  military  aeroplanes, 
to  be  conducted  by  the  War  OflSce,  it  is  certain 
that  powerful,  two-seated  monoplanes,  propelled  by 
seventy  and  hundred  horse-power  engines,  will 
play  an  important  part. 


II 

Latest  developments  in  biplane  construction — ^The  engine- 
in-front,  weight-carrying  machine. 

The  varied  experience  of  the  year  191 1,  so  far  as 
the  use  of  military  biplanes  was  concerned,  revealed 
very  definite  results  at  the  Paris  aeroplane  exhibition 
in  December. 

The  influence  of  monoplane  construction,  upon 
the  design  of  many  of  the  biplanes  shown,  was 
marked.  Clearly  revealed,  for  example,  was  the 
comparatively  new  school — initiated  by  the  Breguet 
— in  which  the  engine  is  fixed  in  the  bow  of  the 
biplane,  as  in  monoplane  practice,  and  a  form  of 
body  almost  identical  with  that  of  a  monoplane 
is  adopted. 

Such  machines,  seeing  that  they  employ  rear 
elevating  planes,   as  do   monoplanes,   are  biplanes 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       83 

only  in  the  sense  that  they  are  fitted  with  two  main- 
planes,  set  one  above  another.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
in  regard  to  the  Breguet — a  notable  representative 
of  this  type — the  description  "  biplane  "  is  occasion- 
ally dropped,  and  the  machine  called  a  "  double- 
monoplane." 

One  of  the  practical  advantages  of  the  engine- 
in-front  system  is  in  regard  to  the  possibility  of 
a  bad  descent.  In  the  event  of  an  abrupt  dive 
to  the  ground,  with  a  machine  of  this  construction, 
the  engine,  and  strengthened  forepart  of  the  body, 
take  the  brunt  of  the  shock.  In  machines  where 
the  power-plant  is  fixed  behind  the  main-planes, 
a  danger  has  revealed  itself  of  the  motor  being 
wrenched  from  its  wooden  bed,  and  falling  forward 
upon  the  pilot — with  disastrous  results. 

Two  notable  exceptions  to  this  new  method  of 
construction  are  those  of  Henry  and  Maurice  Far- 
man.  They  still  maintain  the  system  of  placing 
engines  behind  the  main-planes,  and  of  setting  pilots 
in  front  of  them. 

But  the  Henry  Farman  military  biplane,  as  seen 
at  the  end  of  191 1,  was  a  very  different  machine 
from  that,  for  example,  upon  which  Louis  Paulhan 
made  his  flight  from  London  to  Manchester  in 
April,  1 910. 

Probably  the  most  obvious  of  the  new  features 
introduced  was  that  of  placing  both  pilot  and 
observer  in  seats  set  upon  a  wooden  framework, 
which  projected  in  front  of  the  main-planes.  The 
object  of  this  innovation  was  to  provide  a  pilot, 
or  reconnoitring  officer,  with  the  most  unobstructed 
view  possible  of  the  ground  below  him.  The  ob- 
jection to  the  scheme  was  that  the  exposed  position 


84      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

made  it  highly  probable  that  the  occupants  of  the 
machine  would  bear  the  full  brunt  of  the  impact,  in 
the  case  of  a  bad  descent. 

Another  feature  of  the  Henry  Farman  military 
biplane,  which  is  under  review,  was  the  "  stag- 
gering "  of  the  planes.  Farman  adopted  the  plan 
of  setting  his  upper  main-plane  appreciably  in 
advance  of  the  lower  one.  The  "  staggering  "  of 
planes  is  seriously  criticised,  by  technical  experts,  on 
many  grounds.  But,  in  this  case,  Farman  seems  to 
have  decided  upon  the  system,  in  regard  to  his 
military  machine,  in  order  to  facilitate  a  descent  on 
rough  ground,  and  also  to  assist  the  heavily-laden 
aircraft  in  getting  away  from  the  ground,  and  in 
"  climbing."  The  biplane  certainly  performed  meri- 
toriously in  the  French  military  trials. 

At  first  operating  individually,  but  now  in  part- 
nership with  his  brother  Henry,  Maurice  Farman 
constructed,  towards  the  end  of  191 1,  an  interesting 
type  of  military  biplane.  The  Maurice  Farman 
machine  may  be  said  to  have  come  first  into  definite 
prominence  when  Tabutean  flew  for  more  than 
eight  hours  in  it  in   1910,   securing  the   Michelin 

Cup. 

A  large  machine,  with  extensions  to  its  main- 
planes,  capable  of  carrying  a  very  heavy  load,  and 
of  remaining  in  the  air  for  a  long  time,  but  being 
an  awkward  craft  in  a  high  wind,  save  for  the  most 
expert  pilot — in  such  terms,  one  may  describe  the 
Maurice  Farman.  What  a  skilled  airman  can  do 
with  such  a  big,  slow-flying  machine,  has  been 
shown  by  Renaux,  who  piloted  his  Maurice  Farman 
right  round  the  1030-miles  course  of  the  Circuit  of 
Europe ;  but  there  were,  of  course,  times  when  the 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       85 

monoplanes  flew  in  a  wind  which  kept  him  in  his 
shed.  It  should  be  stated,  to  the  credit  of  the 
Maurice  Farman,  that  it  achieved  excellent  results 
in  the  French  trials. 

Reference  has  been  made  to  the  Breguet.  This 
is  a  biplane  of  a  most  progressive  type.  Steel  enters 
largely  into  its  construction.  It  has  a  tapering  body, 
with  controlling  planes  at  the  tail,  such  as  the 
monoplane  possesses ;  and,  in  addition,  it  is  equipped 
with  two  main  supporting  planes,  such  as  charac- 
terise the  biplane.  These  are  fitted  above  and  below 
the  body  of  the  machine. 

Constructionally,  its  outstanding  feature  is  its 
simplicity.  Instead  of  a  number  of  wooden  sup- 
ports between  the  main-planes,  held  in  place  by 
much  wiring,  the  Breguet  biplane  dispenses  with 
all  save  four  struts;  and  these  are  maintained  in 
position  by  a  minimum  of  wiring. 

The  result,  from  the  point  of  view  of  portability, 
is  that  a  great  stride  forward  is  effected.  The  main- 
planes  of  the  machine,  which  represent  its  bulky 
feature,  can  be  unshipped  in  a  few  minutes.  Nor 
is  this  all;  by  an  ingenious  system  of  hinging  the 
main-planes  to  the  body  of  the  biplane,  these 
planes  may  be  turned  back,  after  they  are  un- 
wired,  and  folded  beside  the  body  of  the  machine. 

A  result  is  thus  achieved  which  would  not  have 
been  considered  possible,  in  the  early  stages  of  aero- 
plane construction.  When  the  planes  are  folded  at  the 
sides  of  the  machine,  it  can  be  made  to  move  down 
a  road  like  a  motor-car,  with  its  engine  running, 
and  its  propeller  drawing  it  forward.  The  steering- 
wheel,  used  when  the  machine  is  in  flight,  is  con- 
nected with  a  small  front  running-wheel.  When  he  is 


86      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

on  the  ground,  therefore,  the  pilot  sits  in  his  driving- 
seat,  and  controls  his  craft  like  a  motorist. 

Such  features  as  this  commend  themselves,  as 
may  be  imagined,  to  military  experts.  The  Breguet 
biplane  possesses  other  original  features  also.  The 
main-planes,  being  constructed  with  thin  metal  ribs, 
are  flexible;  and  this  flexibility  gives  the  machine 
stability  when  assailed  by  wind-gusts. 

There  are  several  military  types  of  the  Breguet 
biplane.  There  is,  for  example  a  machine  built 
to  carry  a  pilot  and  an  observer;  and  another  type, 
more  powerful,  which  raises  a  "  crew  "  of  three  into 
the  air. 

The  latter  is  called  by  its  makers  the  "  cruiser  " 
biplane;  and  it  is  interesting  to  describe  how 
the  "  crew  "  is  disposed  upon  it.  First  comes  the 
engineer;  his  task  is  to  attend  to  the  motor.  He 
is  given  a  seat  right  up  in  the  bows  of  the  machine, 
and  just  behind  the  engine.  The  idea  of  having  a 
man  to  look  after  the  engine  is,  of  course,  an  excel- 
lent one ;  he  is  able  to  "  nurse  "  the  motor,  give  it 
every  attention,  and  detect  at  once  whether  it  is 
developing  any  troubles. 

Behind  the  engineer,  in  the  long,  boat-shaped  body 
of  the  biplane,  is  seated  the  observer.  He  is  free 
from  all  duties  save  the  carrying  out  of  his  observa- 
tion work.  He  has  his  maps  and  notebook — 
shielded  from  the  rush  of  wind — in  the  body  of  the 
machine  before  him. 

Behind  the  reconnoitring  officer  comes  the  pilot 
of  the  machine,  with  the  controlling  wheels  placed  in 
front  of  him.  His  attention  is  devoted  exclusively 
to  steering,  and  preserving  the  lateral  stability  of  the 
biplane. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       87 

This  division  of  duties  upon  an  aeroplane  is 
especially  useful  in  military  work;  and  it  will,  un- 
doubtedly, become  more  and  more  a  feature  of  war 
aircraft.  A  crew  of  three,  upon  a  reconnoitring 
machine,  represents  an  ideal  distribution  of  duties. 
An  engineer,  to  look  after  the  motor  when  in 
flight,  will  probably  become  more  and  more  of  a 
necessity,  as  engines  increase  in  power. 

A  machine  with  ample  engine-power  is  essential 
from  the  military  point  of  view.  It  not  only  means 
ability  to  withstand  wind-gusts,  but  it  spells,  also,  the 
power  to  rise  swiftly. 

This  power  of  quick-rising,  combined  with  high 
speed,  may  frequently  save  an  aeroplane  from 
destruction,  when  it  is  reconnoitring  over  a  hostile 
force.  The  ability  to  "  climb  "  speedily  is,  indeed, 
insisted  upon  by  those  who  frame  the  rules  for 
military  contests. 

Unknown  to  the  crew  of  a  war  machine,  they 
may  approach  within  range  of  a  concealed  battery. 
In  such  a  case,  a  shell  bursting  near  them  will 
probably  be  their  first  indication  of  peril. 

Instantly,  the  pilot  will  seek  to  put  as  great  a  dis- 
tance as  possible  between  himself  and  the  battery; 
and,  as  he  darts  off,  he  will  "  climb  "  as  quickly  as 
he  can.  In  such  circumstances  as  these  a  quick, 
handy  machine  would  probably  escape  unscathed, 
whereas  a  slow-moving  craft  might  run  grave  risk 
of  being  hit.  In  the  matter  of  speed,  a  machine 
like  the  Breguet  shows  a  very  distinct  improvement, 
as  compared  with  early-type  biplanes.  Thirty-five 
miles  an  hour  represented  the  speed  of  some  of 
the  first  biplanes  flown  in  France;  but  this  was 
increased,  before  long,  to  forty  miles  an  hour. 


88       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

Then  came  specially-built  biplanes,  really  racing 
craft,  which  caused  speeds  to  increase  from  forty  to 
forty-five,  and  fifty  miles  an  hour.  Now,  in  reference 
to  the  Breguet,  a  speed  of  sixty  miles  an  hour  is 
attained. 

In  regard  to  the  speed  of  biplanes  when  amply 
engined,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  Mr  Cody,  using  a 
1 20  horse-power  Austrian- Daimler  motor,  has  been 
credited  with  a  pace  of  seventy  miles  an  hour  at 
Farnborough. 

Concerning  the  development  of  big,  weight-carry- 
ing biplanes,  the  French  military  authorities  are  now 
definitely  credited  with  the  intention  of  using  such 
machines,  in  war-time,  for  destructive  purposes.  No 
official  announcement  of  policy,  in  this  connection, 
has  been  made;  but  the  statement  is  current,  and 
finds  general  acceptance  that,  in  the  case  of  a 
war  with  Germany,  large  biplanes  would  be  used 
by  France  along  the  German  frontier,  for  the 
purpose  of  dropping  bombs  upon  fortifications,  and 
frustrating  any  punitive  flights  of  German  air- 
ships. 

In  this  direction,  and  possibly  also  for  transport 
purposes,  the  future  of  the  weight-carrying  biplane 
seems  certainly  to  lie. 

Those  now  available  for  military  purposes  are 
designed  to  possess  a  maximum  of  lifting  power, 
with  reasonable  speed,  and  a  large  measure  of  porta- 
bility. They  possess  strong,  workmanHke  features, 
which  specially  suit  them  for  rough  service. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  an  observer,  in  obtain- 
ing a  maximum  of  unimpeded  vision  for  his  work, 
the  military  biplane  offers  distinct  advantages.  But 
the    relative    value    of    biplanes    and    monoplanes. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       89 

in  war-time,  can  only  be  established,  definitely,  by 
the  carefully-noted  experiences  of  a  campaign. 


Ill 

Healthy  position  of  the  French  industry — What  England 
has  lacked — Danger  of  neglecting  home  builders. 

The  competitive  element  in  France,  so  far  as 
aeroplane  construction  is  concerned,  has  been  fully 
aroused. 

There  is,  indeed,  every  encouragement  for  a  maker 
to  invest  his  money  in  the  production  of  a  machine. 
He  knows  that,  if  he  achieves  a  result  that  is  satis- 
factory from  the  military  point  of  view,  he  will 
receive  definite  Government  support,  in  the  shape  of 
an  order  for  one  or  more  machines. 

This,  of  course,  makes  all  the  difference  between 
development  and  stagnation.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  the  miHtary  authorities,  the  encouragement 
of  construction  has  another  important  effect,  also.  It 
directs  building  into  the  channel  which  they  desire  it 
to  follow — that  is  to  say,  towards  the  steady  improve- 
ment of  machines  suitable  for  purposes  of  war. 

By  this  process  of  placing  every  facility  in  the 
way  of  her  home  manufacturers,  France  ensures 
the  maintenance  of  her  lead,  so  far  as  military  aero- 
planes are  concerned.  The  most  talented  men  as 
designers,  and  the  most  practical  men  as  builders, 
are  always  busy  in  France,  seeking  to  improve  the 
machines  which  are  at  present  in  use. 

An  unfortunate  position,  so  far  as  England  is 
concerned,  was  revealed  in  connection  with  the  pre- 


90      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

liminary  announcement  of  the  intention  of  the  War 
Office  to  hold  a  miUtary  aeroplane  contest.  Starved 
for  lack  of  any  official  recognition  or  support,  repre- 
sentatives of  the  British  industry  pleaded  for  condi- 
tional orders  for  machines. 

In  the  general  advancement  of  the  science,  and 
particularly  so  far  as  costly  experiments  with 
aeroplane  engines  are  concerned.  Government 
apathy,  in  the  past,  has  brought  about  stagnation — 
and  the  use,  on  English  flying-grounds,  of  foreign- 
built  machines.  Will  this  forthcoming  season  show 
a  change  ?     It  is  sincerely  to  be  hoped  that  it  will. 

France  possesses  the  best  machines  to-day;  and 
she  intends  to  have  the  best  machines  to-morrow. 
She  is  in  the  best  position,  also,  to  profit  by  any 
revolutionary  discovery,  as  applied  to  aeroplaning— 
should  any  such  discovery  be  made. 

The  country  which  obtained  first  use  of  any  revolu- 
tionary discovery  would,  naturally,  be  in  a  command- 
ing position;  and,  if  any  such  discovery  is  made, 
there  is  little  doubt  but  that  it  will  be  made  in  France. 
This  is  what  a  country  secures  by  a  pioneer  policy 
in  any  new  science :  it  obtains  the  best  there  is  at  the 
moment,  and  practically  ensures,  also,  obtaining  the 
best  that  the  future  can  bring  forth. 

The  lack  of  anything  like  official  encouragement 
has,  hitherto,  thrown  a  definite  blight  over  aerial 
constructional  work  in  this  country.  Clever 
engineers  have  interested  themselves  in  the  problems 
arising;  but  experimental  work,  in  regard  to  aero- 
planing,  is  notoriously  expensive.  With  little  scope 
for  selling  machines,  when  they  have  built  them, 
British  manufacturers  have  had  no  stimulus  to  com- 
pete with  the  makers  in  France. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       91 

Of  coarse,  there  have  been  private  orders  for 
EngHsh  builders.  But  these  have  not  been  certain. 
A  series  of  definite  orders  from  the  Government — 
given  just  when  the  industry  needed  stimulating — 
would  have  made  all  the  difference. 

With  only  one  or  two  aeroplanes  actually  pur- 
chased, a  maker  knows  that  certain  of  his  expenses 
are  covered,  at  all  events;  and,  when  he  has  dis- 
posed of  three  of  four  machines,  even  if  his  profit 
is  small,  he  is  encouraged  to  embark  upon  fresh 
experiments. 

This  is  how  the  manufacturers  in  France  have  gone 
from  one  triumph  to  another.  They  have  built,  and 
sold,  machines  of  a  certain  type ;  and,  in  the  building 
of  them,  they  have  learned  a  number  of  lessons,  and 
have  seen  where  all  sorts  of  improvements  might 
be  made. 

Then,  having  transacted  some  genuine  business, 
and  established  a  factory  on  a  satisfactory  basis, 
they  are  ready,  and  able,  to  put  to  a  practical  test 
the  ideas  they  have  acquired  in  building  their  first 
machines.  This  is  how  such  world-famous  makers 
as  Bleriot  and  Farman  have  been  able  to  move 
forward. 

What  it  means  to  a  country  to  obtain  a  lead  in 
such  a  new  industry  as  that  of  building  flying 
machines  is  shown  now,  almost  every  day,  in  regard 
to  the  demand  which  has  sprung  up  for  war  aero- 
planes. Many  other  Governments  are,  as  has  been 
indicated,  following  the  lead  of  France  in  obtaining 
air-fleets ;  and,  to  make  a  beginning  they  have,  natu- 
rally, been  obliged  to  buy  aeroplanes. 

The  problem  has  arisen,  therefore,  as  to  where 
they  should  purchase  their  first  machines ;  and  they 


92       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

have  found  themselves  forced  to  go  to  the  French 
manufacturers,  simply  because  the  French  factories 
have  been  producing  the  best  aeroplanes. 

Thus  England,  Germany,  Russia,  Italy,  Spain, 
and  Japan  have  been  obliged  to  go  to  France  to  buy 
aeroplanes.  This  has  meant  more  money  for  ex- 
perimental work  in  France.  Therefore,  what  other 
nations  have  been  doing,  really,  has  been  to  help 
France  to  increase  her  lead,  by  giving  her  manu- 
facturers the  wherewithal  to  extend  their  researches. 
Thus  it  can  be  seen  how  important  it  is  for  a 
country  like  France  to  maintain  her  dominant 
position. 

It  is  true  that  other  nations,  having  made  initial 
purchases  from  the  French  aeroplane  manufacturers, 
will  try  to  improve  upon  these  machines  themselves, 
so  as  to  avoid  spending  any  more  money  out  of  their 
own  country.  But  in  this  their  success  is,  to  a  cer- 
tain extent,  doubtful.  They  may  study  French-built 
machines,  and  may  see  where  improvements  are 
possible.  Then  they  may  seek  to  construct  machines 
of  their  own.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that 
France,  helped  by  the  money  which  these  other 
countries  have  spent  with  her,  is  progressing  rapidly 
all  the  while. 

The  other  countries,  beginners  in  the  construc- 
tion of  aeroplanes,  are  sure  to  make  slow  progress; 
but  France,  with  every  facility  to  hand,  will  go  ahead 
quickly.  Thus,  while  other  countries  are  seeking  to 
improve  upon  the  machines  which  they  have  bought 
in  France,  it  is  probable  that  the  French  manu- 
facturers will  have  gone  ahead  several  stages 
further,  and  will  be  able  to  maintain  a  commanding 
lead. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       93 

Not  only  in  the  purchase  of  military  machines, 
but  in  regard  to  aeroplanes  for  private  use,  France  is 
reaping  the  reward  of  her  go-ahead  policy.  Large 
numbers  of  French-built  aeroplanes  have  been 
purchased  by  airmen  in  other  countries.  The 
reason,  of  course,  is  not  far  to  seek.  Patriotism 
is  one  thing,  the  obtaining  of  the  best  aeroplane 
another. 

Exceptionally  large  prizes  have  been  offered  for 
aeroplane  contests,  and  it  has  been  the  desire  of  all 
competitors  to  secure  either  the  fastest  or  the  most 
reliable  machine,  as  the  case  may  be.  Therefore, 
following  the  example  of  the  military  authorities,  the 
airmen  of  various  countries  have  gone  to  France  for 
their  machines,  and  have  further  swelled  the  re- 
sources of  the  French  makers. 

Some  Englishmen  of  wealth  and  leisure  have, 
greatly  to  their  credit,  supported  and  encouraged  the 
home  manufacturers  in  their  struggle  against  the 
general  apathy  prevailing.  The  effect  of  their 
action  has  been  apparent  in  the  production  of  more 
than  one  aeroplane  which  has  indicated,  clearly,  that 
all  the  industry  in  this  country  requires  is  steady 
development  along  the  right  Unes. 

It  is  often  said  in  England  that  we  shall,  in  regard 
to  aeroplanes,  follow  the  policy  which  was  adopted 
concerning  the  motor-car.  That  is  to  say,  we  shall 
allow  the  foreigner  to  do  all  the  pioneer  work,  and 
then  step  in,  and  produce  a  perfected  machine  just 
as  well  as  he  can. 

But  aeroplanes  are  not  in  the  same  category  as 
motor-cars.  Besides,  it  is  not  our  business  here  to 
deal  with  the  commercial  aspects  of  the  case.  We 
are  not  arguing  the  cause  of  the  aeroplane  from  the 


94      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

point  of  view  of  trade.     The  matter  is  one  of  national 
safety. 

And  this  is  the  position.  It  will  probably 
be  many  years  hence  before  anyone  will  be  able 
to  say:  "Here  is  the  perfected  aeroplane.  Now 
we  can  equip  factories,  and  standardise  our 
output." 

What  will  more  likely  eventuate,  as  we  have 
hinted,  is  a  gradually  improving  war  aeroplane. 
During  the  years  that  improvements  are  being 
sought  in  France — and  found — we  cannot  afford  to 
"  sit  on  the  fence."  In  the  matter  of  some  commer- 
cial development,  it  might  be  possible  to  pursue  a 
laggard  poHcy,  while  another  go-ahead  country  was 
doing  pioneer  work;  but  such  a  scheme  is  perilous 
in  the  extreme  when  a  new  and  vitally-important 
weapon  of  war  is  concerned. 

This  summer,  in  the  military  trials,  British  makers 
will  have  a  chance.  Unfortunately,  they  have  not 
much  time  in  which  to  evolve  the  exceptionally 
efficient  aeroplane  which  the  tests  demand.  In  this 
regard,  without  doubt,  they  are  greatly  handicapped 
in  a  contest  with  French  manufacturers — who  have 
all  the  experience  of  the  191 1  trials  at  Rheims 
behind  them,  and  practically  unlimited  resources  in 
the  shape  of  smoothly-working  factories  and  financial 
strength. 

In  the  matter  of  British  engines,  there  will  certainly 
be  insufficient  time — before  the  War  Office  trials — 
for  any  new  motors  of  sufficient  power  to  be  built  and 
tested  satisfactorily.  This  is  particularly  unfortunate, 
as  it  will  mean,  in  all  probability,  that  British  con- 
structors will  be  obliged,  whether  they  like  it  or  not, 
to  install  machines  with  foreign  motors. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR       96 

Six  months  is  not  long  enough  for  the  home 
aeroplane  industry  to  lift  itself  from  its  Slough  of 
Despond.  The  Government's  tardy  recognition  of 
the  value  of  military  airmanship  cannot  cause  an 
immediate  making-up  of  leeway.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  industry  in  this  country  is  bound  to  suffer, 
from  its  past  neglect,  for  several  years  to  come. 


SEVENTH    SECTION 

WHAT    EXISTING    WAR    AEROPLANES    CAN    ACTUALLY 
ACCOMPLISH 

I 

Plight  of  a  Commander-in-Chief  without  an  aeroplane 
corps — The  work  of  cavalry  reconnaissance. 

What  can  be  achieved  by  aeroplane  reconnaissance, 
when  skilfully  carried  out,  and  conducted  upon  an 
adequate  scale,  it  will  be  the  purpose  of  this  section 
of  our  book  to  show. 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  services  which  an 
efficient  air-corps  will  be  able  to  render,  the  position 
of  a  Commander-in-Chief  who  has  no  aeroplanes  to 
help  him  should  first  be  understood. 

In  modern  warfare,  operations  are  extended  over 
a  very  wide  area.  Sometimes,  for  example,  a  fight- 
ing line  will  stretch  over  a  frontage  of  many  miles. 
This  makes  it  increasingly  difficult  for  a  Commander- 
in-Chief  to  obtain  precise  and  speedy  information 
concerning  the  movements  of  his  enemy. 

Cavalry  scouts  are,  of  course,  sent  out.  They 
move  cautiously  forward,  until  they  come  into  con- 
tact with  the  outposts  which  the  enemy  has  thrown 
forward  with  the  deliberate  intention  of  concealing 
his  intentions.  The  cavalry  scouts  are  able  to  report 
the  position  of  these  outposts ;   but  as  to  what  general 

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THE   AEROPLANE   IN  WAR       97 

strategic  movement  is  taking  place  behind  this  screen 
they  can,  as  a  rule,  provide  only  meagre  information, 
if  any  at  all. 

How  difficult  it  is  to  glean  anything  like  reliable 
news  of  an  enemy's  movements  has  been  indicated 
by  that  great  mihtary  genius,  Napoleon.  Dealing 
with  this  very  question,  and  clearly  emphasising  the 
need  for  such  a  scouting  medium  as  the  aeroplane, 
he  wrote: — 

"  Nothing  is  more  contradictory,  nothing  is 
more  bewildering,  than  the  miltitude  reports  of 
spies,  or  of  officers  sent  out  to  reconnoitre ;  some 
locate  army  corps  where  they  have  seen  only  de- 
tachments ;  others  see  only  detachments  where 
they  ought  to  have  seen  army  corps. 

"  Often  they  have  not  themselves  seen  the  facts 
they  report,  and  they  have  only  gathered  the  hear- 
say evidence  of  alarmed,  surprised,  or  bewildered 
people.  ...  If  a  former  preoccupation  exists,  if 
there  is  a  tendency  to  believe  that  the  enemy  will 
come  from  one  direction  rather  than  from  another, 
the  gathered  evidence  is  interpreted  in  one  sense, 
however  little  it  lends  itself  to  being  so  interpreted. 
It  is  thus  that  great  mistakes  are  made,  which  are 
sometimes  the  ruin  of  armies  and  of  Empires." 

Nothing  could  more  definitely  indicate  the  impor- 
tance of  accurate  reconnoitring  than  the  emphatic 
statement  of  this  great  soldier.  Napoleon  recognised 
that  reliable  information,  concerning  the  doings  of 
his  antagonists,  was  all-important.  A  misunderstand- 
ing of  some  scouting  report  was,  he  knew,  sufficient 
to  lose  the  Commander-in-Chief  a  great  action. 

In  any  battle  a  Commander  seeks,  as  has  been 

G 


98       THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

truly  said,  to  see  what  is  going  on  "  upon  the  other 
side  of  the  hill." 

The  two  armies  are  spread  out,  approaching  each 
other.  Each  Commander  has  thrown  forward  a 
screen  of  men.  These  act,  so  to  speak,  as  "  feelers," 
seeking  to  come  into  touch  with  the  enemy.  Behind 
this  screen  of  outposts  comes  the  real  strength  of  the 
army.  Neither  Commander  knows  how,  when,  or 
at  what  point,  his  opponent  will  develop  his  main 
attack.  So  they  grope  towards  each  other,  any 
authentic  news  of  a  definite  movement  of  troops 
being  eagerly  awaited. 

If,  as  the  result  of  any  information  brought  him, 
one  Commander-in-Chief  can  anticipate  his  oppo- 
nent's chief  move,  he  may — by  that  stroke  alone — 
succeed  in  winning  the  battle  which  ensues. 

Thus  it  is  that  a  Commander-in-Chief  sits  at  his 
Headquarters,  with  maps  in  front  of  him,  asking  him- 
self one  vital  question :  "  At  what  point,  behind  the 
wide-flung  screen  of  his  outposts,  is  my  enemy  de- 
veloping his  main  attack  ?  " 

The  cavalry  scouts,  and  the  scouts  on  foot,  do 
their  work  as  best  they  can.  They  strive,  as  far  as 
is  practicable,  to  pierce  the  barrier  of  men  which  the 
enemy  has  thrown  forward. 

The  task  of  these  scouts  is  dangerous;  it  is 
laborious;  and  it  is  slow.  It  is  also  haphazard. 
But,  from  the  fragmentary  news  that  is  brought 
back  to  him,  a  Commander-in-Chief  has  to  act  as 
best  he  can. 

Some  of  his  scouts  succeed;  others  return  with 
nothing  at  all.  There  are  serious  gaps  in  the  intelli- 
gence ;  much  of  it  may  be  contradictory.  Yet  upon 
such  intelligence  as  this  a  Commander-in-Chief  has 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN   WAR       99 

acted  in  the  past,  and  will  have  to  act  in  the  future, 
unless  he  has  the  aeroplane  scout  placed  at  his 
disposal. 


II 

Work  of  a  squadron  of  air-scouts  described — Tasks  of 
the  pilot  and  observer — Combined  reconnaissance 
by  many  machines — Effect  of  aeroplanes  upon 
tactics. 

Having  indicated  the  difficulties  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, who  has  no  aeroplane  service  at  his 
disposal,  it  is  now  legitimate  to  show  what  can  be 
accomplished  with  the  aid  of  this  new  "  arm." 

We  will  imagine,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that 
an  action  is  imminent,  and  that  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  is  anxious  to  know,  without  delay,  from  what 
direction  he  may  expect  the  enemy  to  mass  his 
troops  for  a  main  attack.  So  he  calls  into  consulta- 
tion the  Commander  of  the  aeroplane  depot.  This 
depot — as  has  been  explained  in  a  previous  section — 
will  probably  be  established  at  a  suitable  point  near 
the  main  body  of  the  troops,  and  will  be  maintained  at 
the  spot  chosen,  until  a  move  on  the  part  of  the  army 
necessitates  a  change  of  quarters. 

To  the  Commander  of  the  aeroplane  depot  the 
Commander-in-Chief  will  explain  the  points,  in 
regard  to  the  general  plan  of  campaign,  upon  which 
he  requires  enlightenment. 

The  Commander  of  the  aeroplanes  will  make  a 
note  of  what  the  Commander-in-Chief  desires ;  then 
he  will  return  to  the  aeroplane  camp,  and  get  to  work. 
It  is  probable,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  affairs,  that 
organised  reconnoitring  flights  will  be  made,  in  war- 


100     THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

time,  either  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning,  or 
during  the  evening.  This  will  suit  the  convenience 
of  the  airmen  by  giving  them  the  best  weather  con- 
ditions to  work  in ;  and  it  will  also  be  satisfactory  for 
the  Commander-in-Chief  to  know  at  the  beginning, 
and  again  at  the  end  of  a  day's  fighting,  what  the 
dispositions  of  his  enemy  are. 

In  the  French  manoeuvres,  and  also  in  other  ex- 
periments made,  it  has  been  shown  that  information, 
concerning  an  enemy's  movements,  is  generally 
required  in  the  morning  and  in  the  evening;  and 
this  applies,  particularly,  to  news  gleaned  in  the  early 
morning,  soon  after  it  is  light.  It  is  then,  before 
the  movements  of  the  day,  that  an  enemy's  disposi- 
tions may  best  be  noted. 

A  good  deal  of  interest  has  been  aroused,  lately, 
in  the  suggestion  that,  in  war-time,  machines  would 
be  required  to  reconnoitre  at  night.  It  has  been 
pointed  out,  in  this  connection,  that  large  movements 
of  troops  are  often  made  under  cover  of  darkness. 

That  night  reconnoitring  is  practical  there  is  no 
doubt.  How  much  an  observer  would  be  able  to 
report,  without  the  use  of  a  searchlight,  experience 
must  prove.  There  seems  little  doubt  but  that  an 
air-scout  could  descend  low  enough,  at  night,  to 
detect  the  movements  of  large  bodies  of  men. 

When  he  has  returned  to  the  aeroplane  camp, 
after  his  consultation  with  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
the  officer  who  is  in  charge  of  the  aviation  depot 
will  seek  an  interview  with  the  officer  who  is 
directly  in  control  of  the  military  pilots  and  ob- 
servers. Maps  will  be  consulted,  and  a  general 
plan  of  reconnoitring  drawn  up ;  and,  at  this  stage 
of  the  proceedings,   the  time  will  come  to  decide 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN   WAR     101 

how  many  machines  are  to  be  sent  out  upon  the 
scouting  expedition. 

This  decision  will  be  governed,  very  largely,  by  the 
extent  of  the  area  to  be  traversed,  and  also  by  the 
urgency  of  the  mission.  Although  all  news  obtained 
will  naturally  be  needed  at  Headquarters  as  quickly 
as  possible,  there  will  be  occasions  when  the  need 
for  haste  is  very  great.  In  such  instances,  more 
machines  will  be  sent  out  than  at  ordinary  times. 

If  he  has  a  complete  and  rapid  reconnaissance  of 
an  enemy's  position  to  make,  covering  the  entire 
area  of  operations,  and  not  any  one  section  of  the 
battle-front,  the  Commander  of  aeroplanes  will  prob- 
ably order  a  large  number  of  machines  to  go  upon 
the  trip. 

The  value  of  numbers  is  self-evident.  One 
machine,  acting  upon  instructions,  can  be  piloted 
over  a  narrow  and  previously-indicated  route.  It 
reports  all  that  is  seen,  but  its  observations  are  neces- 
sarily restricted  to  what  lies  in  its  path. 

It  would  be  impossible,  with  one  machine  making 
one  flight,  to  obtain  anything  like  a  comprehensive 
report  as  to  an  enemy's  doings — at  least  not  in 
reasonable  time. 

This  is  why,  when  a  large  area  has  to  be  covered, 
the  Commander  of  aeroplanes  will  order  out  a 
regular  squadron  of  machines.  After  a  conversa- 
tion with  his  immediate  superior,  the  officer  who  is 
in  charge  of  the  airmen  and  observers  will  discuss 
with  them  the  area  which  each  machine  shall 
cover. 

Again  maps  will  be  consulted,  and  aerial  routes 
will  be  laid  down.  It  will  be  the  aim  of  the  officer 
instructing  the  airmen  to  spread  out  his  scouts  so  as 


102      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

to  present  a  complete  report,  when  the  reconnaissance 
is  effected. 

When  the  whole  of  the  ground  to  be  reconnoitred 
has  thus  been  marked  out  upon  the  maps,  each 
observer — who  will  be  equipped  with  his  own  per- 
sonal map  of  the  fighting  area — will  be  instructed  as 
to  the  course  he  shall  steer.  He  will  duly  note  this, 
and  return  to  his  machine. 

Whereupon,  the  pilots  will  soar  into  the  air  from 
their  camp,  and  speed  away  upon  their  missions.  The 
pilot  of  the  aeroplane  will  be  concerned  with  nothing 
save  the  control  of  his  machine.  He  will  not  need 
to  trouble  himself  about  the  route  taken,  or  about 
what  is  seen  below. 

This  work  will  fall  upon  the  observer,  who  will 
be  placed  in  the  machine  with  an  uninterrupted  view 
of  the  country  below  him,  and  who  will  instruct 
the  pilot  as  to  the  course  he  shall  steer,  and  the 
elevation  he  shall  maintain. 

The  observer,  indeed,  will  be  in  charge  of  the 
aeroplane.  Upon  him  will  rest  the  responsibility  of 
the  success  of  the  expedition,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  information  to  be  obtained.  But  the  work  of 
the  pilot  will  be  important,  also.  Upon  his  skill,  in 
manipulating  the  machine,  will  depend  the  carrying 
out  of  the  flight,  and  the  safe  return  of  the  aeroplane 
to  Headquarters. 

Thus  the  fleet  of  air-scouts  will  start  upon  their 
errand  of  observation.  Each  machine  will  mount 
steadily,  until  an  altitude,  under  ordinary  conditions, 
of  between  3000  and  4000  feet  has  been  reached. 
Then,  at  this  height,  they  will  sweep  out  over  the 
enemy's  lines.  The  altitude  mentioned  is  generally 
regarded  as  a  good  height  for  reconnoitring  work 


THE  AEROPLANE   IN  WAR     103 

because  it  permits  the  observer  a  fairly-detailed  view 
of  the  ground  below,  and  places  him,  also,  at  what  is 
considered  a  safe  elevation,  so  far  as  artillery  fire  is 
concerned.  The  important  question  of  the  vulnera- 
bility of  aircraft,  in  regard  to  artillery  fire,  will  be  dealt 
with  fully  in  a  later  section. 

As  the  reconnoitring  machine  moves  out  over  the 
enemy,  the  pilot  will  be  busy  with  the  control  of  his 
machine.  If  the  weather  proves  very  favourable, 
his  task  will  be  a  comparatively  light  one.  All  that 
he  will  need  to  do  is  to  see  that  he  is  steering  accu- 
rately upon  the  course  laid  down  by  the  observer,  and 
that  his  altitude  remains  at  the  level  chosen.  He  will 
also  listen  attentively  to  the  running  of  his  engine, 
and  occasionally  note  the  number  of  revolutions 
it  is  making,  as  recorded  by  an  indicator  placed 
before  him. 

If  a  reconnoitring  flight  has  to  be  undertaken  in 
adverse  conditions,  say  with  a  gusty,  treacherous 
wind  blowing,  the  task  of  the  pilot  will  be  an  ex- 
extremely  arduous  one.  Apart  from  the  difficulty  of 
keeping  his  craft  upon  a  proper  course,  he  will  be 
faced  with  the  nerve-racking  task  of  preventing  it 
from  "  side-slipping,"  under  the  onslaught  of  vicious 
gusts  of  wind. 

The  "  side-slip  "  which  an  aeroplane  may  make  in 
a  gusty  wind  is,  indeed,  a  very  unpleasant  experience 
for  those  who  are  on  board  it.  What  happens  is 
this:  under  the  influence  of  a  sudden  gust,  the 
machine  heels  over  until  it  reaches  an  angle  when 
forward  motion  is  replaced  by  a  swift,  sickening  slide 
sideways.  A  machine  may  "  side-slip "  in  this 
fashion,  for  an  appreciable  distance,  before  the  pilot 
is  able  to  regain  control  of  it. 


104      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

An  example  may  be  cited  of  an  airman  who  slid 
down  from  an  altitude  of  more  than  800  feet,  until 
he  was  within  a  couple  of  hundred  feet  of  the  ground. 
There  is  only  one  thing  to  do  when  a  machine  begins 
to  "  side-slip  "  in  this  way.  The  pilot  must  alter  the 
angle  of  his  elevating  planes,  so  that  the  aeroplane 
dives  forward  as  well  as  slips  sideways.  This  dive 
adds  to  the  machine's  speed,  and  so  checks  the  side- 
way  fall ;  and,  if  his  altitude  is  sufficient,  the  airman 
is  able  to  regain  control  of  his  machine,  and  bring  it 
back  again  upon  an  even  keel,  before  there  is  danger 
of  contact  with  the  ground. 

In  bad  weather,  as  may  be  imagined,  a  recon- 
noitring trip  may  be  a  serious  ordeal  for  the  man 
at  the  levers.  The  responsibility  for  undertaking  a 
flight,  in  unsuitable  weather  conditions,  will  fall 
upon  the  officer  in  command  of  the  aviation  depot. 
If,  for  example,  the  wind  is  too  high  for  flying,  it 
will  be  his  duty  to  tell  the  Commander-in-Chief  so, 
and  delay  the  intended  reconnaissance  until  condi- 
tions improve. 

The  work  of  the  pilot  of  the  aeroplane,  during  a 
reconnoitring  flight,  has  only  been  described  so  far ; 
now  we  may  deal  with  the  task  of  the  observer. 
He  will,  probably,  have  a  busier  time  than  the  man 
at  the  levers.  From  the  moment  of  leaving  the 
ground,  until  the  flight  is  finished,  he  will  need  to  be 
on  the  alert. 

As  the  aeroplane  approaches  the  enemy's  lines, 
he  will  pore  over  the  map  fixed  in  a  frame  before 
him.  In  addition  to  this  map,  he  will  be  provided 
with  pencil  and  notebook. 

Thus,  when  any  portion  of  the  enemy's  troops 
appear  below  him,  his  task  will  be  perfectly  clear. 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN  WAR     105 

He  will  first  need  to  identify  them.  That  is  to  say, 
he  must  be  able  to  determine  whether  he  is  looking  at 
infantry,  cavalry,  or  artillery;  and  then  he  must  be 
able  to  decide  as  to  the  strength  of  the  forces  that 
are  in  view. 

These  points  determined,  he  will  turn  again  to  his 
map,  so  as  to  make  sure  of  the  actual  point,  on  the 
battle  Hne,  where  the  troops  he  sees  are  stationed. 
This  done,  he  will  make  notes  in  his  book. 

And  so,  throughout  the  flight,  will  the  observa- 
tion officer  be  busy,  peering  downwards ;  consulting 
his  map;  afterwards  scribbling  hastily  in  his  note- 
book. If  he  is  not  quite  sure  what  anything  is  that  he 
sees  below  him,  he  will  ask  the  pilot  to  circle  back, 
so  that  he  can  make  another  inspection. 

If  the  weather  is  perfectly  clear,  he  may  be  able 
to  instruct  the  airman  to  soar  higher,  and  so  be  safer 
from  any  gun-fire  from  below.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  the  morning  or  evening  is  misty,  he  may  have 
to  take  the  risk  of  descending  lower. 

Each  unit  on  the  squadron  of  observing  aeroplanes 
will  be  carrying  out  the  same  routine.  Wide-spread, 
the  air-scouts  will  sweep  over  the  enemy's  position. 
In  an  hour,  each  air-scout  will  be  able  to  traverse  a 
distance  of  more  than  fifty  miles,  and  nothing  of 
importance  below  him  should  pass  undetected. 

In  a  little  more  than  an  hour,  from  the  time  of 
their  starting  away,  the  squadron  of  machines  should 
be  returning  to  their  camp.  One  by  one  they  will 
come  gliding  down,  and  the  observation  officer  in 
each  machine  will  present  a  written  report  to  his 
immediate  chief.  This  officer,  when  all  these  re- 
ports are  in  his  possession,  will  seek  the  Commander 
of  the  aviation  depot.  These  two  officers  will  speedily 


106      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

sift  out  the  information  brought  in  by  air-scouts, 
and  prepare,  for  the  consideration  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  a  summary  of  the  whole  reconnaissance. 

This  the  Commander  of  aeroplanes  will  take  with 
him  to  Headquarters,  and  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
with  the  members  of  his  staff,  will  bend  over  their 
maps,  tracing  the  enemy's  dispositions,  noting  his 
weak  points,  and  also  the  positions  where  he  may  be 
in  force. 

In  regard  to  observing  the  actual  movements  of 
troops,  as  apart  from  the  positions  of  stationary  forces, 
the  work  of  the  war  aeroplane  should  be  wonderfully 
effective.  An  air-scout  may,  for  example,  report  that 
a  section  of  the  enemy  is  on  the  march  between  two 
points  at  a  given  time.  This  news  may  be  considered, 
by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  to  have  a  very  important 
bearing  upon  the  development  of  the  enemy's  plan 
of  campaign.  Is  this  body  of  troops  still  moving  in 
the  same  direction,  say  an  hour  later?  This  may, 
quite  likely,  be  the  question  upon  which  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief may  want  information. 

Upon  hearing  this,  the  Commander  of  aeroplanes 
will  soon  have  two  or  three  scouting  machines  on 
the  move.  There  will  be  no  difficulty  about  such 
individual  work  as  this ;  and  very  soon  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief should  be  supplied  with  the  news 
that  he  requires. 

Thus  it  is  possible  to  outHne,  in  a  general  way, 
the  i-econnoitring  work  of  the  war  aeroplane.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  emphasise  again  the  value  of  in- 
formation which  can  be  borne  so  quickly  to  a  Com- 
mander-in-Chief ;  the  importance  of  the  news  which 
will  be  gleaned  by  the  air-scouts  is,  indeed,  self- 
evident. 


THE   AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     107 

As  the  result  of  an  aerial  reconnaissance  by  many 
machines,  well-organised  and  successfully  carried 
out,  the  Commander-in-Chief  should  be  supplied  with 
information  which  could  not  possibly  be  acquired 
in  any  other  way,  and  which  should  tell  him  where 
the  enemy  was,  and  what  they  were  doing,  only  an 
hour  before  the  news  is  put  before  him. 

On  such  information,  also,  he  can  act  with  con- 
fidence. He  need  not  hesitate,  questioning  its 
authenticity.  On  the  maps  before  him,  set  forth  in 
a  manner  beyond  dispute,  he  will  have  the  position  of 
his  foe,  and  the  direction  in  which  the  chief  bodies 
of  troops  are  being  moved. 

Nor  is  this  all  that  the  aeroplane  can  do,  as  has 
been  shown.  If  a  Commander-in-Chief  is  in  doubt 
about  any  movement  of  the  enemy,  during  the  course 
of  an  action,  he  still  has  the  aeroplane  at  his  im- 
mediate service. 

There  is  no  reason,  indeed,  why  constant  recon- 
naissances should  not  be  made  during  the  course  of 
a  battle.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  a  heavy  attack 
has  been  made  upon  the  enemy.  It  is  sought  to 
know  whether  such  onslaught  has  had  its  full  effect. 
Is  the  enemy  falHng  back?  This  may  become  a 
question  of  great  urgency,  as  it  may  govern  a  Com- 
mander-in-Chiefs next  offensive  move.  Here  is  a 
task  in  which  the  air-scout  can  reveal  his  worth. 

Rising  high,  and  flying  over  the  enemy,  he  should 
be  able  to  determine  whether  a  retreat  has  begun, 
and  should  bring  back  this  information  to  Head- 
quarters with  a  minimum  of  delay.  A  definite  in- 
stance of  the  use  of  the  aeroplane  in  this  connection 
was,  it  may  be  remembered,  given  in  the  French 
manoeuvres  in  Picardy,  when  Lieutenant  Sido  was 


108      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

able  to  inform  his  Headquarters  that  the  enemy  was 
in  retreat,  after  an  important  action. 

If  his  aeroplane  service  is  efficient,  and  there  is 
no  delay  in  obtaining  news,  a  Commander-in-Chief 
should  be  receiving  constant  intelligence,  concerning 
the  movements  of  the  enemy,  during  the  progress  of 
a  battle.  It  may  be  extremely  important,  for  example, 
to  know  that  the  enemy  is  bringing  up  batteries  to  a 
certain  point ;  or  that  a  hill,  or  other  point  of  vantage, 
is  to  be  abandoned.  From  first  to  last,  indeed,  the 
aeroplane  should  be  of  the  greatest  use. 

But,  as  has  been  shown  before,  it  will  not  be  so 
much  a  case  of  the  number  of  aeroplanes  used,  as  of 
the  organisation  behind  them.  In  this  lies  the  crux 
of  the  situation.  Unless  pilots  and  observers  are 
absolutely  competent,  and  ready  for  their  work,  the 
results  obtained  cannot  be  satisfactory. 

The  influence  of  the  aeroplane  scout  upon  military 
tactics  will,  undoubtedly,  be  marked.  The  German 
school,  for  example,  advocates  a  strong,  determined 
advance — not  caring  so  much  what  the  precise 
dispositions  of  an  enemy  are,  but  seeking  to 
envelop  him,  and  deliver  one  quick  and  crushing 
blow. 

French  military  tactics,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
more  strategical — more  prone  to  play  a  waiting, 
watching  game,  and  make  a  master-move  after  the 
battle  scheme  has,  to  a  certain  extent,  revealed 
itself. 

What  has  been  called  "  the  fog  of  war  " — that  is 
to  say,  the  meagre  information  regarding  an  enemy's 
movements,  which  is  all  that  is  available  if  aeroplanes 
are  not  used — suits  the  German  method  of  blunt, 
dogged,  hit-or-miss  advance.     Lack  of  information 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN  WAR     109 

is  not  advantageous,  on  the  other  hand,  to  the  care- 
fully thought-out  French  strategy. 

What  the  advent  of  the  air-scout  does  is  to  help 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  who  is  able  to  make  subtle, 
deeply-planned  moves,  in  which  precise  information 
is  essential,  and  to  discount  a  blind,  crushing  use  of 
numbers. 


Ill 

Other  uses  of  the  war  aeroplane — Surveying — Dispatch- 
carrying — Directing  gun-fire — Transport  of  staff 
officers. 

The  duties  so  far  mentioned  do  not,  by  any 
means,  exhaust  the  possibilities  of  the  war  aero- 
plane. So  far,  only  military  reconnaissance  has  been 
touched  upon.  This  work  is,  of  course,  of  out- 
standing importance ;  but  an  air-corps  could,  during 
a  campaign,  be  put  to  many  other  tasks,  all  of  them 
of  genuine  utility. 

Take,  for  example,  the  work  of  discovering  the 
nature  of  the  country  over  which  an  army  is  about 
to  operate.  This  is  a  task  which  is  extremely  impor- 
tant. But,  hitherto,  the  process  of  obtaining  such 
information  has  been  painfully  slow — painfully  slow, 
that  is,  when  compared  with  the  way  the  aeroplane 
will  be  able  to  carry  out  the  work. 

Here,  indeed,  will  be  an  ideal  opportunity  for 
a  long-distance  flight.  In  a  three-hour,  non-stop 
journey,  a  machine  should  be  able  to  survey  at  least 
150  miles  of  country,  and  return  with  reports  of  the 
utmost  value. 

How  important  this  aerial  survey-work  will  be  is 
instanced  by  Major  J.  N.  C.  Kennedy,  who,  from 


no      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

his  experience  in  the  South  African  war,  states  that 
such  disasters  as  Spion  Kop  could  not  have  hap- 
pened, if  there  had  been  aeroplanes  to  fly  over  and 
observe  the  country  beforehand. 

Here,  then,  is  another  practical  use  for  the 
aeroplane.  A  squadron  of  machines,  flying  ahead 
of  an  army  on  the  march,  will  be  able  to  return  with 
accurate  news  as  to  the  position  of  roads,  railways, 
rivers,  and  bridges.  Such  information,  received  in 
good  time,  may  prove  of  exceptional  value  to  a 
Commander-in-Chief. 

Apart  from  general  survey  work,  also,  the  air-corps 
will  be  able  to  execute  highly-important  orders  in 
locating  the  position  of  an  enemy's  supply  trains, 
magazines,  and  depots. 

Thus  it  can  be  seen  that  there  will  be  practically 
constant  use  for  war  aeroplanes  during  a  campaign — 
apart  from  their  potentiahties  as  weapons  of  destruc- 
tion, concerning  which  notes  will  be  written  later. 

So  highly  does  he  rate  the  work  of  aircraft  in  war- 
time, for  reconnoitring  purposes,  that  the  director 
of  the  military  aviation  service  of  the  French  army 
has  declared:  "Aeroplanes,  carrying  a  steersman, 
observer,  and  combatant,  will  eventually  supersede 
cavalry  for  scouting  purposes." 

In  this  regard,  it  is  interesting  to  note  the  opinion 
of  a  famous  German  military  expert,  who  says : — 

"  They  (aeroplanes)  will  collect  much  informa- 
tion which  would  never  be  accessible  to  cavalry, 
and,  above  all,  they  will  do  it  over  long  distances, 
and  in  a  much  shorter  time.  It  is  a  defect  of 
cavalry  reconnaissance  that  the  knowledge  which 
it  yields  has  necessarily,  in  the  great  majority  of 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN   WAR     111 

eases,  been  long  overtaken  by  events.  No  small 
gifts,  on  the  part  of  the  General,  are  necessary  to 
infer,  from  what  was  ascertained  many  hours 
previously,  what  is  actually  the  existing  situation. 
The  possibiHties  of  error  are  very  great." 

Here  is  another  striking  tribute  to  the  value  of 
the  war  aeroplane.  What  this  German  expert  was 
particularly  impressed  by,  after  observing  a  series 
of  tests  of  aeroplanes  for  reconnoitring,  was  their 
wonderful  speed,  as  compared  with  any  other  means 
of  obtaining  information. 

The  point  he  makes,  in  this  connection,  is  highly 
important.  Not  only  will  the  aeroplane  scout  bring 
back  news  which  it  would  be  impossible  to  obtain 
by  the  use  of  cavalry,  but  he  will  place  this  news  in 
the  hands  of  a  Commander-in-Chief  while  it  is  fresh, 
and  of  the  fullest  importance,  and  not  many  hours 
old — as  the  intelligence  brought  in  by  other  methods 
of  reconnaissance  generally  is. 

Another  extremely  useful  function  of  the  aero- 
plane, during  a  campaign,  must  not  be  forgotten. 
This  is  its  use  as  a  dispatch-carrier.  In  this  regard, 
a  light,  swift  machine  will  be  found  of  utiHty.  No 
ordinary  obstacle  will  hamper  it.  The  fact  that  the 
country  is  mountainous,  or  that  there  are  awkward 
rivers  to  negotiate,  present  serious  problems  for  the 
dispatch-rider,  who  sets  out  to  carry  a  communication 
from  point  to  point  on  horseback.  In  many  cases, 
indeed,  it  becomes  impossible  to  send  a  dispatch 
across  country. 

But  the  aeroplane  dispatch-carrier  will  think 
nothing  of  such  difficulties  as  these.  Over  precipi- 
tous  country,    and   across   mountains,    he   will   fly 


112      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

without  hindrance;  and  he  will  be  faced  with  no 
problems  concerning  the  fording  of  rivers.  As 
straight  as  an  arrow,  from  point  to  point,  he  will 
carry  his  message,  and  at  a  pace  in  excess  of  that 
of  the  express  train. 

The  fact  that  skirmishing  parties  of  the  enemy 
are  dotted  about,  between  his  starting-point  and  his 
objective,  will  not  perplex  him  either,  although  it 
would  prove  a  serious  embarrassment  to  the  dispatch- 
rider  who  used  the  land  when  in  transit. 

Instances  of  the  practical  value  of  dispatch- 
carrying,  in  time  of  war,  are  readily  forthcoming. 
A  distinguished  cavalry-officer,  Colonel  Grantham, 
supplies  one,  for  instance.  In  the  Chinese  war,  he 
recalls  the  plight  of  two  columns  which  were  advanc- 
ing, about  twenty  miles  apart,  to  deliver  a  combined 
attack.  The  country  dividing  them  was  mountain- 
ous ;  parties  of  the  enemy  were  also  moving  about 
on  it.  The  result  was  that,  for  several  days,  no 
message  could  be  got  through.  This  lack  of  com- 
munication made  the  scheme  of  a  joint  advance  very 
difficult  to  carry  out.  Had  an  aeroplane  dispatch- 
carrier  been  available,  in  such  circumstances  as 
these,  he  would  have  linked  up  the  two  columns  in 
a  twenty-minute  flight,  irrespective  of  all  that  lay 
below  him. 

It  is,  of  course,  frequently  necessary,  during  the 
progress  of  a  battle,  for  Generals  commanding 
various  sections  of  an  army  to  report  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief.  Here  the  dispatch-carrying 
aeroplane,  on  account  of  its  speed,  will  be  of  the 
greatest  value. 

What  can  be  done,  in  the  way  of  long-distance 
dispatch-carrying,     has     been     demonstrated    most 


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THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     113 

effectually  by  Captain  Bellenger,  a  well-known 
French  military  airman.  This  officer,  while 
stationed  at  the  Vincennes  air-depot,  received 
instructions  to  carry  a  dispatch,  as  quickly  as 
possible,  to  the  military  flying  school  at  Pau.  This 
represented  a  distance  of  450  miles.  Starting  early 
one  morning,  Captain  Bellenger  reached  Pau  in 
seven  hours  sixteen  minutes  of  actual  flying.  While 
en  routey  he  made  three  halts  to  replenish  his  petrol 
tank. 

Recent  tests  in  France  show  that  quickly- 
assembled,  single-seated  monoplanes  will  be  ex- 
tremely useful,  in  actual  military  operations,  in 
co-operating  with  artillery,  by  giving  aerial  directions 
as  to  gun-fire. 

Upon  occasions  when  the  effect  of  long-distance 
fire  is  unknown  to  the  gunner,  an  aerial  observer, 
ascending  to  an  altitude  of  several  thousand  feet, 
will  be  able  to  detect  what  mischief  the  shells  are 
doing,  and  suggest — either  by  wireless  telegraphy  or 
by  messages  dropped  from  his  machine — corrections 
in  the  gunner's  aim. 

Another  field  of  practical  utility  for  the  aeroplane, 
during  an  action,  Hes  in  the  quick  transport,  from 
place  to  place,  of  staff  officers.  Horses,  motor-cars, 
and  motor-cycles  have,  hitherto,  been  employed  for 
this  purpose.  But  the  aeroplane  is  infinitely  their 
superior  in  the  matter  of  speed. 

Roads  may  be  blocked  with  troops,  or  transport 
waggons,  thereby  holding  up,  temporarily,  the 
passage  of  any  motor-cars  or  motor-cycles.  No 
such  hindrances  affect  the  aeroplane.  With  such 
reliable  passenger-carrying  machines  as  are  now 
available,  staff  officers  will  be  able  to  flit  from  point 

H 


114      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

to  point  on  a  battlefield,  with  a  minimum  of  delay. 
This  will  prove  an  extremely  valuable  addition  to 
what  may  be  termed  the  conveniences  of  war. 

It  is  legitimate,  at  this  juncture,  having  illustrated 
the  uses  of  an  aeroplane  in  time  of  war,  to  picture, 
briefly,  the  contrast  between  two   Commanders-in- 
Chief,  one  of  them  possessing  an  up-to-date  fleet  of 
war  aeroplanes,  and  the  other  without  any  such  aid. 
Prior  to  an  action,  the  one  who  has  an  aeroplane 
corps    sends    out    his    machines     upon    a    general 
reconnaissance.     As  a  result  he  is,  in  an  hour  or 
so,  in  possession  of  all  the  information  he  requires 
concerning   the   enemy.     He   is   able   to    calculate 
where  his  antagonist's  main  blow  is  to  be  struck; 
and  he  is  also  able  to  estimate  the  weak  points  in  his 
opponent's  fighting  Hne. 

The  Commander  who  is  without  aeroplanes  sends 
out  his  cavalry  scouts,  in  the  time-honoured  fashion, 
and  relies  upon  news  from  outposts.  What  infor- 
mation he  thus  obtains  is  bound  to  be  many  hours* 
older  than  that,  concerning  his  own  movements, 
which  is  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy.  Further- 
more, it  leaves  many  questions  of  urgency  altogether 
unanswered.  But,  unsatisfactory  though  his  knowl- 
edge of  his  opponent's  intentions  is,  the  Commander 
has  to  grope  forward.  A  certain  blind  doggedness 
actuates  him;  it  is  a  case,  more  or  less,  of  hit-or- 
miss. 

Now,  were  his  opponent  in  a  similarly  fumbling 
state  of  mind,  it  would  not  matter  so  much.  But, 
thanks  to  his  aeroplanes.  Commander  No.  i  has 
his  opponent's  dispositions  and  movements  carefully 
marked  upon  his  maps. 
Thus  the  two  armies  come  into  conflict.       One 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     115 

Commander-in-Chief  knows  everything;  the  other 
knows  practically  nothing.  What  is  the  result  likely 
to  be?  One  strikes  swiftly  and  surely,  aware  of  the 
precise  strength  opposed  to  him.  The  other  fumbles 
blindly  in  the  dark. 


EIGHTH     SECTION 

WIRELESS     TELEGRAPHY     AND     PHOTOGRAPHY     AS 
AIDS     TO    AERIAL     RECONNAISSANCE 

I 

First  tests  and  successes  with  wireless  telegraphy — 
Difficulty  of  equipping  an  aeroplane  with  transmit- 
ting plant. 

In  the  descriptions  of  the  uses  of  an  aeroplane  in 
war,  which  have  been  set  forth  in  previous  sections, 
nothing  has  been  said  concerning  an  adjunct  which 
now  promises  to  have  an  importance  quite  over- 
whelming upon  future  operations  with  aircraft. 

This  has  reference  to  the  use  of  wireless  tele- 
graphy. It  was  thought,  at  first,  that  any  employment 
of  this  marvel  of  science,  so  far  as  aeroplanes  were 
concerned,  would  be  hopeless.  The  fact  that  the 
aeroplane  is  suspended,  so  to  speak,  in  mid-air,  with 
no  earth  communication,  made  the  problem  of  equip- 
ping it  with  wireless  particularly  difficult. 

But  the  value  of  a  wireless  message,  from  a  flying 
machine,  has  always  been  recognised;  and  so  most 
careful  experiments  have  been  made  to  devise  an 
apparatus.  In  addition  to  the  difficulty  of  trans- 
mitting messages  from  an  aeroplane,  there  was  the 
important  question  of  weight  to  be  considered.  It 
was  seen  that  any  apparatus,  made  to  be  carried 

116 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     117 

upon  aircraft,  must  be  extremely  light;  and,  at  the 
same  time,  it  was  essential  that  it  should  be  of  a  small 
and  convenient  size,  so  that  it  could  be  stowed  away 
somewhere  in  the  proximity  of  the  pilot's  seat. 

It  was  in  America,  in  August,  19  lo,  that  the  first 
success  was  obtained.  An  aeroplane  ascended  with 
the  necessary  transmitting  mechanism  on  board,  and 
with  a  long  aerial  wire  trailing  behind  it,  weighted  with 
lead,  from  which  the  wireless  messages  were  radiated. 
The  apparatus  was  crude,  and  unsatisfactory  from 
many  points  of  view,  but  actual  signals  were  received, 
from  the  aeroplane,  by  a  station  on  the  ground. 

Only  the  most  simple  messages  were  attempted, 
and  the  aeroplane  flew  round  in  fairly  close  proximity 
to  the  receiving  station.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
best  results  reported,  in  connection  with  this  series 
of  tests,  was  a  message  transmitted  from  the  aeroplane 
when  it  was  500  feet  high,  and  which  reached  the 
receiving  station  from  a  distance  of  about  a  mile. 

This  result  was  distinctly  encouraging.  It  showed 
that  wireless  telegraphy,  as  applied  to  the  aeroplane, 
was  not  impossible ;  and  it  had  the  effect,  also,  of 
stimulating  interest  in  other  countries,  and  of  setting 
many  clever  brains  to  work. 

It  was  in  the  following  month  (September,  1910) 
that  a  series  of  experiments  were  begun  in  England. 
Salisbury  Plain  was  the  flying  ground  chosen,  and 
Mr  Robert  Loraine,  a  well-known  actor  who  had 
become  prominent  as  an  airman,  was  the  pilot  of  the 
machine  with  which  the  tests  were  made. 

The  aeroplane  employed  in  the  experiments  was 
a  Bristol  biplane,  fitted  with  a  "  Gnome  "  motor ;  and 
the  designer  of  the  wireless  transmitting  mechanism 
used  was  Mr  Thome  Baker,  a  well-known  electrical 


118      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

expert.  After  a  number  of  tests,  he  had  produced 
a  transmitter  which  only  weighed  about  14  lb.,  and 
which  could  be  fixed,  quite  conveniently,  behind  the 
pilot's  seat. 

Mr  Baker  was  also  able  to  abolish  the  long 
traihng  wire  behind  the  machine,  which  had  been 
used  in  the  American  experiments.  Such  a  wire,  it 
was  recognised,  was  a  bad  feature  of  any  equipment. 
Apart  from  the  obvious  clumsiness  of  such  a  device, 
it  offered  a  danger  of  becoming  entangled  with 
the  rapidly-revolving  propeller  of  the  machine,  and 
so  causing  an  accident.  Mr  Thorne  Baker  obviated 
this  difficulty,  in  his  tests,  by  twining  his  aerial  wire 
round  the  wooden  supports  between  the  main-planes 
of  the  machine. 

Another  long  wire,  the  receiver,  was  stretched 
between  posts  on  the  ground ;  and  then  Mr  Loraine 
ascended,  and  began  to  circle  round  and  round  the 
aerodrome.  For  transmitting  purposes,  he  had  a 
little  key  strapped  to  his  knee,  and  operated  it  with 
his  left  hand — his  right  hand  being  engaged,  of 
course,  with  the  controlling  lever  of  his  machine. 

Again,  as  in  the  American  experiments,  only  the 
simplest  messages  were  attempted.  They  were, 
however,  quite  distinctly  heard.  At  first,  the  signals 
were  not  received  over  a  distance  of  more  than  half 
a  mile,  but  it  was  soon  found  possible  to  increase  the 
distance  between  transmitter  and  receiver  to  approxi- 
mately one  mile.  At  this  distance,  the  dots  and 
dashes  telegraphed  were  distinctly  read  by  Mr  Thorne 
Baker,  who  received  them — as  is  the  custom  with 
wireless  telegraphy — through  telephone  ear-pieces. 

Following  these  tests,  Mr  Thorne  Baker  set  him- 
self the  task  of  perfecting  his  apparatus ;  and  a  very 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     119 

interesting  experiment  was  planned,  in  December, 
1 910,  in  connection  with  the  De  Forest  cross-Channel 
aeroplane  prize. 

Lieutenant  H.  E.  Watkins,  one  of  the  competitors, 
consented  to  take  up  a  transmitting  apparatus  with 
him,  on  his  cross-Channel  flight,  so  that  he  might 
endeavour  to  keep  in  touch  with  a  steam-tug,  in 
which  his  friends  intended  to  follow  him  from  Folke- 
stone to  the  French  coast. 

The  transmitter  which  Mr  Baker  prepared  for  this 
experiment  was  more  powerful  than  the  one  used  in 
the  SaHsbury  Plain  tests,  and  some  conclusive  results 
were  expected  from  this  oversea  flight.  Unfortu- 
nately, however,  Lieutenant  Watkins  was  delayed 
by  bad  weather,  and  a  series  of  trifling  accidents, 
and  so  was  unable  to  start  upon  the  flight.  The 
wireless  test  had,  therefore,  to  be  abandoned. 

After  this,  it  fell  to  the  lot  of  America  to  make 
the  next  move  of  any  interest.  Lieutenant  Beck, 
a  young  officer-airman  engaged  in  military  experi- 
ments with  aeroplanes,  took  up  a  transmitter  with 
him,  and  was  able  to  send  messages  to  a  special 
receiving  station,  over  a  distance  of  quite  two  and 
a  half  miles.  This,  naturally,  was  regarded  as 
distinct  progress.  The  messages  were  clearly  read ; 
and  there  now  seemed  no  difficulty,  with  better 
transmitting  mechanism,  in  increasing  the  distance 
over  which  the  signals  were  sent. 


120      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 


II 

French  triumphs  with  wireless  telegraphy — Messages  sent 
over  a  distance  of  thirty-five  miles. 

In  the  meantime,  as  may  be  imagined,  France  had 
not  been  lethargic  in  dealing  with  this  subject.  The 
French  mihtary  authorities  had,  from  the  first,  recog- 
nised that  wireless  telegraphy,  if  it  could  be  applied 
reliably  to  the  aeroplane,  would  greatly  increase  the 
utility  of  aircraft  in  time  of  war. 

At  several  of  the  French  military  aerodromes,  at 
the  beginning  of  191 1,  experiments  were  in  progress, 
and  clever  civilian  electricians  were  called  into  con- 
ference by  the  authorities.  But  only  meagre  news 
leaked  out  as  to  what  was  actually  being  done. 

Before  the  end  of  January,  191 1,  however,  definite 
results  had  been  obtained.  Mr  Maurice  Farman,  a 
brother  of  Mr  Henry  Farman,  who  had  built  an 
excellent  biplane  for  military  use,  ascended  at  the 
aerodrome  at  Buc,  and  sent  a  wireless  message  back 
to  the  flying  ground,  when  he  was  passing  over  the 
countryside  quite  ten  miles  away. 

This  was  a  highly-important  result,  and  promised 
to  place  the  wireless  outfit  on  a  practical  basis,  so 
far  as  war  purposes  were  concerned.  Further  tests 
were  made  at  Buc,  and  the  radius  over  which  mes- 
sages could  be  transmitted  was  soon  increased  from 
ten  to  fifteen  miles. 

At  this  juncture,  the  French  military  authorities 
took  the  matter  in  hand  with  renewed  vigour, 
and  the  energies  of  the  scientific  staff  were  directed 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     121 

towards  still  further  increasing  the  transmitting  power 
of  the  apparatus  installed. 

An  improved  transmitting  mechanism,  weighing 
about  55  lb.,  was  built  and  fitted  to  a  biplane  at 
the  beginning  of  July,  191 1;  and  Captain  Brenot, 
a  prominent  French  miHtary  airman,  was  given  the 
task  of  thoroughly  testing  this  device.  He  was  able 
to  do  so  with  remarkable  results. 

While  flying  between  St  Cyr  and  Rambouillet,  he 
succeeded  in  getting  into  touch  with  the  wireless 
installation  fixed  upon  the  Eiffel  Tower  in  Paris. 
The  distance  was  one  of  at  least  thirty-five  miles. 

Captain  Brenot  did  more,  also,  than  transmit  a 
mere  series  of  dots  and  dashes.  He  spelt  out  a 
complete  message  while  flying,  and  it  was  correctly 
received  by  an  operator  of  the  Eiffel  Tower  wire- 
less station.  This  historic  aerial  message  was  as 
follows : — 

"  Captain  Brenot,  conducting  experiments  in 
aeroplane  with  wireless  telegraphy,  to  the  Minister 
of  War. — Flying  between  St  Cyr  and  Rambouillet. 
We  beg  to  present  our  sincere  regards.  We  are 
above  the  forest  of  Rambouillet,  at  a  height  of 
1640  feet." 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  dramatic,  in  its 
way,  than  the  receipt  of  this  message  in  Paris  from 
an  aeroplane,  fitted  with  wireless  telegraphy,  thirty 
miles  away;  it  demonstrated,  conclusively,  that  an 
aeroplane,  when  equipped  in  this  way,  was  an 
absolutely-revolutionary  weapon  of  warfare. 

Since  then,  French  tests  with  wireless  have  been 
steadily  going  ahead,  and  improvements  have  been 
made.    The  results  obtained  are  now  more  certain; 


122      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

and  it  has  been  proved,  beyond  doubt,  that  the 
wireless  message  from  an  air-scout  will  play  a  very 
prominent  part  in  future  military  operations. 


Ill 

Practical   uses   of  wireless   upon   aeroplanes — England's 
lack  of  effort. 

How  wireless  telegraphy  will  aid  the  military 
airman  may  readily  be  seen.  It  will,  in  the  first 
instance,  be  a  remarkable  time-saver.  Instead  of 
returning  to  Headquarters  with  a  brief  and  urgent 
report,  the  observation  officer  in  an  aeroplane  will 
be  able  to  transmit  it  instantaneously,  while  still 
flying  on  his  course.  In  the  case  of  machines  not 
equipped  with  a  wireless  installation,  a  reconnoitring 
flight  will  need  to  be  followed  by  a  return  journey  to 
the  aeroplane  camp.  Then  the  airman's  message  will 
have  to  be  brought  along  to  Headquarters.  Thus 
there  will  be  some  delay,  although  this  can,  of 
course,  be  reduced  to  a  minimum  by  sound 
organisation. 

But  the  fitting  of  a  wireless  apparatus  will  obviate, 
at  one  stroke,  all  delay  occasioned  by  a  machine 
flying  back  from  the  district  over  which  it  is  recon- 
noitring, by  the  descent  at  the  miHtary  camp,  and  by 
the  conveying  of  the  news  to  Headquarters. 

It  is  not  Hkely,  however,  that  every  machine  will 
be  fitted  with  a  wireless  outfit.  In  an  aerial  recon- 
naissance under  ordinary  conditions — made,  say, 
during  the  early  morning  or  evening,  to  show  the 
general  disposition  of  an  enemy  at  a  specified  time 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN  WAR     123 

— it  will  be  sufficient  if  the  airmen  return  to  their 
starting-point,  and  the  news  is  brought  to  Head- 
quarters in  the  ordinary  way.  There  will  not,  in 
such  cases,  be  sufficient  urgency  to  justify  the  use  of 
wireless  messages. 

But,  under  many  circumstances  which  will  arise 
during  war,  a  machine  which  can  flash  back  frequent 
messages,  without  losing  the  time  of  actually  flying 
back  with  them,  will  be  of  almost  inestimable  value. 

Let  us  take,  for  example,  the  position  of  a  Com- 
mander-in-Chief who  is  in  the  act  of  delivering  a 
heavy  attack,  and  wishes  to  know,  from  moment  to 
moment  if  possible,  how  the  onslaught  is  being  with- 
stood, and  if  there  is  any  tendency  on  the  part  of 
his  enemy  to  retreat.  In  such  a  case  a  special  aero- 
plane, fitted  with  wireless,  would  be  dispatched,  to 
fly  in  circles  over  the  fighting  area;  and  a  por- 
table receiving  apparatus  would  be  moved  up  close 
beside  the  point  where  the  Commander-in-Chief  had 
stationed  himself.  In  this  way,  news  could  be  re- 
ceived in  the  form  of  a  constant  stream  of  messages. 

This  is  only  one  instance  of  the  practical  utiHty  of 
wireless  telegraphy  from  an  aeroplane  during  war- 
time;  many  others,  naturally,  present  themselves. 
In  the  course  of  a  battle,  the  officer  commanding 
aeroplanes  should  always  have,  ready  for  an  emer- 
gency, one  or  two  machines  which  are  equipped  with 
wireless.  Thus,  immediately  any  point  arises  regard- 
ing a  movement  of  the  enemy,  upon  which  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief desires  speedy  enlightenment,  a 
machine  can  be  sent  off  without  a  moment's  delay; 
and  the  information,  once  obtained,  can  be  flashed 
back  by  wireless  a  second  or  so  after  the  observation 
officer  has  made  his  reconnaissance. 


124      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

During  a  series  of  military  experiments  with  wire- 
less telegraphy,  carried  out  in  France  during  August 
and  September,  191 1,  the  possibility  of  directing  the 
fire  of  artillery,  by  means  of  messages  from  an  aero- 
plane, was  investigated.  Ascending  from  a  fortified 
position,  which  was  supposed  to  be  besieged,  aero- 
planes, equipped  with  wireless  installations,  made 
circuits  over  the  country,  in  the  immediate  neigh- 
bourhood, and  sent  back  messages  to  their  Head- 
quarters, describing  with  complete  accuracy  the 
position  of  concealed  batteries,  which  were  assumed 
to  be  carrying  out  a  bombardment. 

Aided  by  this  intelligence,  the  gunners  of  the  be- 
sieged position  would,  in  actual  warfare,  have  been 
able  to  direct  a  teUing  fire  upon  their  hidden  enemy. 
It  would  be  possible,  also,  in  such  circumstances, 
for  the  aeroplanist  to  remain  aloft  during  the  firing, 
and  actually  direct  the  gunners  in  their  aim  by  means 
of  wireless  signals. 

Taking  into  consideration  such  possibilities  as 
these,  an  eminent  French  military  expert  has 
observed:  "The  aeroplane,  without  wireless  tele- 
graphy, is  a  sufficiently  wonderful  '  arm,'  altering  all 
our  preconceived  notions  concerning  warlike  opera- 
tions. And  now  comes  this  new  marvel.  It  is  almost 
impossible  to  calculate  what  the  effect  of  wireless 
signals  from  an  aeroplane,  during  a  battle,  will  be. 
This  much  is  certain.  The  use  of  machines  so 
equipped  will  play  a  revolutionary  part  in  any 
action.  Upon  their  skilful  handling,  of  course, 
much  will  depend.  Unless  a  Commander-in-Chief 
has  accustomed  himself  to  their  use,  during  peace 
manoeuvres,  and  unless  the  officers  operating  the 
transmitting   mechanism,    and   those   receiving   the 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     125 

messages,  are  well-trained  and  thoroughly  accus- 
tomed to  their  work,  the  best  results  are  not  Ukely 
to  be  obtained." 

Naturally,  in  this  connection,  the  question  arises: 
what  is  England  doing?  The  reply  cannot  be 
anything  but  disappointing.  The  privately-con- 
ducted experiments  of  Mr  Thorne  Baker,  pre- 
viously mentioned,  represent  practically  all  that 
has  been  done  to  perfect  wireless  telegraphy  for 
aerial  use. 

So  far  as  the  authorities  are  concerned,  civilian 
suggestions  of  co-operation,  towards  obtaining  im- 
proved apparatus,  have  not  been  received  in  an  en- 
couraging spirit.  From  the  small  army  airship,  "  The 
Beta,"  wireless  trials  have,  it  is  true,  been  carried  out 
once  or  twice;  and  some  unambitious  experiments 
with  biplanes,  at  the  Royal  Aircraft  Factory,  were 
reported  in  April,  191 2.  But  no  practical  outfit  has 
been  devised. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  question  of  the  applica- 
tion of  wireless  telegraphy  to  aeroplanes  provides 
a  very  striking  illustration  of  the  evils  of  our  back- 
ward policy.  Immediately  there  was  an  opportunity 
of  using  wireless  successfully,  the  French  military 
authorities  were  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  situa- 
tion, and  carry  out  adequate  tests.  This  was  because 
their  organisation  was  what  it  should  be,  and  because 
they  had  men  and  machines  ready  to  be  used  in  any 
experiments  required. 

Our  backward  position  told  against  us  inevitably, 
when  this  new  adjunct  to  the  aeroplane  came  along. 
We  had  insufficient  machines,  and  not  enough  men. 
It  was,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  more  than  sufficient  for 
us  to  make  anything  hke  a  show  in  ordinary  flying 


126      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

work,  without  being  required  to  go  a  stage  further, 
and  experiment  with  wireless. 

Thus  the  lesson  can  be  forced  home.  France  has 
taken  up  this  new  aid  to  aerial  reconnoitring — is  per- 
fecting herself  in  it,  and  accustoming  her  officers  to 
its  use.  We  have  not  begun  to  work  with  it  yet.  We 
are  thus  a  definite  stage  behind,  and  shall  remain  so, 
unless  a  real  effort  is  put  forth  to  make  up  leeway. 

By  the  time  we  have  come  to  the  stage  of  adopting 
a  wireless  installation  upon  aeroplanes,  France  may 
be  busy  with  some  new,  and  even  more  important, 
phase  of  flying. 

As  the  military  expert  quoted  above  remarks,  with 
perfect  truth,  it  is  essential  that  adequate  and  realistic 
tests  should  be  carried  out,  with  such  an  aid  as  wire- 
less telegraphy,  before  any  really  effective  use  can  be 
made  of  it. 


IV 

Photography  from  a  war  aeroplane — The  use  of  special 
automatic  cameras. 

While  dealing,  in  this  section,  with  such  an  ad- 
junct to  reconnoitring  as  is  afforded  by  wireless  tele- 
graphy, it  is  permissible,  also,  to  refer  to  the  use  of 
photography  in  connection  with  aeroplanes. 

Here,  once  more,  it  is  necessary  to  turn  to  France 
for  an  illustration  of  recent  work.  Ascending  from 
the  Chalons  military  camp,  quite  recently,  Lieutenant 
Blard,  an  army  airman,  succeeded  in  obtaining  some 
excellent  photographs  of  Rheims  when  flying  at  an 
altitude  of  4000  feet.     He  used  a  special  camera. 

In   America,    also,    practical   attention   has   been 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     127 

devoted  to  this  phase  of  military  aeroplaning.  An 
officer,  when  flying  in  a  biplane,  has  succeeded  in 
obtaining  good  photographs  from  as  great  an  altitude 
as  6000  feet. 

The  utility  of  photography,  as  increasing  the 
powers  of  the  aeroplane  in  war-time,  will  be  consider- 
able. In  an  aerial  survey  of  country,  for  instance, 
the  camera  will  play  an  important  part.  A  series  of 
good  photographs,  when  pieced  together,  will  reveal 
the  characteristics  of  land  from  the  military  point 
of  view;  and,  in  taking  photographs  of  fortifica- 
tions, the  aeroplane  with  a  camera  will  find  another 
ready  use. 

It  is  now  held  that  all  scouting  aeroplanes  should  be 
fitted  with  a  camera,  to  be  used,  during  reconnoitring, 
whenever  a  favourable  opportunity  arises. 

In  the  first  tests  made  with  photography  from  an 
aeroplane,  an  ordinary  camera  was  used,  being  held, 
by  the  passenger  in  the  machine,  in  the  best  position 
possible  to  secure  a  photograph  of  whatever  object 
it  was  desired  to  snapshot. 

But  this  method  was  seen  to  be  somewhat  clumsy. 
In  many  machines,  for  example,  it  was  not  possible 
to  obtain  a  picture,  when  taken  in  this  fashion,  of 
anything  directly  below.  The  business  of  changing 
plates,  also,  was  found  to  be  an  awkward  one. 

So  it  was  seen  that  there  was  need  for  something 
in  the  nature  of  the  automatic  camera,  specially 
designed  for  military  work.  In  Germany,  where 
great  interest  has  been  evinced  in  aerial  photography, 
a  camera  with  a  special  telephoto  lens,  operating 
almost  like  a  gun,  has  been  devised  for  use  in  an 
aeroplane.  This  machine  the  observer  holds  to  his 
shoulder,  "  aiming  "  it  at  the  object  which  he  wishes 


128      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

to  photograph,  and  making  the  exposure  by  the  pull- 
ing of  a  trigger. 

In  England,  where  private  enterprise  has  out- 
stripped any  official  action,  Mr  Thorne  Baker  has 
devised  a  very  ingenious  camera.  This  is  suspended 
below  the  aeroplane,  in  such  a  position  that  it  points 
directly  downwards ;  and  the  whole  operation  of  the 
camera  is  automatic. 

The  airman  or  observer  puts  the  machine  in  action 
by  pressing  a  button.  This  causes  a  photograph  to 
be  taken  of  whatever  the  aeroplane  is  passing  over 
at  the  moment.  Then,  by  means  of  another  piece 
of  automatic  machinery,  a  plate  is  changed  for  a 
fresh  exposure.  Such  a  camera  as  this  will,  un- 
doubtedly, prove  of  very  considerable  value  as  an 
adjunct  to  survey  work  with  an  aeroplane. 

At  the  end  of  August,  191 1,  several  military 
officers  in  France  carried  out  special  tests  with  aerial 
photography.  They  made  flights  over  fortresses, 
for  example,  and  secured  excellent  pictures.  Tracts 
of  country  were  also  photographed,  as  were  troops 
on  the  march. 

The  result  is  that  photography  has  joined  wire- 
less telegraphy,  in  the  French  air-corps,  as  a  definite 
aid  to  aerial  reconnoitring. 


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NINTH    SECTION 

DEVELOPMENT    OF    ALL-WEATHER   WAR    AEROPLANES 

I 

Flights  in  thirty-five-mile-an-hour  winds — Arguments  of 
sceptics — What  the  great  contests  of  191 1  proved. 

Reference  has  been  made  to  the  fact  that,  as  soon 
as  engines  became  reliable,  and  airmen  gained 
confidence,  winds  of  an  appreciable  velocity  were 
successfully  combated. 

But  even  now,  despite  the  strides  which  the  aero- 
plane is  making  towards  becoming  an  all-weather 
machine,  those  who  belittle  it  from  the  military  point 
of  view,  and  uphold  an  official  policy  of  inactivity, 
are  found  ready  to  argue  that  the  heavier-than-air 
machine  is  still  purely  a  fine-weather  craft.  Such 
an  attitude  is  governed,  not  so  much  by  deep-rooted 
conservatism,  as  by  ignorance. 

The  fact  is  that  the  wind-flying  capabilities  of 
an  aeroplane  have  been  improved  to  an  altogether 
remarkable  extent.  So  far  as  an  average  can  be 
struck,  it  may  be  said  that,  at  the  present  time,  a  war 
machine  can  be  operated,  and  can  carry  out  useful 
work,  in  a  wind  blowing  at  the  rate  of  from  thirty  to 
thirty-five  miles  an  hour.  Higher  winds  are,  as  has 
been  said,  occasionally  combated;   but  this  repre- 

129  I 


130      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

sents,  approximately,  the  maximum  for  practical 
purposes  to-day. 

Some  military  critics,  when  such  facts  as  these  are 
adduced,  raise  the  point  that  such  "  air-worthiness  " 
as  this  is  not  sufficient.  The  complications  of  war 
are  already  so  great,  they  declare,  that  a  Commander- 
in-Chief  is  not  justified  in  increasing  his  responsi' 
bilities  by  saddling  himself  with  a  squadron  of  aero- 
planes, when  the  machines  will  be  inoperative  should 
a  high  wind  spring  up. 

"  Enthusiasts  do  not  seem  to  reaHse  this  point,** 
a  military  critic  has  observed,  in  regard  to  the  general 
question  of  aeroplane  reliability.  "  A  commander  of 
troops  would,  almost,  be  more  hampered  than  helped 
by  an  air  service,  were  it  only  possible  to  use  it  one 
day,  and  then  not  the  next,  and  so  on.  He  would  rely 
upon  it,  you  see,  and  then  it  would  fail  him  just  at 
some  critical  moment.  I  know  it  may  be  said,  in 
answer  to  this,  that  even  if  only  occasional  use  can  be 
made  of  aeroplanes,  it  is  worth  while  to  equip  an  army 
with  them,  because,  if  they  succeed  in  their  object 
once  in  six  times,  they  may  alter  the  whole  course 
of  a  battle.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  a  very 
considerable  organisation  has  to  be  built  up,  if  an 
aeroplane  service  is  to  be  of  any  real  use.  The 
already  huge  impedimenta  of  an  army  has  to  be 
added  to;  and  this,  alone,  is  a  very  serious  point. 
On  account  of  the  unreHability  of  the  air  service, 
also,  cavalry  scouts,  and  other  scouting  agencies, 
have  to  be  employed,  just  as  usual.  The  position 
is,  really,  a  somewhat  unsatisfactory  one.  For  days 
on  end,  if  the  weather  is  bad,  the  aeroplanes  may  be 
inoperative." 

This  view  is,  of  course,  an  unduly  pessimistic  one. 


THE   AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     131 

Having  regard  to  the  capabilities  of  present-type 
aeroplanes,  the  occasions  upon  which  war  machine* 
would  be  windbound  would  be  very  rare.  It  is  reliably 
estimated,  in  fact,  that  aeroplane  scouts  would  be 
able  to  render  good  service  on  80  per  cent,  of  the 
days  of  the  year. 

It  might  happen  that  a  boisterous  wind,  rising  in 
the  morning,  would  prevent  the  air-scouts  from 
working  at  midday,  or  during  the  afternoon.  But, 
even  during  a  generally  unfavourable  spell  of 
weather,  a  shrewd  Commander  of  aeroplanes  should 
be  able  to  snatch  an  hour's  lull  in  the  wind,  probably 
in  the  early  morning  or  evening,  and  get  his  machines 
to  work. 

Either  a  morning  or  evening  calm,  during  a 
period  of  gusty  winds,  is  generally  experienced ;  and, 
in  any  such  lull,  so  rapid  is  their  work,  the  aeroplanes 
should  be  able  to  acquire  what  information  is  neces- 
sary, and  be  back  again  at  Headquarters,  before  any 
hazardous  rising  of  the  wind  takes  place. 

In  this  way,  it  should  be  possible  to  manipulate 
the  service,  even  with  existing  machines,  so  as  to 
make  it  of  practical  value,  upon  almost  every  day 
of  a  campaign;  and  the  fact  that  one  hour's  work 
would  probably  be  sufficient  for  a  reconnoitring 
flight,  is  the  important  factor  of  the  situation  to  be 
remembered. 

The  point  to  be  made  in  this  connection  is  this: 
those  who  have  studied  the  progress  of  aeroplaning, 
and  realise  the  wonderful  strides  which  have  recently 
been  made,  see  quite  clearly  that,  even  under  un- 
favourable conditions,  a  war  machine  should  be  able 
to  give  a  very  good  account  of  itself. 

This  fact  will  not  be  admitted,  however,  by  those 


132      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

who  still  maintain  the  attitude  that  the  aeroplane  is 
a  fair-weather  machine,  and  will  never  be  anything 
else.  Their  prejudice  will  not  permit  them  to  read, 
as  they  should,  the  lessons  of  recent  events.  They 
magnify  failures,  and  ignore  successes. 

For  such  a  negative  policy  there  was,  at  first,  some 
excuse,  although  scepticism,  at  the  dawn  of  a  new  in- 
dustry, is  the  reverse  of  helpful.  When  aeroplanes 
were  in  their  crudest  stage,  they  provided  plenty  of 
material  for  the  cynic.  In  those  days,  pilots  spent 
most  of  their  time  in  their  hangars,  tuning  up 
obstinate  engines ;  and  it  was  a  case,  as  one  humorous 
pioneer  put  it,  of  flying  "  a  mile  a  month." 

The  prevailing  spirit  of  scepticism  was  well 
revealed  in  the  attitude  taken  up  by  many  people 
in  connection  with  the  prize  of  ;^io,v300  offered  by 
The  Daily  Mail  for  the  flight  from  London  to  Man- 
chester. To  imagine  that  such  a  feat  would  be 
accomplished  was  regarded  as  ridiculous.  And  yet, 
practically  at  the  first  attempt,  the  flight  was  made. 
Then  came  the  second  ;^  10,000  prize  by  the 
generous  and  far-seeing  proprietors  of  The  Daily 
Mail — this  time  for  a  loio-miles  aerial  tour  around 
Great  Britain,  in  which  rules  were  introduced  to  make 
it  incumbent  upon  pilots  to  complete  the  whole  course 
upon  one  machine. 

Here  was  a  leap,  indeed.  From  180  miles  to 
1000!  Could  it  be  done?  Could  such  a  reliable 
aeroplane  be  found?  These  were  the  questions 
asked;  and,  in  this  connection,  one  significant  fact 
may  be  mentioned.  It  was  this:  even  some  of  the 
experts — men  thoroughly  well  acquainted  with  the 
industry — were  doubtful  as  to  whether  this  prize 
would  be  won.     They  knew,  of  course,  what  giant 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     133 

strides  were  being  made.  But,  still,  so  severe  was 
the  ordeal,  they  had  their  doubts. 

What  a  triumph  this  great  contest  was  for  the 
aeroplane  will  be  fresh  in  any  reader's  memory. 
Flying  neck  and  neck  round  the  loio-miles  course, 
Beaumont  and  Vedrines  astonished  the  world  by  the 
certainty  of  their  aerial  progress. 

Calculations  as  to  when  the  race  would  finish 
had  been  made  beforehand.  Reckoning  the  very 
highest  speeds  it  would  be  possible  to  attain,  and 
assuming  an  entire  absence  of  mechanical  troubles, 
it  was  estimated  that  the  winner  would  complete  the 
circuit  at  a  certain  hour  on  a  specified  morning ;  and 
the  winner,  Beaumont,  was  only  four  hours  longer, 
in  completing  the  course,  than  the  most  favourable 
estimate  had  allowed  him. 

Even  the  most  enthusiastic  supporters  of  the 
aeroplane  were  astonished  by  this  feat.  In  flying, 
which  was  spread  out  over  several  days,  and  involved 
aerial  journeys  over  most  difficult  country,  Beaumont 
and  Vedrines  made  light  of  every  adverse  condition. 
In  Scotland,  they  combated  winds  so  violent  that 
their  machines  danced  and  plunged  in  the  air,  and 
occasionally  "  side-slipped "  for  many  feet  under 
the  treacherous  impulses  of  unexpected  gusts.  But, 
when  they  were  begged  to  wait  a  while,  and  give 
the  weather  an  opportunity  of  improving,  these 
two  champions  resolutely  took  their  seats  in  their 
monoplanes,  and  flew  on.  The  lesson,  from  the 
military  point  of  view,  was  overwhelmingly 
important. 

Not  only  did  these  two  men  fly  with  the  regularity 
and  speed  of  express  trains,  but  they  both  per- 
formed their  wonderful  feats  on  machines  which  were 


134      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

unchanged  throughout.  This  represented  the  real 
progress.  In  previous  contests  of  a  similar  nature, 
in  which  long  distances  had  been  traversed,  there 
had  been  no  restriction  at  all  as  to  the  number  of 
machines  used. 

The  result  had  been,  therefore,  that  makers  of 
aeroplanes,  naturally  anxious  to  see  their  representa- 
tives win,  had  dotted  spare  machines  all  over  the 
route;  and,  in  one  instance,  a  competitor  used  as 
many  as  three  aeroplanes  before  completing  one 
long-distance  race. 

The  point  we  are  immediately  concerned  with  is 
this.  A  certain  number  of  days,  chosen  a  long  time 
ahead,  were  set  apart  for  this  loio-miles  race  round 
Great  Britain;  and  upon  these  days  it  was  flown. 
Beaumont  and  Vedrines  proceeded  from  stage  to 
stage,  flying  to  schedule,  and  making  light  of  adverse 
weather.  The  climatic  conditions,  as  has  been  said, 
were  not  ideal.  When  the  time  came  to  leave  Edin- 
burgh, for  instance,  so  powerful  a  wind  was  blowing 
that  it  was  not  reckoned,  even  by  practical  men,  that 
the  pilots  would  be  able  to  get  away. 

But,  to  the  amazement  even  of  officials,  the  two 
monoplanists  soared  up,  and  deliberately  fought  the 
wind.  While  flying  on  to  the  other  stopping-places 
in  Scotland,  also,  both  men  passed  through  heavy 
storms  of  rain;  and  again,  contrary  to  expectation, 
they  did  not  descend,  but  battled  on.  The  result 
was  that,  when  this  wonderful  air  race  was  at  an  end, 
both  men  were  justified  in  describing  their  mono- 
planes as  all-weather  machines. 

What  this  performance,  and  others,  have  demon- 
strated is  this:  at  the  present  moment,  although 
admittedly  experimental,  the  aeroplane  is  sufl5ciently 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     135 

well  able  to  combat  adverse  weather  as  to  make  it 
a  highly-useful  weapon  of  war. 


II 

Value  of  high  speed,  when  combating  a  wind — Construc- 
tional difficulties  of  a  hundred-mile-an-hour  machine. 

It  is  unwise  to  regard  the  capabilities  of  the 
present-type  aeroplane  as  representing,  in  any  way, 
a  limit,  or  a  standard  of  achievement.  What  the 
machine  built  to-day  can  perform,  the  aeroplane  of 
to-morrow  will,  assuredly,  be  able  to  improve  upon ; 
and  so  progress  will  be  recorded,  until  something  in 
the  nature  of  a  perfected  aircraft  is  evolved. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  is  practically  no  stage, 
in  connection  with  any  forms  of  manufacture,  when 
a  builder  can  say :  "  Here  is  a  machine  incapable  of 
improvement."  Take,  as  an  example,  the  motor-car. 
The  luxurious,  six-cyHndered  machine  appears  to 
represent  what  may  be  termed  "  the  last  word  " ;  but 
small  improvements  are  constantly  being  made,  and 
thoughtful  manufacturers  still  see  new  avenues  of 
progress. 

So  it  is  in  regard  to  the  wind-flying  capabilities 
of  an  aeroplane.  Thirty  to  thirty-five  miles  an  hour 
represents,  as  has  been  said,  a  fair  maximum  for  the 
strength  of  wind  in  which  a  machine  can  be  navigated 
at  the  present  time.  But  this  will  not  exist  long  as  a 
standard;  improvements  in  the  speed,  and  in  the 
general  stability  of  machines,  are  being  made  from 
day  to  day. 

The  result  of  this  progress  in  manufacture  will  be 


136      THE  AEKOPLANE  IN  WAR 

that  the  aeroplane  will  be  navigable  in  higher  and 
higher  winds.  Forty-mile-an-hour  winds  will,  before 
long,  cease  to  prevent  regular  flight;  and  it  is  the 
view  of  eminent  designers  and  builders  that  it  will 
be  possible  for  the  aeroplane  to  remain  aloft  in  winds 
blowing  at  the  rate  of  more  than  fifty  miles  an  hour. 
It  is  hoped,  in  fact,  that  machines  will,  eventually, 
be  able  to  live  in  any  wind  save  such  a  raging  gale 
as  drives  big  steamships  to  port. 

Already,  certain  definite  Hues  of  improvement 
suggest  themselves  to  the  makers  of  aeroplanes.  In 
combating  a  high  wind,  failing  any  device  to  provide 
an  aeroplane  with  automatic  stability,  high  speed 
is  found  to  be  of  the  greatest  aid.  But  there  are 
difficulties  in  connection  with  the  attaining  of  high 
speed,  as  will  be  shown  later. 

An  illustration  of  the  value  of  high  speed,  in  over- 
coming the  wind,  was  giving  at  the  Rheims  flying 
meeting  in  the  summer  of  1910.  Morane,  testing  a 
monoplane  fitted  with  a  motor  of  a  hundred  horse- 
power, attained  a  speed  of  quite  eighty  miles  an  hour. 
Travelling  at  this  rate,  he  found  that  he  was  able 
to  pass  close  behind  other  machines,  despite  the  rush 
of  wind  from  their  propellers.  Had  he  been  flying 
a  slower  machine,  this-  "  back-draught "  would,  in- 
evitably, have  caused  him  to  capsize. 

Speed,  also,  was  what  helped  Beaumont  and 
Vedrines,  when  they  were  fighting  adverse  winds  in 
the  Circuit  of  Britain.  Beaumont's  monoplane  had  a 
speed  of  a  little  over  sixty  miles  an  hour ;  and  that 
of  Vedrines  was  a  trifle  faster.  Had  either  of  these 
airmen  been  piloting  a  slow-flying  biplane,  he  would 
have  been  forced  to  descend,  seeing  that  his  machine 
would  have  become  unmanageable  in  heavy  gusts. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     137 

Speed,  therefore,  is  the  aim  of  most  manufac- 
turers. They  see  that  the  aeroplane  must,  if  it  is 
to  compete  commercially  with  land  or  sea  transit, 
provide  a  means  of  locomotion  more  rapid  than  any 
which  at  present  exists;  and  they  recognise,  also, 
that  speed  offers — at  any  rate  at  present — a  solution 
of  the  problem  of  all-weather  flying. 

But  there  are,  as  has  been  hinted,  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  large  increases  in  speed.  Two  hundred  miles 
an  hour  through  the  air  is,  frequently,  cited  as  the 
ideal  to  be  aimed  at.  So  far,  with  a  specially-built 
racing  machine,  a  speed  of  approximately  a  hundred 
miles  an  hour  has  represented  the  maximum  attained. 
Such  machines  are,  however,  more  or  less  "  freaks  " ; 
the  best  results  obtained  with  ordinary  machines  being 
from  sixty-five  to  seventy  miles  an  hour. 

Higher  speeds  still  might  be  thought  to  be  merely  a 
question  of  increasing  horse-power.  But  other  con- 
siderations enter  into  the  question.  A  high-speed 
machine  has,  it  must  be  remembered,  to  start  away 
from  the  ground,  and  land  again  at  the  end  of  a 
flight;  its  actual  passage  through  the  air  is  not  the 
only  point  to  be  considered. 

With  a  racing  monoplane,  for  example,  the  small 
size  of  its  supporting  wings,  and  the  slight  camber 
upon  them,  necessitate  its  moving  over  the  ground 
at  a  very  high  speed  before  it  can  obtain  the  necessary 
"  lift  "  to  get  into  the  air ;  and  then  comes  the  question 
of  returning  to  the  ground  again.  These  fast  machines 
will  only  glide  at  comparatively  high  speeds. 

A  problem  arises,  therefore,  as  to  the  landing 
chassis  which  will  withstand  the  shock  of  high-speed 
landings — that  is  to  say,  on  anything  save  perfecdy 
smooth  ground.    Apart  from  the  question  of  the  skill 


138      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

of  the  pilot,  in  effecting  a  safe  descent  at  such  high 
speeds — and  this  is  a  factor  seriously  to  be  reckoned 
with — the  running-wheels  and  skids  of  a  machine  will 
not  endure  the  strain  of  a  landing  on  anything  like  a 
rough  surface. 

Thus,  were  speeds  to  be  pushed,  say,  to  a  hundred 
and  fifty  miles  an  hour,  under  present  conditions  of 
flying,  and  with  any  existing  method  of  building  land- 
ing mechanism,  accidents  would  be  likely  to  happen, 
when  airmen  came  to  the  point  of  effecting  a  descent. 

Also  to  be  reckoned  with,  is  the  question  of  increas- 
ing the  structural  strength  of  machines  in  order  to 
meet  the  wind  pressure  of  very  high  speeds. 


Ill 

Variable-speed  aeroplane — Plans  for  constructing  aircraft 
of  this  type — Advantages  of  such  a  machine. 

As  regards  the  problem  of  a  fast,  and  yet  reliable 
aeroplane,  which  is  an  especially  important  one  from 
the  military  point  of  view,  seeing  that  machines  will 
need  to  operate  over  all  sorts  of  country  during  a 
campaign,  the  view  is  now  taken,  by  eminent  manu- 
facturers, that  something  in  the  nature  of  a  variable- 
speed  aircraft  will  need  to  be  devised. 

If  this  can  be  evolved,  it  certainly  promises  a 
solution  of  the  problem.  What  the  question  resolves 
itself  into,  as  can  be  seen,  is  this :  there  are  very  dis- 
tinct limits  to  the  rate  at  which  it  is  practical  to  move 
across  the  ground  on  preparing  to  soar,  and  also  to 
the  speed  at  which  it  is  feasible  to  return  again  to 
earth. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     139 

The  variable-speed  machine  seems  destined  to 
meet  these  difficulties,  and  makers  are  busy  with  plans 
for  the  building  of  aeroplanes  of  this  type.  The 
immediate  aim  is  to  produce,  if  possible,  an  aero- 
plane with  a  maximum  speed  approaching,  say,  a 
hundred  miles  an  hour,  and  a  minimum  speed  of 
about  thirty  miles  an  hour. 

In  this  way,  adequate  use  would  be  made  of  the 
air  as  a  speed  medium  and,  at  the  same  time,  it  would 
be  possible  to  effect  safisfactory  landings  on  fairly 
rough  ground,  as  well  as  on  smooth  surfaces.  For  the 
production  of  such  a  variable-speed  machine,  several 
designs  have  already  been  prepared;  but,  as  yet, 
each  awaits  the  ordeal  of  a  practical  test. 

One  plan,  for  example,  involves  the  altering  of 
the  angle  of  incidence  of  the  planes,  while  a  machine 
is  in  flight.  The  angle  would,  that  is  to  say,  be  made 
steep  for  slow  flight,  and  flatter  when  high  speed  was 
required.  Another  device  aims  at  obtaining  variable 
speed  by  a  process  of  reefing  the  planes  of  a  machine. 
This  would  be  done  by  reducing,  or  rolling  up,  the 
rear  extremities  of  the  plane  surfaces. 

According  to  this  system,  a  machine  would  have 
its  slowest  speed  when  its  maximum  amount  of 
sustaining  surface  was  in  operation,  and  would  fly 
faster  as  the  pilot  gradually  brought  into  play  the 
reefing  process. 

A  third  scheme  which  is  suggested  deals  with  the 
telescoping  of  the  plane-ends  of  a  machine,  thereby 
reducing  the  Hfting  surface. 

Of  these  methods,  the  one  most  favoured, 
having  regard  to  its  practicability,  is  that  of  slightly 
altering  the  angle  of  the  planes ;  and  several  manu- 
facturers    are     already     busy     with     experimental 


140      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

machines  of  this  type.  It  appears  likely  that  actual 
tests  will,  before  long,  be  attempted  with  an  aero- 
plane thus  equipped. 

For  military  work,  a  variable-speed  machine  pro- 
mises to  be  exceptionally  useful.  The  high  speed 
would  be  employed  in  weathering  a  gusty  wind,  or 
in  moving  rapidly  to  any  desired  locality,  when  about 
to  carry  out  a  reconnaissance.  Then,  when  a  detailed 
observation  was  being  made,  the  slowest  speed  would 
be  adopted,  so  as  to  give  the  observer  plenty  of  oppor- 
tunity of  studying  what  lay  below  him. 

The  production  of  a  practical  machine,  embody- 
ing the  principle  of  variable  speeds,  is  now  held  to 
be  merely  a  question  of  time,  and  of  careful  experi- 
ment. Therefore,  the  promise  of  the  immediate 
future,  particularly  as  regards  the  military  aspect  of 
flying,  is  most  hopeful — both  from  the  point  of  view 
of  wind-flying,  and  of  reliability. 

One  by  one,  indeed,  the  objections  against  the 
military  aeroplane  are  likely  to  be  overcome,  until  a 
machine  is  an  accomplished  fact  which  will  meet  all 
practical  requirements. 


IV 


Power-plant  of  aeroplanes — Fitting  two  engines  to  obviate 
involuntary  descents 

While  writing  of  aeroplane  development,  mention 
should  certainly  be  made  of  engines.  It  has  been 
shown,  already,  what  a  wonderful  step  forward 
was  made  with  the  introduction  of  the  revolving 
"  Gnome."     This  engine  will  operate  with  the  re- 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     141 

liability  of  that  fitted  to  a  motor-car;  there  are 
other  types  of  engine  now  achieving  thoroughly  good 
results ;  and  they  promise  to  do  better  in  the  future. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  propulsion,  therefore,  the 
future  of  the  aeroplane  appears  assured. 

One  great  objection  of  sceptics,  in  regard  to  the 
power-plant  of  aeroplanes,  has  been  that,  should 
an  engine  fail,  a  machine  is  compelled  to  make  an 
involuntary  descent.  In  answer  to  this  criticism, 
advocates  of  the  aeroplane  have  pointed  out  that 
motors  are  becoming  more  and  more  reliable,  and  that 
such  stoppages  are  already  reduced  to  a  minimum. 

It  is  now  seen  that  it  will  be  possible  to  prevent 
involuntary  descent,  when  flying  across  country, 
by  equipping  aeroplanes  with  a  reserve  power-- 
plant. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  experiments,  in  this 
regard,  is  being  carried  out  by  Mr  Horace  Short, 
the  aeronautical  engineer  of  the  Royal  Aero  Club. 

Mr  Short  produced,  in  September,  191 1,  a  biplane 
fitted  with  two  "  Gnome  "  engines.  One,  placed  in 
front  of  the  machine,  operated  a  couple  of  tractor 
propellers  fitted  before  the  main-planes.  The  other, 
installed  at  the  rear,  actuated  a  single  propeller. 
The  machine  was  designed  so  that  one  engine  would 
drive  it  at  a  speed  of  about  thirty-six  miles  an  hour ; 
while,  if  both  were  employed,  its  pace  would  increase 
to  more  than  fifty  miles  an  hour.  In  actual  tests, 
most  encouraging  results  were  obtained  with  this 
machine,  and  Mr  Short  is  now  perfecting  this  type  of 
twin-engine  biplane. 

By  equipping  an  aeroplane  with  two  engines, 
working  independently  of  each  other,  the  danger  of 
an  involuntary  descent,  on  bad  ground,  is  obviated. 


142      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

Should  one  engine  stop,  the  pilot  can  keep  himself 
in  the  air  with  the  other. 

In  such  a  machine  as  this,  which  might  be 
described  as  a  "  safety  "  aeroplane,  the  weight  of  the 
additional  engine  is,  of  course,  a  consideration,  but 
in  cases  where  exceptional  reliability  is  required — 
say,  for  example,  when  a  most  urgent  dispatch  has 
to  be  taken  across  country  from  point  to  point  in 
military  operations — a  dual-engine  machine  will 
probably  be  used. 

Consideration  of  such  facts  as  have  been  cited  in 
this  section  show  that  aeroplanes,  for  military  work, 
have  an  almost  unlimited  field  for  improvement. 
Therefore,  any  nation  which  neglects  war  machines 
now,  on  the  argument  that  they  are  unreliable,  is 
pursuing  an  extremely  foolish  policy.  If  feats  such 
as  have  been  recently  accomplished  are  possible,  with 
machines  built  with  wood,  wire,  and  canvas,  what  will 
not  be  achieved  with  the  stronger,  speedier,  heavier 
aeroplanes,  such  as  are  already  being  constructed? 

Sceptics  there  are,  of  course,  who  may  be  found 
ready  to  say  that  the  aeroplane  will  never  be  made 
rehable;  but  their  contentions  are  being  proved  to 
be  wrong  from  day  to  day.  Already,  with  the 
simplest  possible  apparatus,  a  remarkable  stage  of 
efficiency  has  been  reached.  And  now  the  aeroplane 
promises  to  embark  upon  a  new  era  of  construction. 

Wood  is  being  replaced  by  metal;  and  extreme 
lightness  is  no  longer  the  insistent  demand. 
Aeroplanes  are  being  built  for  general,  everyday 
use. 

From  the  military  point  of  view,  the  aeroplanes 
at  present  available  have  drawbacks.  There  is,  in- 
deed, room  for  vast  improvement.    Greater  strength, 


THE  AEROPLANE   IN  WAR     143 

greater  reliability,  greater  portability — these  are  the 
aims  that  makers  have  in  view ;  and  they  will,  without 
doubt,  be  realised. 

The  War   Office   tests    this    summer   will   teach 
manufacturers  many  a  useful  lesson. 


TENTH    SECTION 

THE     TRAINING    OF    ARMY    AIRMEN 


French      thoroughness — An      expert's      tribute — Sound 
training  all-important. 

It  is  now  possible  to  deal  with  one  of  the  most 
important  considerations  in  connection  with  military 
aeroplaning.  This  concerns  the  training  of  pilots  and 
observers  at  the  military  flying  schools. 

France  is  devoting  herself  energetically  to  this 
work.  Germany,  now  equally  "  keen  "  upon  military 
aviation,  is  establishing  schools  in  all  suitable  places. 
Russia  is  convinced  that  the  right  policy  is  to  create 
a  large  and  efficient  corps  of  airmen.  So  is  Austria, 
Japan,  as  representing  earnest  progress,  is  not  only 
training  men  at  home,  but  is  sending  a  large  number 
of  officers  to  the  various  schools  in  Europe. 

As  has  been  set  forth  before,  in  another  con- 
nection, but  should  be  emphasised  again  here,  the  true 
policy  as  regards  military  flying,  in  the  present  stage 
of  development,  should  be :  "  Test  all  new  machines 
that  are  introduced ;  maintain  a  fleet  sufficient  to  meet 
any  emergency  which  may  arise;  and,  above  all, 
train  men  with  the  object  of  acquiring  a  far  stronger 
corps  of  pilots  and  observers  than  any  present  situa- 
tion demands." 

144 


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THE  AEROPLANE   IN  WAR     145 

Here,  at  any  rate,  is  the  clear-cut  policy  both  of 
France  and  Germany — a  policy  which  Russia  is 
beginning  to  imitate,  and  a  poHcy,  also,  that  Japan 
is  following.  X 

Having  toured  France  quite  recently,  an  expert 
thus  describes  the  activities  at  the  French  flying 
schools.  "  Those  who  are  not  directly  in  touch 
with  the  various  Government  departments  cannot 
estimate  how  many  airmen  there  are  at  work. 
Flying  schools  seem  to  be  springing  up  everywhere. 
Depots  are  being  estabHshed  all  over  the  country. 
Officers  are  flying  from  place  to  place  every  day.  To 
see  a  military  machine,  carrying  a  pilot  and  observer,  ^ 

passing  swiftly  overhead,  is  now  quite  a  common 
sight.  Orders  are  being  received  almost  daily  at 
the  military  camps,  instructing  a  machine  to  set  forth 
upon  a  reconnoitring  flight,  or  to  carry  a  dispatch 
from  one  camp  to  another. 

"  It  is  the  thoroughness,  and  the  business-like  way 
in  which  this  work  is  done,  that  are  so  impressive.  An 
order  for  a  reconnoitring  flight  is  received.  Promptly 
the  officer  and  his  observer  prepare  themselves.  The 
aeroplane,  properly  tuned  up,  is  all  ready,  and  is 
quickly  wheeled  from  its  shed.  They  mount  to  their 
places,  and  are  away. 

"  Directly  afterwards,  perhaps,  another  machine  is 
ordered  out.  In  the  early  days  of  flying,  one  was 
prepared  for  a  delay  of  several  hours  when  an  air- 
man set  out  upon  anything  like  a  long  flight.  His 
engine  had  to  be  tuned  up  with  laborious  care ;  there 
were  a  hundred  and  one  details  that  had  been  for- 
gotten, and  had  to  be  put  right  after  the  machine  had 
been  brought  out  of  its  shed.  Now,  contrast  this 
wearisome  delay  with  the  promptitude  of  the  French 

K 


146      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

officer-airmen.  There  is  no  feverish  rush  and  bustle 
at  the  commencement  of  a  flight.  The  propeller  is 
turned;  the  motor  fires  at  once;  and  the  machine 
takes  the  air. 

"  This,  of  course,  is  the  direct  fruit  of  training. 
Tfiis  familiarity  with  machines,  and  with  the  routine 
of  flying,  is  the  reward  which  France  is  already 
gaining  for  her  devotion  to  miHtary  aviation,  and  her 
unsparing  efforts  to  make  her  service  thoroughly 
efficient. 

"  The  way  in  which  the  aeroplanes  are  kept  in 
trim,  and  the  cool,  alert  manner  in  which  they  are 
handled,  come  as  revelations  to  a  man  who  has 
only  seen  the  machinery  of  flight  as  it  is  in  operation 
at  an  ordinary  flying  school.  Particularly  is  one 
impressed  by  the  skill,  and  good  organisation,  among 
the  engineer-mechanics  at  the  military  stations. 

"  The  use  of  the  aeroplane,  for  purposes  of  war, 
necessitates  a  vast  amount  of  training  for  every  unit 
engaged  in  the  aerial  work,  and,  without  such  training, 
nothing  in  the  nature  of  real  success  can  be  attained." 

This  tribute  provides  an  indication  of  the  prac- 
ticability of  the  military  training  now  proceeding 
in  France.  Efficiency  is,  indeed,  the  constant 
watchword.  Operating  with  a  war  weapon  that  is 
new  and  strange,  the  French  military  authorities 
have  already  worked  wonders;  and  their  success  is 
due  to  the  organisation  they  have  been  able  to  intro- 
duce at  their  flying  schools. 

Very  carefully  considered,  in  every  way,  is  the 
course  of  instruction  through  which  an  officer-airman 
is  called  upon  to  pass.  The  aim  is  to  make  him 
proficient  in  every  respect.  For  military  purposes, 
it  is  not  sufficient  for  an  officer  to  be,  say,  a  fine 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     147 

"  fancy  "  flyer,  and  ignorant  in  regard  to  engines,  or 
a  skilled  engineer  and  an  indifferent  pilot.  He  must 
be  a  thoroughly  all-round  man. 


II 

How  the  military  airman  is  "  schooled  " — His  course  of 
instruction  described. 

The  novice  who  comes  to  the  French  military 
schools  is  given  a  course  of  general  tuition.  He  is 
first  brought  to  study  flying  in  its  broad  as- 
pect, and  not  as  regards  detail.  This  period  of 
general  "  schooling "  may  last  for  two  or  three 
months,  during  which  the  beginner  makes  it  his 
business  to  study  aeroplanes,  and  their  motors,  very 
carefully.  He  acquaints  himself,  for  example,  with 
the  method  of  control  employed  in  the  various 
machines. 

Then,  as  regards  motors,  he  has  much  to  occupy 
him.  He  will  take  an  interesting  engine  Hke 
the  "  Gnome,"  for  instance,  and  make  himself 
thoroughly  conversant  with  all  its  details.  The 
value  of  such  preliminary  work  is  often  shown  sub- 
sequently when,  perhaps,  an  officer  may  be  stranded 
some  distance  from  Headquarters  with  a  jibbing 
engine. 

Instead  of  being  helpless  in  such  circumstances, 
his  previous  period  of  tuition  stands  him  in  good 
stead,  and  he  is  able  to  run  over  his  motor  with  an 
expert  eye,  and  so  discover  the  little  defect  which 
may  be  causing  all  the  trouble. 

Apart  from  the  "  Gnome,"  there  are  other  makes 


148      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

of  engine  in  the  aviation  school  to  which  the  pupil 
may  direct  his  attention,  with  good  results.  Thus 
the  novice  acquires  a  general  knowledge  regarding 
aeroplanes  and  their  motive  power,  and  prepares 
himself  for  the  second  stage  of  his  tuition. 

This  resolves  itself  into  a  series  of  flights,  which 
end  in  his  taking  control  of  an  aeroplane  himself. 
But,  first  of  all,  he  takes  his  place  in  the  passenger- 
seat  of  a  military  machine,  and  is  piloted  round  the 
aerodrome  by  an  officer-instructor  of  proved  skill. 
For  his  first  few  flights,  the  beginner  merely  sits  in 
the  machine,  and  accustoms  himself  to  the  novel 
experience  of  being  in  an  aeroplane. 

This  first  acquaintance  with  flight  generally  proves 
confusing.  The  engine  of  an  aeroplane  makes  a 
din  which  is  trying  to  the  novice.  Then  the  pace 
of  the  machine,  when  it  moves  across  the  ground, 
and  the  rapidity  with  which  it  soars  in  flight,  are 
confusing,  also. 

It  is,  therefore,  a  sound  policy  to  allow  a  beginner 
to  make  several  trips  with  an  experienced  officer, 
before  he  attempts  to  control  a  machine  himself. 
By  so  doing,  the  pupil  has  an  opportunity  of  getting 
over  his  first  bewilderment,  and  contrives  to  be  in  a 
fairly  cool  and  collected  frame  of  mind  when  his  turn 
comes  to  assume  control  of  the  levers. 

After  several  trial  journeys  have  been  made,  and 
the  novice  is  no  longer  embarrassed  by  the  strange- 
ness of  his  position,  he  is  allowed,  by  his  instructor, 
to  exercise  temporary  command  over  the  aeroplane 
while  it  is  in  flight.  This  is  accomplished  by  means 
of  a  dual  control ;  a  set  of  levers  are  before  the  pilot, 
and  another  in  front  of  the  pupil. 

The  former,  after  warning  his  charge  to  be  ready, 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     U9 

relinquishes  his  hold  upon  the  levers,  and  the  pupil 
takes  charge  of  the  machine.  The  instructor,  of 
course,  keeps  a  keen  eye  upon  the  behaviour  of  the 
machine;  should  the  pupil  make  an  error,  the  pilot 
is  able  to  rectify  it  before  there  is  any  chance  of  an 
accident. 

By  this  admirably  practical  system,  a  pupil  can  be 
led  to  a  satisfactory  state  of  proficiency  without  risk, 
either  to  himself  or  to  his  instructor.  After  he  has 
controlled  the  machine,  for  a  spell,  during  straight 
flights,  he  is  given  the  opportunity  of  making  a  turn 
in  the  air. 

This  operation  requires  the  exercise  of  skill  and 
judgment.  Apart  from  moving  the  rudder,  or  rud- 
ders, which  send  the  machine  round,  the  pilot  needs 
to  operate  his  "  ailerons,"  or  wing-warping  device, 
as  the  case  may  be,  in  order  to  "  bank  "  the  machine 
over,  and  so  facilitate  the  turning  movement. 

As  soon  as  he  shows  sufficient  skill  in  controlling 
an  aeroplane,  while  with  a  pilot,  the  pupil  is  given 
an  opportunity  of  flying  by  himself.  As  a  rule,  his 
previous  tuition  has  been  so  valuable  to  him  that  he 
finds  little  difficulty  in  performing  a  solo  flight,  and 
so  prepares  himself  for  the  obtaining  of  his  certifi- 
cate from  the  French  Aero  Club. 

This  certificate  of  proficiency  is  obtained  by 
making  a  series  of  flights  before  official  observers, 
and  in  maintaining  a  certain  altitude,  while  so  doing. 
A  descent  has  also  to  be  made  with  the  engine  of  the 
machine  stopped,  so  as  to  demonstrate  the  pilot's 
ability  to  effect  2l  vol  plane. 

In  the  case  of  a  civilian  airman,  the  passing  of  this 
test  is  considered  sufficient  evidence  of  his  ability 
to    control    a    machine ;    but,    as    regards    French 


150      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

military  airmen,  a  greater  degree  of  proficiency 
is  required.  Therefore,  when  he  has  acquired  his 
Aero  Club  certificate,  the  officer-airman  has  to  pre- 
pare himself  for  another  ordeal. 

The  French  mihtary  authorities  demand  that  he 
should  make  a  long  flight  across  country,  that  he 
should  remain  in  the  air  for  a  couple  of  hours  with- 
out descending,  and  that  he  should  demonstrate  his 
capabilities  by  piloting  his  machine  in  a  fairly-high 
wind. 

After  this,  he  is  regarded  as  a  man  well  qualified 
to  study  the  actual  work  to  be  undertaken  by  an 
airman  in  war-time.  The  next  stage,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  is  in  learning  to  observe  over  a  given  tract 
of  country. 

In  this  test  of  his  skill,  a  superior  officer  indicates 
for  him  an  aerial  route,  which  covers  a  fairly-wide 
district  in  the  vicinity  of  the  air-station.  The  pupil 
flies  over  this,  and,  on  his  return,  presents  a  report 
upon  what  he  has  seen  while  in  the  air. 

This  report — ^which  deals  with  roads,  railways, 
and  the  general  characteristics  of  the  country — is 
examined  by  his  chief,  who  points  out  in  whatever 
way  it  might  have  been  improved,  probably  in  the 
direction  of  military  precision,  or  in  the  statement 
of  more  detail.  Then  the  pupil  flies  over  the  same, 
or  another  route,  on  another  day ;  and  so  on. 

No  pains  are  spared  to  make  him  acquainted  with 
his  work.  It  is  an  axiom,  at  the  French  schools, 
that  a  pilot  should  be  so  accustomed  to  flying  that 
the  actual  manipulation  of  his  machine  becomes 
mechanical.  When  such  skill  is  attained,  the  airman 
is  free  to  devote  his  mind  to  whatever  work  is  on 
hand;  but  such  a  state  of  proficiency  can  only  be 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     161 

acquired  in  one  way — and  that  is  by  constant 
flying. 

After  he  has  become  accustomed  to  observing 
from  his  machine  while  it  is  in  flight,  the  pupil  is 
set  a  variety  of  other  tasks,  at  the  discretion  of  his 
instructors.  He  is,  for  example,  detailed  to  fly 
across  country  from  point  to  point,  bearing  a 
message,  and  to  return  with  another  dispatch. 
Cross-country  journeys,  from  one  flying  school  to 
another,  are  also  encouraged. 

In  this  way,  by  actual  practice  in  the  manipulation 
of  his  machine,  and  in  the  carrying  out  of  tasks  such 
as  he  would  be  set  in  time  of  war,  the  pupil  gains 
skill  and  confidence,  and  eventually  becomes  a 
thoroughly  well-trained  and  proficient  member  of  the 
air-corps. 


Ill 

Rules     for     training — Dummy     aeroplanes — A     pupil's 
first   *'hops." 

Some  admirable  hints,  as  to  the  methods  which 
should  be  adopted  in  teaching  airmen,  have  been 
given  by  foreign  military  experts. 

An  officer  of  great  experience,  for  instance,  de- 
clares it  essential  that  the  pupil  should  first  devote 
himself  to  a  theoretical  and  practical  apprenticeship 
in  regard  to  aeroplane  motors.  He  should,  he  also 
declares,  be  called  upon  to  detect  the  reason  for  any 
stoppages  intentionally  caused  by  the  instructor. 

This  officer  also  advocates  the  driving  of  motor- 
cars, at  high  speed,  as  a  useful  preHminary  stage  for 
intending  military  airmen,  holding  that  such  rapid 


152      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

driving  gives  a  man  a  judgment  of  pace  and  distance 
which  he  would  not  otherwise  possess. 

It  is  contended,  also,  by  other  authorities,  that 
ascents  in  free  balloons  are  of  value,  as  a  preliminary 
to  actual  aeroplaning.  Such  ascents,  in  the  opinion 
of  these  experts,  help  a  man  to  gauge  heights,  and 
so  prove  of  value  to  him  in  subsequent  tests  with 
aeroplanes. 

While  doing  a  brief  course  of  ballooning,  the 
officer  can,  it  is  pointed  out,  study  the  contour  of 
the  ground  below  him,  and  can  also  make  himself 
acquainted,  to  a  certain  extent,  with  the  use  of 
maps  and  compasses.  He  may  also  practise  aerial 
photography. 

What  other  practical  authorities  have  found  of 
value,  and  what  they  recommend  as  a  stage  in  the 
tuition  of  an  officer-airman,  is  a  day  or  so  during 
which  a  pupil  takes  the  driving-seat  of  a  military 
machine,  and  practises — on  the  ground — the  mani- 
pulations which  he  would  have  to  make  were  the 
aeroplane  in  actual  flight. 

When  the  novice  is  thus  in  the  driving-seat,  it  is 
suggested  that  an  instructor  should  put  him  through 
a  regular  lesson — asking  him,  for  instance,  what 
manipulations  of  his  levers  would  be  necessary  to 
effect  a  turning  movement. 

Such  a  plan  is,  undoubtedly,  of  value.  Preli- 
minary work  of  this  kind,  conducted  by  a  pupil 
while  on  the  ground,  in  order  to  accustom  him  to 
the  handling  of  a  machine,  before  actually  taking 
the  air,  is  encouraged  at  many  civilian  schools ;  and, 
to  facilitate  such  practice,  several  ingenious  machines 
have  been  devised.  In  one  of  them,  the  pupil  sits 
in  a  wooden  framework,  which  is  balanced  on  a  pivot, 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     153 

and  is  equipped  with  a  forward  elevating  plane,  and 
"  ailerons." 

When  the  beginner  is  ready  for  a  spell  of  practice, 
the  machine  is  turned,  so  that  it  faces  the  wind. 
Then  the  pupil  takes  his  seat,  and  grips  his  levers. 
The  balance  of  the  machine  is  such  that  any 
gust  has  a  tendency  to  make  it  tilt  over  from  side 
to  side,  or  tip  forwards  or  backwards.  If  he  is 
quick  enough,  the  pupil  can  check  these  overturning 
influences  by  movements  of  the  controlling  planes. 
Thus  he  obtains,  without  risk  to  himself,  or  the 
danger  of  damaging  an  aeroplane,  an  insight  into 
the  general  principles  of  control. 

Also  emphasised  by  many  experts,  is  the  value  of 
a  stage  in  military  training  which  has  already  been 
described — that  in  which  a  pupil  is  taken,  for  a  series 
of  passenger  flights,  by  an  expert  airman.  During 
these  flights,  of  course,  the  novice  is  learning  many 
practical  lessons. 

Other  authorities  advocate,  as  a  definite  stage  in 
a  pupil's  course  of  training,  an  exercise  which  has 
not  previously  been  touched  upon.  This  entails 
arranging  a  machine  so  that  it  will  move  along  the 
ground  at  a  high  speed,  but  will  not  ascend.  The 
beginner  should  be  allowed  to  manipulate  such  a 
machine  for  a  day  or  so,  running  it  up  and  down  the 
aerodrome.  Such  a  period  of  "  roUing,"  as  it  has 
come  to  be  termed  at  the  flying  schools,  should  be 
sandwiched  between  the  pupil's  flights  as  a  passen- 
ger, and  his  first  attempt  at  solo  work. 

The  first  of  these  "  rolHng  "  tests  should,  it  is 
held,  be  undertaken  with  an  instructor.  When  he 
can  control  a  machine  perfectly  well  on  the  ground, 
the  novice  has  learned  a  very  useful  lesson.       In 


154      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

this  "  rolling  "  work,  he  becomes  accustomed,  also, 
to  operating  his  engine  controls,  and  shakes  off  the 
confusion  that  the  noise  of  the  motor  so  frequently 
occasions. 

The  pupil's  first  solo  flights  should  be  nothing 
more  than  short  jumps  off  the  ground,  made  while 
moving  along  in  a  straight  line.  At  the  flying 
schools,  these  attempts  at  flight,  on  the  part  of 
novices,  are  described  as  "  hops  " ;  and,  when  per- 
forming them,  the  beginner  resembles  a  young  bird 
which  is  first  trying  its  wings.  He  flutters  into  the 
air  for  a  yard  or  so,  and  then  descends  again — ^not 
always  elegantly. 

"  Hopping  "  practice,  if  systematically  carried  out, 
obviates  the  breaking-up  of  many  a  machine,  be- 
cause it  teaches  the  pupil  how  to  make  a  descent 
Landing  is,  it  may  be  pointed  out,  the  chief  difficulty 
for  the  beginner.  He  can  usually  get  into  the  air 
all  right — sometimes,  more  quickly  than  he  desires* 
The  problem  is  how  to  return  to  earth  again,  making 
a  correct  descent. 

When  a  man  learns  to  ride  a  bicycle,  the  inevitable 
tendency,  which  he  displays,  is  to  overdo  the  balan- 
cing movements.  The  result  is  that  he  swerves 
abruptly  from  side  to  side,  and  frequently  comes  to 
grief.  The  same  mistake  is,  to  a  great  extent,  made 
by  the  novice  in  flying.  He  jerks  his  machine  off 
the  ground  with  an  over-abrupt  operation  of  his 
elevating  plane,  and  he  sometimes  descends  with  a 
disconcerting  dive. 

It  is  not  until  he  has  been  practising  for  some 
little  time,  that  a  pupil  obtains  what  has  been 
described  as  the  "  feel "  of  his  machine.  What 
happens,    really,    is    that   he    suddenly    obtains    a 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     156 

sensitive  touch  upon  his  controlling  levers;  and 
then,  instead  of  obeying  his  instructor  without 
appreciating  exactly  what  he  has  been  doing,  he 
begins  to  act  for  himself — with  the  commencement 
of  that  feeling  of  sureness  which  reveals  the  expert. 

From  "  hops,"  according  to  expert  ruling,  the 
military  pupil  should  proceed  to  straight  flights  of 
gradually  increasing  length.  This  recommendation 
presupposes  the  possession  of  an  aerodrome  of  ample 
size.  Nothing  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  more  impor- 
tant than  a  commodious  aerodrome  for  purposes  of 
instruction. 

The  selection  of  a  ground  which  is  cramped,  or  in 
a  bad  position,  is  very  poor  poHcy.  Unless  he  has 
plenty  of  manoeuvring  space,  a  pupil  acquires  a 
feeling  of  nervousness,  which  is  sometimes  disas- 
trous. Under  the  influence  of  it,  when  he  first 
assumes  sole  control  of  a  machine,  he  is  occasionally 
induced  to  make  mistakes  which  result  in  the  wreck- 
ing of  machines. 

A  wide,  flat,  perfectly-unobstructed  space  is  the 
ideal.  When  he  brings  his  machine  out  upon  such 
an  aerodrome,  the  novice  is  inspired  with  a  con- 
fidence which  is  half  the  battle.  He  feels  he  has 
not  got  to  do  things  in  a  hurry;  he  knows  there 
is  plenty  of  room. 

As  soon  as  straight  flights  can  be  accomplished, 
the  pupil  should,  it  is  held,  be  set  the  task  of  learn- 
ing to  "  bank  "  his  machine  over,  and  make  circles. 
The  thoroughness  of  the  pupil's  tuition,  up  to  this 
point,  should  stand  him  in  good  stead.  He  knows 
his  motor ;  he  knows  his  machine ;  he  is  familiar 
with  his  controls;  he  is  not  flustered  when  he  is  in 
the  air. 


156      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

All  such  points  count  enormously — added  to  the 
fact  that  we  assume  the  aerodrome  he  is  practising 
over  is  a  good  one.  In  such  cases,  the  pupil  should 
be  able  to  make  wide  turns  in  the  air  without  any 
trouble  at  all. 

Afterwards,  the  budding  airman  should  learn  to 
fly  high.  "  Climbing  "  is  what  experienced  airmen 
call  it.  Here,  again,  the  requisite  for  success  is  a 
pupil's  confidence  in  himself,  and  in  his  machine — 
as  inspired  by  the  stages  through  which  he  has  pre- 
viously passed. 

As  has  been  quite  rightly  stated,  the  airman's 
need,  before  he  attempts  anything  in  the  nature  of 
high  flying,  is  to  feel  perfectly  at  home  on  his 
machine.  He  must  have  no  anxiety  as  to  any 
possible  mistake  in  his  controlling  movements;  he 
must  not  be  worrying  about  his  engine.  In  a  word, 
he  must  have  a  perfectly-undisturbed  mind. 

This  mental  state  is  brought  about,  of  course, 
by  feehng  perfectly  competent  to  deal  with  any 
emergency,  should  it  arise.  By  the  time  he 
has  reached  the  high-flying  stage,  any  pupil 
should — if  he  has  been  thoroughly  trained — begin 
to  experience  a  feeling  of  "  one-ness "  with  his 
machine. 


IV 

Cross-country  flights — The  vol  plane — Difficulty  of  first 
observation  tests  from  an  aeroplane. 

"  Only  when  it  is  possible  to  control  a  machine 
with  safety,  and  without  anxiety,  at  a  height  of  600 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     157 

feet,  should  the  military  airman  attempt  to  fly  across 
country." 

This  declaration,  made  by  an  acknowledged 
authority,  is  a  perfectly  sound  one;  and,  so  far  as 
the  military  flying  schools  are  concerned,  it  repre- 
sents a  rule  now  almost  generally  adopted. 

A  most  necessary  step,  before  setting  forth  on  a 
cross-country  flight,  is  to  master  the  art  of  effecting 
a  safe  and  steady  vol  plane.  The  airman,  when  he 
is  on  a  cross-country  journey,  must  be  ready  at  any 
moment  for  his  engine  to  miss-fire,  and  perhaps  stop. 
With  the  reliable  motors  now  obtainable,  this  is  not 
Hkely  to  happen,  as  has  been  shown;  but  engine 
failure  is  still  a  contingency  for  which  the  pilot  must 
be  prepared. 

We  will  suppose,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that 
a  military  airman  is  flying  at  an  altitude  of  looo 
feet,  across  an  average  country.  Suddenly,  with 
a  splutter,  his  engine  ceases  to  work.  If  he  is 
dexterous,  he  is  not  nonplussed.  With  a  move- 
ment of  his  elevating  plane,  he  tilts  the  aeroplane 
upon  a  downward  glide,  and  comes  sweeping  towards 
the  ground.  Experience  tells  him  just  what  is  a 
safe  gliding  angle;  he  does  not  pitch  his  machine 
too  far  forward,  nor  does  he  make  his  angle  so  fine 
that  there  is  any  chance  of  the  aeroplane  losing  way, 
and  so  becoming  unmanageable. 

As  he  glides  down  in  this  fashion,  with  perfect 
control  over  his  machine,  although  it  has  been  de- 
prived of  motive  power,  he  looks  about  keenly  to 
select  a  suitable  landing-place.  He  is  not  forced  to 
keep  gliding  straight  ahead.  He  can,  if  he  elects, 
turn  either  to  right  or  left;  and  it  is  possible  to 
make  a  half-circle  in  the  air,  while  gliding  down,  and 


158      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

so  land  upon  some  spot  which  lay  beneath  the 
machine  at  the  moment  the  engine  stopped. 

Therefore,  granted  that  fairly-normal  country  lies 
below,  the  airman  should  have  plenty  of  time,  from 
an  altitude  of  looo  feet,  to  select  a  landing-place, 
and  make  a  fair  descent  upon  it. 

If  a  pilot  knows,  thoroughly  well,  the  kind  of 
country  he  is  flying  over,  and  no  difficulty  presents 
itself  in  finding  a  landing-place,  he  can  fly  compara- 
tively low,  if  he  prefers  to  do  so.  By  this  is  meant 
an  altitude  of  perhaps  five  or  six  hundred  feet. 

If  the  country  is  difficult,  however — that  is  to  say, 
if  fair  landing-places  are  not  easy  to  find — it  behoves 
the  airman  to  attain  a  considerably  greater  altitude. 
Over  unfavourable  country,  from  the  landing-point 
of  view,  an  experienced  pilot  will  maintain  a 
height  of  2000  feet,  or  more.  He  does  this  be- 
cause, should  his  engine  fail  him,  he  will  have 
plenty  of  time  to  pick  out — from  a  considerable 
area  of  country  around  him — some  fairly-suitable 
descending-point. 

In  the  flying  contests  held  last  summer,  the  most 
expert  pilots,  such  as  Beaumont  and  Vedrines,  flew 
across  country  at  an  altitude  of  about  3000  feet. 
What  influenced  them,  in  doing  so,  was  the  knowl- 
edge that  any  wind  that  is  blowing  is  generally  most 
steady  at  such  altitudes. 

Once  he  is  able  to  fly  across  country,  without  worry- 
ing at  all  about  the  control  of  his  machine,  the  mih- 
tary  airman  is  ready  to  take  up  the  practical  tasks 
which  await  him.  One  of  the  most  interesting  ex- 
periments, which  he  will  be  asked  to  carry  out,  is  to 
fly  over  bodies  of  troops  on  the  march,  and  test  his 
powers  of  observation.     It  is  one  thing,  of  course, 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     1&9 

to  see  troops  below  him,  and  another  to  render  an 
accurate  report  as  to  their  strength  and  formation. 

One  of  the  most  expert  of  French  mihtary  airmen 
describes,  very  interestingly,  how  a  reconnoitring 
officer  seeks  to  render  accurate  his  observations  of 
troops;  and  his  remarks  go  to  prove,  very  dis- 
tinctly, that  nothing  but  unremitting  practice  will 
create  a  reliable  air-scout — a  contention  which  is 
made  by  all  experts  upon  this  subject. 

The  strength  of  columns  on  the  march — ^when 
seen  from  the  bird's-eye  view  of  an  aeroplane — 
should,  says  this  officer,  be  estimated  by  comparison, 
on  the  airman's  map,  with  the  length  of  the  road 
along  which  they  are  marching. 

Massed  formations  of  troops  should,  he  adds,  be 
determined  according  to  the  open  spaces  separating 
the  various  units.  From  the  airman's  point  of  view, 
other  clues  to  the  strength  of  an  enemy  are  the 
number  of  waggons,  the  number  of  mounted  officers 
(in  the  case  of  infantry),  and  so  forth. 

It  will  be  seen  that,  although  the  elevation  of  an 
aeroplane  gives  the  observer  a  unique  advantage, 
reconnoitring  from  an  altitude  of,  say,  3000  feet  is 
by  no  means  easy  work ;  the  point  of  view  is  strange, 
and  new  rules  have  to  be  made,  if  reliable  informa- 
tion is  to  be  forthcoming. 

With  adequate  practice,  of  course,  an  observer 
becomes  remarkably  quick  in  estimating  the  import 
of  what  he  sees  below  him.  Details,  which  would 
mean  nothing  to  the  novice,  frequently  tell  him  the 
whole  story. 

Thus  a  novice  becomes,  in  time,  a  thoroughly- 
expert  airman,  capable  of  carrying  out,  satisfactorily, 
all  the  tasks  that  are  set  him.    To  encourage  military 


160      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

pilots  at  their  work,  the  French  authorities  have  very 
wisely  instituted  a  special  scale  of  pay — or,  rather, 
an  arrangement  of  bonuses — for  flights  effected. 

Naturally,  such  practical  encouragement  is  greatly 
appreciated  by  the  officers  who  take  part  in  the  air 
service.  The  work  is  arduous,  beyond  all  question, 
and  the  men  who  are  engaged  upon  it  now  are 
pioneers.  All  that  they  discover,  through  dint  of 
enthusiastic  and  self-sacrificing  work,  is  to  the  benefit 
of  those  who  follow  in  their  footsteps.  Therefore, 
they  richly  deserve  all  the  practical  aid  that  can  be 
given  them. 


V 

Finishing    work    at    French    schools — Practical    tests — 
German  thoroughness — Energy  of  English  officers. 

Having  described  the  instructional  work  at  the 
French  flying  schools,  it  may  be  interesting  to  show 
how  practical  tests  are  carried  out — almost  every 
day — to  prepare  the  officer-airmen  for  the  duties 
which  they  will  be  called  upon  to  perform,  in  time 
of  war. 

As  has  been  mentioned,  the  French  authorities 
have  now  organised  flying  schools,  and  air-depots,  in 
many  parts  of  the  country ;  and,  when  any  general 
movements  of  troops  is  being  made,  the  officer  in 
charge  of  the  nearest  aviation  centre  is  frequently 
ordered,  by  a  message  from  Headquarters,  to  carry 
out  some  special  aerial  manoeuvre. 

One  example  of  this  excellent  system  is  suflScient. 
Not  long  ago,  a  fairly  large  body  of  troops  was 


o 


!-5  -5 


o, 
c  « 


%e    ••>,"}"*.. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     161 

manoeuvring  between  Rheims  and  Chalons.  Seeing 
an  opportunity  for  a  practical  test  of  aeroplane  effi- 
ciency, one  of  the  Generals  engaged  in  the  operation 
sent  a  message  to  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  air- 
depot  at  Chalons,  requesting  the  services  of  four 
airmen,  without  delay. 

The  summons  was  quite  unexpected,  as  it  was 
intended  to  be ;  but  the  military  school  was  not  un- 
prepared. Within  a  few  minutes  of  the  receipt  of 
his  instructions,  the  officer  commanding  the  aero- 
planes had  detailed  four  Heutenants  for  service. 
Their  machines  were  made  ready,  by  the  mechanics, 
with  practically  no  delay  at  all ;  and,  in  less  than  half 
an  hour,  the  officers  were  in  the  air,  and  on  their  way 
to  the  point  where  they  had  been  instructed  to  report 
themselves. 

They  arrived  at  the  appointed  place  without 
hitch  or  delay,  and  immediately  received  orders  to 
reconnoitre  specified  tracts  of  country.  They  were 
quickly  in  the  air  again;  and  each  of  the  four 
air-scouts  was  able  to  carry  out  his  task  wfth  complete 
success. 

Returning  to  their  starting-point,  the  four  pilots 
duly  presented  their  reports,  made  out  according  to 
the  system  in  vogue.  They  were  then  informed  that 
their  work  was,  for  the  time  being,  at  an  end. 
Whereupon  all  four  took  their  seats  in  their  machines 
again,  and  flew  back  to  the  aviation  camp. 

The  point  to  be  emphasised,  in  this  connection,  is 
that  the  manoeuvre  was  carried  out  by  four  scouts. 
Had  one,  or  even  two,  performed  these  flights,  it 
would  not  have  been  so  noteworthy.  But  the  fact 
that  four  machines  could  make  a  series  of  test  flights, 
without  prearrangement,  and  yet  without  mechanical 

L 


162      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

breakdown  of  any  kind,  provides  a  convincing 
tribute  to  the  reliability  of  a  well-built  military 
machine. 

When  no  specific  reconnoitring  flights  are  on 
hand,  officers  from  the  various  French  schools  are 
frequently  instructed  to  leave  Headquarters  in  the 
early  morning,  and  make  as  long  an  aerial  tour  as 
possible  before  nightfall,  traversing  a  specified  route, 
and  returning  to  their  starting-point. 

Such  tests  as  these,  of  course,  demonstrate  the 
reHability  of  aeroplanes  and  engines,  and  also  the 
skill  and  endurance  of  the  pilots. 

One  officer,  for  example,  started  away  early  in  the 
morning,  and  succeeded  in  flying  for  a  distance  of 
250  miles  between  St  Omer  and  the  Belgian  frontier. 
A  military  observer  accompanied  him ;  and  brief 
reports,  describing  the  country  surveyed,  were  Sent 
back  by  means  of  carrier  pigeons. 

This  flight — typical  of  many  now  being  performed 
— occupied  practically  the  whole  day.  Descents 
were  made,  occasionally,  to  replenish  petrol  and  oil 
tanks,  the  aeroplane  being  followed,  on  its  pilgrim- 
age, by  motor-cars  laden  with  fuel  and  spare  parts. 

Motor-car  gangs,  equipped  with  all  material  likely 
to  be  necessary  in  connection  with  a  breakdown,  are 
now  in  readiness  at  the  French  air-stations;  and 
they  will  play  a  highly-important  part  when  aero- 
planes are  employed  upon  active  service. 

Mention  has  been  made  of  the  thoroughness  of  the 
German  War  Office  in  regard  to  military  flying 
schools ;  and,  while  citing  practical  instances,  it  may 
be  interesting  to  extract  an  item  from  the  German 
general  progranime. 

In  one  batch,  during  the  summer  of  191 1,  seven- 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     163 

teen  officers  were  selected  to  undergo  a  special  flying 
course  at  Doeberitz.  These  courses  lasted  a  speci- 
fied number  of  months,  and  the  officers  were  drafted 
from  one  class  to  another  according  to  their  state  of 
proficiency. 

The  adequacy  of  the  training,  given  to  the  German 
officer-airman,  is  revealed  in  the  practice  flights  which 
are  attempted,  immediately  the  pilots  have  obtained 
full  control  over  their  machines.  Here,  for  example, 
Is  a  typical  reconnoitring  trip.  Two  young  airmen 
left  the  Doeberitz  aerodrome,  and  flew  over  a  dis- 
tance of  400  miles,  weathering  two  severe  storms 
while  upon  their  aerial  journey. 

The  machine  they  employed  was  a  military-type, 
weight-carrying  biplane,  and  they  took  it  in  turns  to 
steer.  Their  tour  lasted  several  days ;  and,  in  one 
flight,  extending  over  three  and  a  half  hours,  they 
traversed  a  distance  of  149  miles.  Motor-cars,  bear- 
ing spare  parts,  kept  in  touch  with  the  airmen;  the 
whole  undertaking  was  admirably  organised,  from 
the  miHtary  point  of  view. 

It  is  in  work  like  this,  of  course,  that  definite 
progress  is  made.  In  connection  with  such  long  re- 
connoitring tours,  a  German  officer  of  experience 
has  placed  upon  record  the  view :  "  However  good 
you  may  imagine  your  organisation  to  be,  a  practical 
test  will  generally  reveal  at  least  one  or  two  false  links 
in  the  chain ;  and,  of  flying,  this  is  truer  than  of  any- 
thing else.  Once  an  air-corps  is  proficient,  actual 
war  conditions  should  be  represented  as  frequently 
as  possible.  This  will  polish  up  the  entire  system, 
and  make  each  unit  sure  of  its  work.  Unless  recon- 
noitring tests,  carried  out  on  a  practical  war  basis, 
are  frequently  made,  it  is  idle  to  assume  that  your 


164      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

corps  is  ready  to  do  any  valuable  work  during  a 
campaign." 

There  is  no  need,  at  any  rate,  to  impress  the 
wisdom  of  this  observation  upon  the  French  miHtary 
authorities.  Whenever  a  long  reconnoitring  flight  is 
accomplished,  from  one  of  the  flying  schools,  the 
ofl&cer  who  is  acting  as  observer  is  instructed  to  send 
a  concise  service  telegram  to  Headquarters,  describ- 
ing the  journey  that  has  been  made. 

It  may  be  interesting  to  reproduce  the  text  of 
such  a  message,  in  order  to  show  the  business-like 
way  in  which  the  French  air-work  is  carried  out. 
This  was  a  telegram,  for  example,  received  in  Paris 
in  connection  with  a  typical  practice  flight : — 

"  Lieut,  in  command  aeroplane  1 1  to  War  OflBce. 
Lieuts.  Cammerman  pilot.  Vullieume  observation 
officer.  Left  Mezieres  7.10  a.m.  Passed  over 
Vervins,  Guise,  St  Quentin,  landed  north  of 
Amiens  at  9.55  a.m.  to  inquire  direction  aero- 
drome. Landed  aerodrome  10.30  a.m.  Voyage 
difficult  owing  mist,  which  frequently  obscured 
ground.     No  incident." 

Messages,  such  as  this,  are  now  being  dispatched 
and  received  daily,  in  connection  with  the  flights  or- 
ganised at  the  French  flying  schools.  The  dispatch- 
ing of  such  telegrams  is,  of  course,  only  a  detail  of 
the  general  work;  but  it  is  one  of  those  items,  never- 
theless, which  needs  practice  to  make  perfect. 

In  the  arrangement  of  non-stop  flying  tests,  the 
ofl[icers  in  charge  of  the  French  schools  leave  no 
stone  unturned  to  promote  the  eflficiency  of  their 
pupils.  As  a  contrast  to  long  tours,  lasting  several 
days,  continuous  flights,  involving  a  return  to  the 


THE  AEROPLANE   IN  WAR     165 

aerodrome  before  descending,  teach  an  airman  use- 
ful lessons. 

Three  instances  of  such  non-stop  flights,  selected 
more  or  less  haphazard  from  the  reports  received, 
from  day  to  day,  in  connection  with  French  military 
aviation,  are  sufficient  to  indicate  what  excellent  work 
is  being  done.    They  are  appended : — 

"  A  Heutenant  flies  with  an  observer,  without 
descending,  over  a  prearranged  course  of  lOO 
miles.    The  flight  lasts  two  and  a  half  hours. 

"  A  Heutenant,  carrying  a  special  observation 
officer,  remains  in  the  air  for  three  hours  fifteen 
minutes. 

"  A  Heutenant,  taking  up  a  captain  as  observer, 
flies  for  125  miles,  non-stop." 

It  is  by  means  of  flights  such  as  these,  carried  out 
regularly,  and  without  ostentation,  that  the  French 
air-corps  obtains  the  efficiency  which  is  the  admira- 
tion of  those  who  are  in  a  position  to  reaHse  what 
complete  organisation  means. 

As  regards  England,  it  should  be  mentioned  that 
the  few  officer-airmen  who  have,  so  far,  been  per- 
mitted by  the  authorities  to  study  military  flying, 
have  done  their  utmost  to  perfect  themselves  in  the 
art.  They  are  making  experimental  flights,  when- 
ever possible,  and  are  becoming  thoroughly  com- 
petent. 

They  have  proved  indeed,  beyond  question,  that 
England  has  the  right  material.  All  that  is  wanted, 
as  has  been  pointed  out  again  and  again,  is  practical 
encouragement.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  both  in  "  dash  " 
and  judgment  when  flying,  British  pilots  have  shown 
that  they  need  fear  no  foreign  competition. 


166      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

The  cool  nerve  which  is  possessed  by  the  EngUsh 
officer-airman  was  revealed,  in  a  most  striking 
way,  by  an  experience,  while  flying,  which  befell 
Lieutenants  Reynolds  and  Barrington-Kennett — two 
of  the  most  ardent  officers  of  our  Air  Battalion. 

The  adventure  occurred  while  the  two  airmen  were 
reconnoitring  in  Cambridgeshire  during  the  autumn 
of  191 1  ;  and  it  possesses  a  unique  interest,  inasmuch 
as  it  affords  an  example  of  the  most  remarkable 
escape  from  death  yet  chronicled  in  connection  with 
the  aeroplane. 

The  two  pilots,  flying  separate  machines,  were  re- 
connoitring from  a  temporary  aviation  camp  during 
the  evening,  and  were  passing  across  country  at  an 
altitude  of  a  little  less  than  2000  feet.  The  weather 
was  oppressive — a  thunderstorm  threatening. 

Suddenly  a  violent  wind,  the  forerunner  of  the 
storm,  began  to  sweep  across  country.  So  powerful 
was  this  wind  that  it  tore  roofs  off  sheds.  Lieutenant 
Barrington-Kennett,  flying  a  little  lower  than 
Lieutenant  Reynolds,  felt  the  force  of  the  wind 
first;  his  biplane  tossed  and  rolled  ominously. 

Pointing  his  machine  earthwards,  and  keeping  his 
engine  running  at  its  full  power,  he  began  to  descend 
as  rapidly  as  possible.  But  the  wind  increased  in 
violence,  to  a  remarkable  extent.  The  biplane 
gave  a  sudden  leap  into  the  air.  Then  it  dropped 
sheer  for  many  feet.  The  airman  was  flung  upwards 
from  his  driving-seat,  and  came  into  abrupt  contact 
with  the  lower  part  of  his  upper  main-plane.  Then 
he  was  jerked  back  again,  coming  down  half  in,  and 
half  out  of  his  seat,  and  smashing  the  side  of  it. 
Fortunately,  however,  he  was  able  to  grip  the  lever 
actuating  the  elevating-plane  and  "  ailerons,"  and  so 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     167 

maintained  control  of  his  machine  until  he  made  a 
hurried  landing  in  a  field. 

Lieutenant  Reynolds  had  an  experience  far  more 
alarming.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  he  was 
flying  higher  than  his  companion,  the  machine  he 
was  piloting  was  a  military  biplane  fitted  with 
weight-carrying  extensions,  which  made  it  more 
difficult  than  an  ordinary  machine  to  control  in  a 
wind. 

When  the  first  gusts  struck  him.  Lieutenant 
Reynolds  sought  to  follow  the  other  pilot's  example, 
and  make  a  descent.  He  had  actually  come  down 
from  2000  feet  to  about  1500  feet,  when  a  sudden  and 
overwhelmingly  powerful  rush  of  wind  caught  the 
biplane,  and  turned  it  completely  upside-down. 

As  the  machine  swung  helplessly  over,  entirely 
beyond  its  pilot's  control,  Lieutenant  Reynolds  had 
the  presence  of  mind  to  switch  off  his  engine.  This 
probably  prevented  the  biplane  from  rushing  pell- 
mell  to  destruction.  The  next  thing  that  the  young 
airman  remembers  was  clinging  desperately  to  the 
edge  of  the  lower  main-plane,  having  been  swung 
abruptly  out  of  his  driving-seat — which  was  now 
above  his  head. 

Upside-down,  and  beyond  any  possibility  of  con- 
trol, the  aeroplane  began  to  fall  to  the  ground,  which 
was  more  than  1000  feet  below.  It  would  appear 
that  nothing  but  a  miracle  could  save  an  airman 
under  such  circumstances  as  these;  and  Lieutenant 
Reynolds,  certainly,  regarded  his  chances  as  being 
slender. 

But,  extraordinary  as  it  may  seem,  the  extent  of 
his  injuries,  in  this  looo-feet  fall,  were  a  sprained 
ankle  and  a  general  shock;     and  this  is  how  the 


168      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

miracle  happened.  The  big  biplane,  being  very 
lightly  laden,  did  not  fall  sheer  to  the  ground,  but 
came  fluttering  down  like  a  box-kite.  At  first,  after 
overturning,  it  dived  a  short  distance,  tail-first ;  then 
it  came  to  a  halt,  and  floated  down  for  a  second  or 
so,  following  up  this  manoeuvre  by  a  forward  dive, 
and  another  period  of  floating. 

Lieutenant  Reynolds  continued  to  cling  grimly  to 
the  lower  plane;  and  the  machine  came  down  in  a 
field,  still  upside-down,  and  with  its  running  wheels 
thrust  up  in  the  air.  At  the  actual  moment  of  strik- 
ing the  ground,  the  aeroplane  was  fluttering,  and  not 
diving.  This  was  fortunate  for  the  pilot,  as  the 
biplane  came  in  contact  with  the  earth  without  any 
great  violence.  _ 

Many  a  man's  nerve  would  have  been  shattered 
by  such  an  experience,  but  this  was  not  the  case  with 
Lieutenant  Reynolds.  He  was  soon  flying  again,  as 
though  nothing  had  happened.  There  is,  therefore, 
reason  for  stating  that  England  has  the  right  material 
among  her  few  military  airmen. 


ELEVENTH    SECTION 

THE    COST    OF    WAR    AEROPLANES 
I 

Why  manufacturers  charge  high  prices — Cost  of  experi- 
mental work — Building  of  trial  machines. 

A  DECIDEDLY  interesting  question  is  that  of  the 
cost  of  aeroplanes.  It  represents  a  consideration, 
also,  which  is  of  practical  importance  from  the  mili- 
tary point  of  view. 

So  far,  the  price  of  any  aeroplane  of  a  well-known 
make  has  been  high.  An  ordinary-type  biplane,  for 
example,  fitted  with  a  "  Gnome  "  engine,  has  been 
selling  for  approximately  ^looo.  A  monoplane  of 
established  repute,  built  to  carry  a  pilot  alone,  has 
been  listed  at  ;^900. 

A  military-type  biplane,  capable  of  carrying  three 
men,  has  been  selling  at  something  like  ;^I200,  and 
a  reconnoitring  monoplane,  for  two  occupants,  has 
been  priced  at  a  figure  in  excess  of  ;^iooo.  There 
has,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  been  good  reason  for 
manufacturers  to  demand  high  prices  for  their 
machines. 

The  expenses  of  a  builder  of  aeroplanes  are 
extremely  heavy.  His  business  is  not  at  all  like 
any  ordinary  commercial  undertaking.  He  does  not 
merely  build  a  machine,  and  then  sell  it.     He  has 

169 


170      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

costly  researches  to  undertake,  and  wearisome  and 
expensive  experimental  work  to  carry  out. 

Let  us  take  a  typical  example.  A  prominent 
manufacturer  in  France  designed  a  monoplane, 
which  embodied  improvements  upon  existing  prac- 
tice. Having  the  facilities  of  a  well-equipped 
workshop,  he  speedily  put  his  ideas  to  a  practical 
test,  and  commenced  the  building  of  a  machine. 

This  occupied  some  weeks,  during  which  time, 
of  course,  the  builder  had  the  wages  of  his 
engineers  to  pay.  Then,  when  the  machine  was 
ready  for  tests,  he  had  to  hand  it  over  to  his  profes- 
sional aviator — another  well-paid  employe.  The 
monoplane  was  taken  to  the  private  flying  ground 
which  the  manufacturer  found  it  necessary  to  rent; 
and  here,  for  a  week  or  so,  first  experiments  were 
carried  out,  the  wages  of  the  aviator  being  augmented 
by  those  of  a  regular  staff  of  mechanics. 

The  result  of  the  trials  was  that,  after  securing 
useful  data,  the  monoplane  was  irretrievably  wrecked, 
in  landing  after  a  flight.  Whereupon,  the  manu- 
facturer had  to  face  the  expense  of  building  a  second 
machine,  embodying  further  improvements  suggested 
— and  going  through  the  whole  routine  again. 

This  he  did,  devoting  several  weeks  of  his 
men's  time  to  constructing  the  new  machine.  Once 
more,  when  it  was  finished,  the  professional  aviator 
took  it  in  hand.  This  time,  after  an  even  shorter 
career  than  the  first  machine,  the  monoplane  was 
broken  up.  Again,  however,  improvements  sug- 
gested themselves;  and  so  the  maker  embarked, 
patiently,  upon  the  construction  of  a  third  model. 

To  cut  a  long  story  short,  this  process  of  evolution 
went  on  until  six  monoplanes  had  been  built,  each 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     171 

one  more  reliable  in  action  than  its  predecessor.  It 
was  only,  in  fact,  when  a  seventh  machine  stood 
ready,  that  the  manufacturer  considered  he  had  a 
flying  machine  he  could  offer  to  prospective  pur- 
chasers, as  a  safe  and  improved  type. 

In  fixing  the  price  that  he  should  ask  for  this  new 
model,  the  manufacturer  was  guided,  naturally,  by 
the  ouday  that  had  been  necessary  in  perfecting  it. 
It  would  have  been  unreasonable,  under  such  circum- 
stances, for  the  purchaser  to  expect  to  buy  the 
machine  at  a  figure  which  represented  a  small  profit 
for  its  builder,  over  and  above  the  actual  cost  of  pro- 
duction of  that  one  model.  Having  spent  thousands 
of  pounds  upon  his  experiments,  the  manufacturer 
was  obliged  to  recoup  himself,  by  charging  a  high 
price  for  his  goods. 

Another  factor  would  also  govern  price  in  such 
circumstances  as  these.  The  manufacturer  would 
have  no  guarantee  as  to  selling  any  fixed  number  of 
machines.  In  the  case  of  a  new  motor-car,  for 
instance,  the  machine  is  standardised ;  and,  if  it  is  a 
good  one,  a  large  number  are  sold.  This,  naturally, 
reduces  the  price  per  machine. 

But,  in  the  case  of  this  new  monoplane,  even  if  it 
is  the  best  produced  at  the  moment,  the  question  of 
the  number  to  be  sold  is  an  unsatisfactorily  vague 
quantity.  After  only  two  or  three  have  been  dis- 
posed of,  for  instance,  another  machine  may  be  put 
upon  the  market  which  is  a  few  miles  an  hour  faster ; 
whereupon,  the  aviators  who  are  intent  upon  winning 
speed  prizes  quickly  devote  their  attention  to  the 
new  machine. 

As  may  be  imagined,  therefore,  what  with  enor- 
mously-heavy first  costs,  and  a  doubtful  sale  even 


172      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

when  a  good  machine  is  produced,  the  manufacturer 
of  aeroplanes  has  no  alternative  but  to  charge  a 
high  price  for  the  machines  he  does  succeed  in 
disposing  of. 

Let  us  consider,  for  a  moment,  the  experience  of 
such  a  famous  manufacturer  as  M.  Louis  Bleriot. 
It  was  in  1906  that  he  began  experimenting  with 
monoplanes,  entirety  at  his  own  expense ;  and  he  was 
spending  money  lavishly  on  new  machines,  and 
devoting  a  vast  amount  of  time  to  the  problem,  until 
the  summer  of  1909.  Apart  from  the  money  he 
spent,  and  the  aircraft  he  broke  up,  he  risked  his 
life,  on  many  occasions,  in  attempting  to  fly  on 
machines  which  were  entirely  experimental. 

It  was  estimated,  indeed,  that — before  this  famous 
airman  and  constructer  flew  the  Channel,  in  July, 
1909 — he  had  expended  a  fortune  upon  aerial  re- 
search work.  It  was  perfectly  legitimate,  therefore, 
that  he  should  endeavour  to  recoup  himself,  for  all 
his  time  and  expense,  when  a  sale  did  spring  up  for 
his  machines. 

It  has  not  been  a  case,  since  then,  of  produc- 
ing machines  of  a  standard  type.  Directly  he  had 
perfected  the  simple,  low-powered  monoplane  upon 
which  he  crossed  from  France  to  England,  M. 
Bleriot  began  experimenting  with  a  more  powerful 
machine ;  and  so  he  has  been  engaged  ever  since. 

In  his  works  in  Paris,  for  example,  M.  Bleriot 
employs  a  skilled  staff  of  draughtsmen,  who  are  busy 
every  day  upon  designs  for  new  machines.  He 
must  keep  pace  with  his  rivals,  and  he  must  meet 
the  growing  demands  of  the  military  service.  Faster 
and  more  reliable  machines  are  demanded  every  day, 
and  strenuous  efforts  must  be  made  to  fulfil  these 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     173 

demands.  Therefore,  the  expense  of  running  an 
aeroplane  factory  is  exceptionally  high. 

These  facts  are  interesting,  as  they  explain  why 
"  a  few  bits  of  stick  and  canvas,  and  an  engine,"  as 
an  aeroplane  has  been  described,  should  cost  as  much 
as  ^looo.  It  is  not  so  much  the  wood,  and  the 
canvas,  and  the  engine  that  the  purchaser  is  paying 
for,  as  the  months,  and  perhaps  years,  of  patient  toil 
and  ceaseless  expense,  which  have  gone  to  the  pro- 
duction of  a  practical  machine. 

High  prices  are  charged  for  aeroplane  engines. 
Here,  again,  the  same  causes  are  at  work.  Most 
costly  are  the  preliminary  expenses  connected  with 
the  production  of  a  new  petrol  engine.  In  the  case 
of  the  famous  "  Gnome,"  for  instance,  many  thousands 
of  pounds  were  spent  upon  a  series  of  experimental 
engines,  before  a  reliable  model  could  be  obtained. 


II 

Economy  of  a  large  military  order  for  machines — The 
incidental  expenses. 

The  idea  has  been  conveyed,  by  the  previous 
notes,  that  the  aeroplane  is  an  expensive  machine. 
So  it  is,  at  present,  so  far  as  the  private  purchaser 
is  concerned — although  its  champions  are  already 
prone  to  point  out  that  a  first-class  flying  machine 
does  not  cost  more  than  a  high-powered,  luxurious 
motor-car. 

When  the  aeroplane  is  regarded  as  a  weapon  of 
war,  however,  it  should  not  be  considered  expensive. 
It  is,  in  fact,  remarkably  cheap,  particularly  when 


174      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

compared  with  the  cost  of  other  forms  of  arma- 
ment. 

The  prices,  previously  quoted,  as  representing  the 
cost  of  the  best  makes  of  aeroplane,  have  been  for 
individual  machines;  and  this  introduces  a  point 
which  is  greatly  in  favour  of  any  War  Department, 
when  it  seeks  to  equip  itself  with  a  number  of  aero- 
planes. Through  placing  orders  for  a  batch  of 
machines,  instead  of  buying  one  here  and  there,  any 
Government  should  be  able  materially  to  reduce  the 
price  of  any  make. 

Grant,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  a  country 
decides  to  provide  itself  with  a  fleet  of  a  hundred 
war  aeroplanes.  The  poHcy,  in  such  a  case,  would 
be  to  look  round,  at  the  beginning  of  any  flying 
season,  and  make  a  selection,  say,  of  the  three  types 
of  machine  best  suited  for  the  tasks  arising  in  mili- 
tary work. 

It  would  certainly  not  be  wise  to  buy  a  hundred 
machines  all  of  one  type,  although,  by  so  doing,  the 
price  for  each  machine  could  be  more  reduced  than 
in  the  case  of  splitting  up  an  order  between  several 
manufacturers.  But  such  a  policy  of  having  "  all 
one's  eggs  in  one  basket "  would  not  be  judicious — 
or  fair  to  the  industry  as  a  whole.  Government 
policy,  in  this  regard,  should  be  to  support  as  many 
manufacturers  as  is  reasonably  possible,  and  thus 
ensure  the  industry  maintaining  a  healthy  position. 

Orders  placed  with  a  number  of  makers  would 
be  necessary,  in  fact.  But,  even  with  such  a 
distribution  as  this,  a  considerable  saving  of  ex- 
pense could  be  made.  Expert  estimates  have  been 
given  as  to  the  cost,  per  machine,  of  a  hundred  war 
aeroplanes,   all  ordered  at  the  same  time;    and  a 


THE   AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     175 

reasonably  exact  figure  places  the  average  price,  for 
each  machine,  at  ;^6oo. 

This  represents  a  very  definite  reduction  upon  the 
price  of  a  single  machine ;  and  it  also  indicates  that, 
in  the  future,  when  aeroplanes  are  bought  in  even 
larger  numbers,  for  war  purposes,  the  cost  of  each 
machine  will  become  an  almost  insignificant  item — 
insignificant,  that  is  to  say,  when  compared  with  the 
cost  of  other  forms  of  armament.  When  a  thousand 
machines  can  be  ordered,  and  built  at  one  time,  for 
example,  the  cost  per  machine  will  be  enormously 
reduced. 

There  should  be  no  outcry,  indeed,  as  to  the  cost 
of  war  aeroplanes.  The  Admiralty  embarks,  without 
question,  upon  the  construction  of  a  great  battleship, 
although  it  knows  that  each  huge  craft  will  speedily 
become  obsolete.  This  money  is  not  grudged;  it 
is  for  the  defence  of  the  country. 

The  same  attitude  should  be  taken  up  as  regards 
the  creation  of  a  fleet  of  war  aeroplanes.  They,  too, 
have  become  essential  weapons. 

War  aeroplanes  are,  in  their  own  sphere,  quite 
as  important  as  battleships.  And  the  contrast 
between  the  two  weapons,  in  the  matter  of  price, 
is  extraordinary.  For  the  price  of  one  Dreadnought 
it  is,  indeed,  estimated  that  a  fleet  of  a  couple  of 
thousand  aeroplanes  could  be  created. 

An  enthusiastic  advocate  of  the  war  aeroplane  puts 
this  matter  of  cost  very  forcibly.  "  It  is  as  nothing," 
he  declares.  "A  vote  of  a  few  hundred  thousand 
pounds  would  place  the  whole  air  service  on  a  sound 
basis,  so  far  as  England  is  concerned.  The  net  cost 
of  each  aeroplane,  in  a  squadron,  is  an  absolutely 
insignificant  item  of  expense,  when  we  reckon  what 


176      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

we  are  spending,  in  other  ways,  on  our  Army  and 
Navy.  One  aircraft  represents  only  about  twice 
the  amount  spent  in  making  one  of  the  great  shells 
fired  by  our  biggest  naval  guns.  It  is  this  astonish- 
ing cheapness  of  the  aeroplane,  having  regard  to  its 
revolutionary  work,  which  is  the  surprising  factor 
of  the  situation.  It  will  mean,  of  course,  that  flying 
machines  will  be  used,  eventually,  in  huge  fleets." 

Naturally,  the  purchase  of  a  hundred  machines 
does  not  represent  the  total  outlay,  in  connection  with 
the  estabHshment  of  a  well-equipped  air-corps.  An 
organisation  must  be  built  up  round  these  machines, 
and  there  must  be  men  not  only  to  fly  them,  but  to 
keep  them  in  a  state  of  efficiency;  and  there  is  the 
need,  also,  of  housing  the  air-fleet. 

The  question  of  providing  sheds  for  a  fleet  of 
machines  is  an  important  one.  Aeroplanes  must  be 
well  housed,  or  their  depreciation  is  rapid.  What- 
ever sheds  are  provided  must,  apart  from  being 
strong  and  weather-proof,  be  portable  as  well. 

Under  the  same  heading,  also,  should  come  the 
workshops — some  of  them  portable — necessary  to 
cope  with  repairs  and  renewals  in  connection  with 
machines.  This,  too,  is  an  important  item,  as  first- 
class  repair  work  is  an  essential  feature  in  the  organi- 
sation of  any  air  service. 

An  estimate  of  the  money  that  should  be  ex- 
pended upon  sheds  and  repair-shops — for  a  fleet 
of  a  hundred  aeroplanes — places  the  amount  at 
;^20,ooo.  Money  should  not  be  stinted  in  this 
direction;  good  sheds,  and  efficient  repairs,  should 
both  tell  their  tale,  when  the  aeroplane  is  used  in 
a  campaign. 

Now  it  is  necessary  to  touch  upon  the  question  of 


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THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     177 

military  flying  grounds,  and  the  expense  incurred 
in  keeping  them  in  proper  order;  also  the  sum  of 
money  necessary  to  provide  a  sufficient  number  of 
motor  transport  lorries  for  the  air-fleet.  As  has  been 
explained,  the  plan  generally  adopted  is  for  an  aero- 
plane to  be  transported  from  point  to  point  on  a 
lorry,  and  followed  by  a  repair-car. 

In  regard  to  the  English  trials  of  war  aeroplanes, 
a  point  is  made — in  connection  with  the  size  of  the 
packing-cases  for  machines — of  the  possibiUty  of 
transporting  aircraft  by  railway  in  time  of  war. 
Undoubtedly,  under  favourable  circumstances,  this 
would  provide  a  rapid  method  of  bringing  up 
machines  from  a  distance. 

Under  the  headings  of  the  expenditure  upon  flying 
grounds,  and  the  provision  of  motor-lorries  to  follow 
aeroplanes,  and  act  as  transport  waggons,  a  reasonable 
estimate  of  the  sum  to  be  expended — in  connection 
with  a  fleet  of  a  hundred  machines — is  ;^  20,000. 

The  sum  of  ;^  100,000  should  be  sufficient,  not 
only  to  purchase  a  hundred  war  aeroplanes,  but 
to  equip  the  corps  with  sheds  and  repair-shops,  and 
also  to  maintain  flying  grounds,  and  provide  an  ade- 
quate number  of  motor-lorries. 

This  amount  allocated  for  machines  and  inciden- 
tals, a  Government  would  find  itself  face  to  face 
with  the  question  of  providing  officers  and  men  for 
the  air-corps.  Pay  for  this  corps  should,  it  is  con- 
sidered, be  represented  by  an  annual  sum  of  approxi- 
mately ;^  60,000. 


M 


178      THE  AEEOPLANE  IN  WAK 


III 


Question  of  renewals — General  cheapness  of  an  air-corps, 
as  compared  with  other  forms  of  armament. 

A  point  of  considerable  importance,  in  regard  to 
an  air-corps,  concerns  the  money  which  should  be 
put  aside,  each  year,  for  the  provision  of  new 
machines.  One  eminently  practical  authority, 
Colonel  J.  E.  Capper,  reckons  that,  in  connection 
with  a  fleet  of  a  hundred  aeroplanes,  an  allowance 
should  be  made  for  the  purchase  of  forty  new 
machines  each  year. 

Upon  this  question  of  renewals  there  is,  however, 
diversity  of  opinion.  The  contention  is  made,  for 
example,  that  a  Government  should  be  prepared,  at 
the  commencement  of  the  flying  season,  to  relegate 
all  its  previous  year's  machines  to  the  schools,  for 
the  use  of  pupils,  and  purchase  a  new  fleet  of  up-to- 
date  craft  for  use  in  war-time. 

Such  a  drastic  step,  however,  should  not  be 
necessary.  It  would  be  advisable,  of  course,  to 
weed  out  a  number  of  machines,  from  time  to  time, 
for  the  reason  that  they  become  obsolete ;  and  such 
machines  should,  as  suggested,  find  a  place  at  the 
schools  for  the  use  of  beginners. 

The  exact  number  of  new  aeroplanes  which  it 
should  be  advisable  to  buy,  in  any  one  year,  must  be 
governed,  very  largely,  by  the  process  of  perfection 
which  goes  on.  For  the  next  year  or  so,  it  is 
probable  that  an  allowance  for  renewals  will  need 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN   WAR     179 

to  be  a  heavy  one.  Afterwards,  as  the  rate  of  im- 
provement becomes  slower,  the  purchase  of  new 
machines  will  represent  a  lighter  item. 

A  good  reconnoitring  biplane,  say  of  the  flying 
season  of  191 1,  is  not  likely  to  become  obsolete  in 
191 2.  A  new  machine  will  probably  fly  farther  and 
faster,  and  carry  more  weight;  but  the  191 1  biplane 
will  still  be  capable  of  useful  work,  and  need  not 
be  relegated  to  the  scrap-heap.  It  will  behove  a 
Government,  of  course,  to  equip  itself  with  as  many 
new-type  machines  as  possible ;  and  an  estimate  of 
forty  new  machines  a  year,  in  connection  with  a  fleet 
of  a  hundred,  is  by  no  means  unreasonable. 

This,  of  course,  presupposes  a  logical  process  of 
development,  with  an  improved  type  of  machine 
appearing  from  year  to  year.  Should  a  revolu- 
tionary discovery  be  made,  the  plans  of  all  nations 
would  be  altered.  It  might  then  become  necessary, 
in  the  interests  of  national  safety,  to  "  scrap  "  a  whole 
fleet  of  aeroplanes,  in  order  to  make  way  for  the  type 
which  had  made  them  obsolete. 

But  the  unexpected  production  of  an  aeroplane, 
immeasurably  superior  to  existing  models,  is  not 
anticipated.  Already,  it  is  true,  the  way  can  be  seen 
to  make  many  improvements  upon  present-type 
aeroplanes ;  but,  in  regard  to  such  a  difficult  problem 
as  that  of  aviation,  the  testing  and  perfecting  of 
any  new  device,  however  simple,  cannot  be  hastily 
carried  out. 

One  other  consideration,  in  regard  to  the  running 
costs  of  a  fleet  of  machines,  now  presents  itself. 
This  concerns  the  allowance  to  be  made  for  the 
general  upkeep  of  the  aeroplanes,  and  for  such  items 
as  the  provision  of  petrol  and  oil.     Here  an  expert 


180      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

computation  places  the  figure — for  an  air  service  of 
a  hundred  machines — at  a  sum  of  /"  16,000. 

It  is  possible  to  arrive  at  a  summary  of  the  cost 
of  the  purchase  and  upkeep  of  a  fleet  of  a  hundred 
machines.  First  would  come  the  expenditure  of 
;^  100,000  upon  the  aeroplanes  themselves,  and  inci- 
dentals ;  and  then  the  Government  would  need  to 
be  ready  to  spend  another  ^100,000  a  year  upon 
the  upkeep  of  the  corps. 

Such  estimates  as  this  go  to  reveal  the  inadequacy 
of  the  grant  made  by  the  British  Government  for  the 
year  191 1 -12.  As  has  been  previously  mentioned, 
the  actual  sum  devoted  to  aeroplaning,  dirigible 
ballooning,  and  the  upkeep  of  the  Air  Battalion,  has 
been  ;^  85,000.  Owing  to  the  costliness  of  airships, 
only  a  small  portion  of  this  sum  has  been  devoted  to 
aeroplanes.  There  is  no  chance — ^with  such  a  grant 
as  this — of  mapping  out  an  adequate  programme 
for  aeroplane  work. 


OUR   AERIAL    PROGRAMME 
FOR   1912-13 

While  the  greater  portion  of  this  book  was  already 
in  the  Press,  and  too  late  for  classification  or  detailed 
comment,  the  Government's  programme  in  regard  to 
Naval  and  Military  Airmanship,  for  191 2-13,  was 
duly  announced. 

The  appended  summary  of  the  official  scheme  is 
from  the  Memorandum,  concerning  the  Army  Esti- 
mates, issued  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War : — 

"  Sufficient  experience  has  now  been  gained  in 
military  aviation  to  warrant  advance  on  less  tentative 
lines;  and  after  careful  consideration  by  the  Committee 
of  Imperial  Defence,  it  has  been  decided  to  establish 
at  once  a  joint  Army  and  Navy  School  of  i\viation  at 
which  officers  of  both  services  shall  be  taught  to  fly, 
before  proceeding  to  the  separate  Army  and  Navy 
establishments  at  which  they  will  be  exercised  in  the 
more  specialised  requirements  of  their  respective 
services. 

'*  A  site  for  the  school  has  been  selected  on  Salis- 
bury Plain,  and  the  purchase  of  the  necessary  land 
will  be  completed  at  the  beginning  of  April.  Building, 
to  plans  which  have  been  already  prepared,  will  be 
pressed  forward  rapidly,  and  it  is  hoped  at  a  very  early 
date  to  have  accommodation  at  the  school  for  officers 
and  men,  instructors  and  mechanics,  as  well  as  the 
necessary  sheds  for  aeroplanes  and  workshops  for  their 
repair  and  adjustment.     Provision  has  also  been  made 

181 


182      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

on  an  extended  scale  for  purchase  of  aeroplanes  and 
other  necessary  equipment  for  the  school. 

*'  Officers  of  both  services  will  be  employed  on  the 
staff  of  the  school,  and  its  expenses  (other  than  cost  of 
land)  will  be  shared  between  Army  and  Navy  votes. 

**  The  Estimates  further  provide  for  continuing  the 
experimental  and  other  work  of  the  Army  aircraft 
factory,  for  further  buildings  required  for  airships,  for 
an  addition  of  personnel  to  Army  establishments  for 
aeroplane  work,  and  for  a  considerable  number  of 
aeroplanes  as  a  first  instalment  of  the  equipment  of  the 
Field  Army. 

**  The  total  provision  for  the  above  services  made 
in  these  estimates  compares  with  that  made  in  1911-12 
as  follows : — 


— 

1912.13 

I9II-I2 

Establishment  of  Army  personnel  for  aero- 

nautical work ...        ... 

;^25,000 

;^20,000 

Premiums  to  officers  gaining  pilot's  certifi- 

cates       

3,000 

— 

Staff  of  new  school        

5,000 

— 

Aeroplanes,  stores,  and  materials  for  factory 

and  school        

161,000 

85,000 

Buildings,  including  Army  share  of  school 

buildings          

38,000 

26,000 

Land  for  school 

90,000 

— ' 

;^322,000 

;^I3I.OOO 

Less    Admiralty    contribution    to    general 

expenses  of  school 

14,000 

— 

;^308,000 

;^I3I,000 

Increased  provision 

£m 

,000 

For  a  full  statement  of  the  Government's  aerial 
programme,  it  is  not  possible  to  do  better  than  re- 
produce the  speech  (as  printed  in  The  Times)  which 
was  made  by  Colonel  Seely,  Parliamentary  Under- 
Secretary  of  State  for  War. 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN  WAR     183 

Colonel  Seely,  explaining  in  the  House  of  Commons 
the  official  scheme  for  the  forthcoming  year,  said  :— 

"  He  now  came  to  what  was  called  aviation,  though 
he  hoped  that  that  detestable  word  would  vanish  from 
the  English  language.  With  regard  to  the  defence  of 
the  country,  the  Prime  Minister  had  appointed  a  com- 
mittee, of  which  Lord  Haldane  was  the  chairman. 
That  committee  settled  broad  principles  and  entrusted 
the  making-out  of  the  complete  scheme  to  a  technical 
committee,  of  which  he  acted  as  chairman.  This 
committee  was  at  work  during  the  whole  of  last  recess, 
and  prepared  a  scheme  which  the  full  committee  had 
accepted  in  all  parts  except  the  details  as  to  pay.  The 
scheme  had  that  morning  been  approved  by  the  Prime 
Minister,  and  would  now  be  carried  into  effect. 

"  There  was  to  be  one  flying  corps,  embracing 
soldiers,  sailors,  and  civilians — all  who  could  fly  and 
would  take  the  obligation  to  serve  this  country  in  time 
of  war  in  any  part  of  the  world.  No  man  would  hold 
executive  rank  in  the  flying  corps  unless  he  was  himself 
an  expert  flyer.  The  present  Air  Battalion  would  cease 
to  exist,  and  part  of  it  would  be  absorbed  in  the  new 
organisation.  The  corps  would  be  one  corps,  and  as 
far  as  possible  all  the  officers  would  be  paid  and  treated 
alike.  In  a  purely  land  war  the  whole  flying  corps 
would  be  available  for  land  warfare,  and  in  a  purely 
naval  war  for  naval  warfare.  The  headquarters  would 
be  near  Nether- Avon  on  Salisbury  Plain,  where  a  large 
tract  had  been  purchased  at  a  cost  of  about  ;^90,ooo. 
In  the  first  instance  accommodation  would  be  pro- 
vided for  sixty  officers  at  the  school  at  any  one  time. 
There  would  be  three  terms  of  four  months  each,  and  it 
was  proposed  to  pass  through  a  hundred  and  eighty 
officers  in  each  year.  If  an  officer  wished  to  join  the 
flying  corps  he  had  first  to  get  the  consent  of  the 
military  authorities,  then  to  be  passed  by  the  doctor, 
and  afterwards  obtain  his  Royal  Aero  Club  certificate 


184      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

at  a  private  aerodrome.     It  was  not  proposed  to  use  the 
central  school  for  teaching  officers  to  fly.    They  would 
learn  the  elements  of  the  art  elsewhere  and  go  to  the 
flying   school   for   the   more  advanced  course.     After 
receiving  the  Royal  Aero  Club  certificate,  and  before 
presenting  themselves,  they  would  receive  £y$  which 
it  was  believed  would  cover  the  cost.     This  arrange- 
ment   had    already    been    in    force    some    little    time; 
he   believed    between    twenty    and   thirty    officers   had 
received    the    £7S'      Afterwards    officers    would    be 
attached    to    the    central    air    school,    and    would    go 
through     a    course    of    four    months.      They    would 
learn   progressive  flying,  mechanics  and  construction, 
meteorology,  observation  from  the  air,  flying  by  com- 
pass,   photography    from     the    air,     signalling,    and 
types  of  warships  of  all  nations.     After  this  course  the 
officer   of   the   air-corps,    whatever    his   origin,    would 
either  join  the  military  wing  or  the  naval  wing,  or  go 
straight    to    the    reserve.     The    military    wing    would 
consist  of  seven  aeroplane  squadrons,  each  containing 
twelve  aeroplanes  and  a  suitable  number  of  officers  for 
flying.     There  would  be  an  eighth  squadron,  consisting 
of  balloons  and  kites.      The  naval  wing  would  have 
headquarters   at    Eastchurch.     The    numbers    had   not 
yet  been  finally  settled,  but  they  would  be  considerable, 
and  would  be  increased.     In  the  reserve  there  would  be 
two  classes — the  first  reserve  consisting  of  airmen  who 
performed    so    many    flights    across   country    in    each 
quarter  and  received  a  retaining  fee,  and  the  second 
reserve  consisting  of  those  who  did  not  enter  into  this 
undertaking,  but  would  be  available   in   time  of  war. 
Both  the  Army  and  Navy  wings  of  the  air-crops  would 
always  be  on  a  war  footing,  and  the  peace  and  war 
establishments  would  be  the  same.     The  Army  aircraft 
factory  would  cease  to  be  called  by  that  name,  and 
would  become  the  aircraft  factory  for  the  whole  flying 
corps.     Its    functions   would    include    experiment    and 
building    experimental    machines,    making    repairs    to 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     185 

machines  where  that  was  thought  desirable,  sometimes 
building  machines,  though  that  would  not  be  its 
primary  duty,  and  training  in  expert  knowledge  the 
numerous  mechanics  who  would  be  required  for  this 
new  service. 

**  The  scheme  involved  the  purchase  of  a  hundred 
and  thirty-one  aeroplanes.  He  was  not  sure  they  could 
all  be  bought  this  year,  though  the  obstacle  was  not 
expense.  The  first  seventy-one  had  been  sanctioned 
already.  The  orders  for  a  great  many  of  them  had 
gone  out,  and  the  others  were  in  process  of  negotiation. 
Not  so  many  had  been  ordered  from  British  manu- 
facturers as  could  be  wished,  but  that  was  because  the 
technical  members  of  his  committee  realised,  and  in 
this  they  had  the  full  approval  of  the  whole  committee, 
that  the  first  essential  was  efficiency  and  safety.  In 
many  respects  France  had  gone  a  long  way  ahead  of 
us  in  both  those  matters.  The  Government  could  not 
buy  British  machines  at  the  price  of  human  life,  but  no 
doubt  this  difficulty  would  soon  be  overcome,  for  a  great 
many  of  the  best  brains  were  undoubtedly  at  work 
making  the  aeroplane  not  only  more  speedy  and 
efficient,  but  safer. 

'*  The  risks  the  officers  would  run  would  be  very 
great.  The  insurance  rates  were  very  high.  But  it 
was  some  consideration  to  know  that  in  France  they 
had  enormously  increased  the  safety  of  learning  to  fly. 
One  school  had  covered  160,000  kilometres  without 
accident.  It  was  to  be  hoped  the  risks  would  be 
reduced,  but  they  would  still  be  very  great,  and  he 
trusted  the  House  would  not  grudge  the  expense  in- 
volved in  making  adequate  payment  to  officers,  and 
giving  an  adequate  scale  of  pensions  in  the  event  of 
their  being  seriously  injured.  (Cheers.)  The  military 
wing  required  at  once  to  fly  these  aeroplanes  a 
hundred  and  thirty-three  officers,  the  Navy  a  number 
not  yet  fixed,  but  thirty  or  forty  at  once,  and  the  reserve 
a  number  which  would  depend  on  the  progress  of  our 


186      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

science  in  the  near  future.  They  had  not  got  the 
hundred  and  thirty-three  military  officers.  No  doubt 
many  officers  would  volunteer.  It  could  only  be  hoped 
that  they  would  learn  to  fly  with  as  little  accident  as 
possible.  It  had  been  settled  that  the  officers  should 
learn  to  fly  at  private  flying  schools,  first,  because  it 
was  desirable  to  encourage  private  effort;  and,  secondly, 
because  they  thought  there  was  less  risk  of  accident  in 
the  initial  stages  if  this  method  was  adopted.  It  was 
a  method  which  had  been  largely  followed  in  France, 
and  it  had  obvious  advantages.  It  was  greatly  to  the 
interest  of  the  owner  of  an  aerodrome  to  avoid  accident. 
When  officers  had  learned  the  elementary  art  of  flying 
they  would  go  to  the  central  flying  school." 

This  official  announcement  of  policy,  as  revealed 
above,  unfortunately  comes  too  late  for  more  than 
the  briefest  criticism  in  these  pages. 

All  that  can  be  said,  indeed,  is  that  the  scheme 
prepared,  while  certainly  representing  a  stride  for- 
ward in  comparison  with  the  previous  apathy  of  our 
authorities,  is  still  inadequate  when  contrasted  with 
the  activities  of  either  France  or  Germany. 

In  France  close  upon  ;^  100,000  has  been  sub- 
scribed, by  an  enthusiastic  public,  to  augment  the 
milHon  which  the  Government  will  expend;  Ger- 
many has  increased  an  original  vote  to  the  tune  of 
;^  100,000. 

Our  scheme  can  only  be  regarded  as  a  beginning 
— and,  in  several  respects,  a  disappointing  one,  seeing 
that,  at  the  end  of  the  present  flying  season,  both 
France  and  Germany  will,  inevitably,  have  still 
further  increased  their  already  long  lead. 

Agitation  for  a  more  ambitious  aerial  programme 
in  England  must  not,  indeed,  cease;  this  1912-13 
scheme  is  not  sound  enough  to  reheve  public  un- 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     187 

easiness.  We  are  lamentably  behind ;  and  adequate 
steps  have  not,  even  now,  been  taken  to  bring  us  on 
anything  like  a  level  with  foreign  rivals,  despite  the 
fact  that  the  aeroplane  has  been  proved  to  be  an  abso- 
lutely revolutionary  weapon  of  modern  war. 


NOTE 

Amplifying  the  official  statement  of  policy  pre- 
viously quoted i  the  authorities  issued^  on  12th  Aprils 
igi2,  a  fuller  explanation  of  their  aerial  programme. 
But  it  throws  no  very  clear  light  upon  the  immediate 
future;  and,  although  it  deals  with  plans  which  are 
ambitious y  it  is  disquietingly  vague  concerning  the  all- 
important  question  of  finance. 

The  official  design  is,  it  is  stated,  to  form  seven 
aeroplane  squadrons,  each  comprising  twelve  aero- 
planes; and,  to  man  this  air-fleet,  a  force  of  J64  pilots 
and  observers  will  be  required.  In  addition,  there  will 
be  forty  airmen  who  ivill  be  trained,  specifically,  in  the 
duties  of  naval  airmanship. 

But  the  facilities  actually  provided — as  apart  from 
paper  schemes — are  still  so  meagre  that  it  will  only  be 
possible,  during  this  year,  to  train  a  very  small  pro- 
portion of  the  corps  set  forth  above.  Thus  it  is  to 
be  feared  that,  at  the  end  of  igi2,  our  position  will 
continue  to  compare,  most  unfavourably,  with  that  of 
either  France  or  Germany. 

We  are  more  than  a  year  behind,  and  seem  likely 
to  remain  so. 


TWELFTH    SECTION 

PROBLEM     OF     ARTILLERY     FIRE     AND    THE 
AEROPLANE 

I 

Conflicting  opinions  as  to  an  aeroplane's  vulnerability — 
Experiments  which  have  been  carried  out. 

So  far,  the  military  aeroplane  has  been  described 
as  a  reconnoitring  or  dispatch-bearing  craft,  carry- 
ing out  its  important  work,  in  time  of  war,  without 
any  interference  save  that  brought  about  by  adverse 
weather  conditions. 

But  there  is  an  aspect  of  the  case,  so  far  as  actual 
service  conditions  are  concerned,  which  will — 
according  to  many  vehement  critics  of  the  aeroplane 
— nullify  the  utility  of  an  air-scout,  and  make  ex- 
penditure upon  fleets  of  machines  largely  a  waste 
of  money. 

They  affirm,  in  a  word,  that  well-directed  artillery- 
fire  will  prove  so  deadly  that  no  aeroplane  will  be 
able  to  live  through  it,  and  that  any  reconnoitring 
machine,  which  ventures  over  an  enemy's  position, 
will  be  destroyed  with  the  greatest  ease. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  an  equally  definite 
statement  by  staunch  advocates  of  military  flying. 
They  declare,  emphatically,  that  artillery-fire,  when 
directed  against  aeroplanes,  will  prove  a  negligible 

188 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN  WAR     189 

quantity.  No  point,  indeed,  arouses  more  contro- 
versy than  the  problem  of  the  vulnerability  of  the 
aeroplane  to  artillery  or  rifle-fire. 

The  question  is  a  moot  one,  and  it  is  bound  to 
remain  so  until  the  coming  of  a  war  in  which  aero- 
planes are  employed  in  fair  numbers;  but  nothing 
could  be  more  ill-advised  than  a  policy  which  stints 
aeroplane  development,  because  it  is  believed  they 
will  be  destroyed  by  gun-fire. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  tests  which  have  been  made 
up  to  the  present  time  are  in  favour,  not  of  the 
gunner,  but  of  the  aeroplane.  This  fact  is,  however, 
frequently  ignored  by  the  artillery  experts.  They 
adhere  to  their  view,  and  the  airmen  to  theirs. 
"  Aeroplanes  will  be  swept  away  when  they  come 
into  the  danger  zone,"  declare  the  champions  of 
artillery.  "  Nothing  of  the  sort  will  happen,"  retort 
the  advocates  of  the  aeroplane. 

It  is  probable  that  an  unbiased  reader  will  prefer 
to  take  a  view  rather  midway  between  these  two,  and 
be  willing  to  grant  that,  while  some  aeroplanes  are 
likely  to  be  "  winged  "  by  skilful  gunners,  the  greater 
proportion  of  them  will,  on  account  of  their  height 
and  speed,  escape  being  hit. 

Since  the  aeroplane  has  demonstrated  its  un- 
questionable value  as  a  reconnoitring  craft,  special 
guns  have  been  made  in  order  to  combat  it.  These 
have  long  range,  and  are  designed  to  fire  vertically 
into  the  air.  Many  tests  have,  also,  been  made  with 
kites  and  balloons,  to  reveal  the  ease,  or  otherwise, 
of  striking  an  aeroplane  in  flight. 

As  regards  these  experiments,  the  opinion  among 
experts  is  again  divided.  Artillerymen  do  not  hesi- 
tate to  say  that  they  prove  their  case — ^which  is,  of 


190      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

course,  that  the  aeroplane  is  a  vulnerable  target. 
Aeroplane  enthusiasts  combat  such  suggestions ;  and 
so  the  controversy  goes  on. 

One  fact  stands  suggestively  revealed;  wise 
countries,  despite  assertions  that  artillery  will  blow 
aeroplanes  to  pieces,  are  buying  more  and  more 
machines,  instead  of  curtailing  their  orders. 

France  and  Germany,  for  instance,  which  have 
carried  out  more  tests  than  any  other  countries  in 
regard  to  the  vulnerability  of  aircraft,  are  determined 
to  increase  their  fleets  of  aeroplanes. 

This,  surely,  should  tell  its  own  story.  It  is  un- 
usually impressive,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  seeing  that 
artillery  experts,  both  in  France  and  Germany,  have 
been  ready  to  declare  that  well-directed  gun-fire  will 
rob  aeroplane  scouting  of  its  significance.  But 
those  who  control  constructive  policy,  both  in  France 
and  Germany,  have  judged  impartially;  and,  as  a 
result,  they  have  bought  more  aeroplanes. 

The  difficulty,  in  carrying  out  tests  of  gun-fire,  as 
directed  against  aeroplanes,  is  to  obtain  artificial 
conditions  which  shall,  even  roughly,  approximate  to 
those  which  would  prevail  in  actual  war.  So  far,  it 
has  been  clear  that,  in  all  tests  which  have  been 
carried  out,  conditions  have  been  in  favour  of  the 
gunner.  But,  even  so,  the  results  obtained  have 
been  inconclusive — to  say  the  least  of  it. 

Let  us  take,  for  purpose  of  illustration,  one  of  the 
experiments  conducted  in  France.  In  this  a  large 
box-kite  was  employed.  It  was  allowed  to  ascend, 
in  a  strong  wind,  until  it  flew  at  a  height,  in  regard 
to  its  size,  which  represented,  approximately,  the 
target  which  would  be  represented  by  a  scouting 
aeroplane. 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN  WAR     191 

Then  it  was  towed  past  a  battery  of  artillery. 
Twelve  shots  were  fired  at  it ;  and,  out  of  the  dozen, 
one  hit  was  recorded.  This  was  not  a  good  result, 
from  the  gunner's  point  of  view.  In  this  test,  too, 
conditions  favoured  the  men  at  the  guns. 

To  begin  with,  they  expected  their  target,  and 
knew  from  which  direction  it  would  appear.  In  the 
second  place,  the  target  was,  in  comparison  with  an 
aeroplane,  moving  much  more  slowly  than  the  flying 
machine  would  have  done ;  and,  in  the  third  place, 
the  kite  was  towed  in  a  perfectly-straight  line,  and 
was  not  pursuing  an  erratic  course,  as  an  aeroplane 
would  certainly  do — in  the  efforts  of  the  pilot  to 
escape  being  hit — were  it  under  fire.  And  yet,  even 
with  these  points  in  their  favour,  the  gunners 
achieved  but  one  hit  in  a  dozen  shots. 

It  is  possible  to  cite  another  instance,  in  this  con- 
nection— that  of  a  series  of  tests  carried  out,  iq 
American  waters,  from  a  warship.  Here,  again,  the 
target  was  a  box-kite,  and  it  was  flown  above  the 
vessel  at  an  altitude  of  about  800  feet.  Ten  blue- 
jackets were  then  formed  up  upon  the  deck  ;  and  they 
fired  three  volleys  at  this  representation  of  an  aero- 
plane. The  bullets,  in  the  first  two  volleys,  all  went 
wide  of  the  mark.  In  the  third,  however,  the  box- 
kite  was  hit. 

Here,  again,  although  conditions  favoured  the 
riflemen,  they  failed  to  obtain  satisfactory  results. 
During  the  three  volleys,  the  box-kite  was  flown  at 
an  unvarying  height.  This  was  a  point  very  greatly 
in  their  favour. 

In  actual  warfare,  had  they  been  firing  at  an  aero- 
plane, the  machine  would,  probably,  have  been 
travelling  at  a  speed  of  sixty  miles  an  hour  or  more ; 


192      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

and  it  would,  therefore,  have  presented  a  different 
range,  at  each  volley  fired. 

Another  experiment,  carried  out  from  an  Ameri- 
can battleship,  is  also  of  interest.  In  this  case,  a 
plunging  kite  was  sent  up  to  a  specified  height,  and 
1 60  rounds  were  fired  at  it  with  rifles.  Although 
the  kite  swung  about  a  good  deal,  it  did  not  vary  its 
altitude.  In  connection  with  this  test — in  which 
picked  shots  were  employed — ^40  hits,  out  of  the  160 
rounds,  were  recorded. 

As  a  result  of  the  tests  recorded  above,  and  of 
others  less  interesting,  the  Secretary  of  the  United 
States  Navy  was  led  to  make  the  pronouncement  that 
no  aeroplane  could,  with  any  degree  of  safety, 
approach  nearer  than  1000  yards  of  a  position 
protected  by  rifle-fire. 

As  opposed  to  this  view,  the  opinion  of  experts  at 
the  Hythe  School  of  Musketry  is  that  it  would  be  more 
or  less  a  waste  of  ammunition  to  attempt  to  "  wing," 
with  rifle-fire,  an  aeroplane  3000  feet  high.  In  the 
practical  work  of  the  aeroplane  in  Tripoli,  machines 
flying  less  than  2000  feet  high  were  not  damaged 
by  rifle-fire. 

The  point  to  bear  in  mind,  in  this  connection,  is 
that  an  aeroplane  flying  3000  feet  high,  and  at  a 
speed  greater  than  that  of  an  express  train,  would, 
inevitably,  prove  a  very  difficult  target.  The  air- 
man would  appear  suddenly,  and  quickly  go  out  of 
view  again  ;  and  he  would  alter  his  height,  and  course, 
so  that  a  perplexed  gunner — needing  to  fire  quickly, 
or  not  at  all — would  find  the  range  constantly 
varying. 

Quite  recently,  a  famous  military  expert  has  pro- 
nounced the  opinion  that  high-angle  gun-fire  would 


<  -z 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     193 

have  no  great  potentiality  against  fast-flying  aero- 
planes. 

Amplifying  some  tests  first  carried  out  in  France, 
have  come  a  series  of  more  recent  experiments,  in 
which  the  conditions  imposed  have  been  more  dis- 
advantageous to  the  gunners.  The  result  has  been 
a  striking  testimony  to  the  invulnerability  of  the  aero- 
plane. For  example,  kites  have  been  towed  by 
motor-cars  at  a  speed  actually  representing  the  flight 
of  fast  monoplanes.  Gunners,  when  firing  under  such 
fairly  realistic  conditions,  have  failed  to  secure  any- 
thing like  a  satisfactory  percentage  of  hits. 

Tests  on  a  somewhat  similar  scale  have,  also,  been 
carried  out  in  Germany ;  and,  here  again,  the  artillery 
has  not  distinguished  itself.  In  Germany,  also, 
small  balloons  have  been  used  as  targets.  These 
have  been  set  free,  and  have  been  permitted  to 
ascend  to  a  certain  height,  before  being  fired  at.  In 
connection  with  these  experiments,  a  fairly-large  per- 
centage of  hits  was  recorded.  This  was  due,  no 
doubt,  to  the  fact  that  there  was  no  erratic  movement 
to  be  allowed  for — the  balloons  moving  on  an  easily 
determined  line. 

These  target  tests,  as  can  be  seen,  represent  condi- 
tions which  are  quite  artificial.  It  is  possible  to 
take,  for  the  sake  of  comparison,  the  practice  indulged 
in  by  gunners  at  coast  defences.  Targets  are  towed 
at  specified  distances  out  to  sea,  and  then  the  gunners 
pound  away  at  them.  Such  practice  is  good,  of 
course.  It  accustoms  the  men  to  the  handling  of 
their  guns;  and  it  certainly  improves  their  mark- 
manship. 

But  now  contrast  this  target  practice  with  a 
sudden  attack,  in  war-time,  by  hostile  torpedo  craft. 

N 


194      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

Here  will  be  no  mechanically-moving  target,  at 
which  to  take  a  leisurely  aim.  Instead,  there  will 
be  the  rush  and  tear  of  war.  Markmanship,  under 
such  conditions,  is  a  very  different  thing  to  quietly- 
conducted  practice  firing.  And  a  similar  argument 
— only  with  greater  force — applies  to  shooting  at 
aeroplanes  in  war-time. 

Among  distinguished  students  of  this  problem 
of  gun-fire  and  the  aeroplane  is  Colonel  J.  E. 
Capper,  who  was,  for  seven  years,  in  charge  of  the 
aeronautical  work  of  the  British  Government.  His 
view  is  that  artillery,  however  well-trained,  would 
have  very  great  difficulty  in  firing  accurately  at  a 
fast-flying  machine. 

An  instance  which  Colonel  Capper  gives  is  this: 
if  the  range  of  a  gun  is  5000  yards,  an  aeroplane, 
moving  across  it  at  a  speed  of  fifty  miles  an  hour, 
would  be  in  range  for  less  than  3-|  minutes.  During 
this  period  of  3^  minutes,  the  gun  would  need  to 
travel  across  an  angle  of  60  degrees,  altering  its 
range  down  to  4330  yards  in  the  first  if  minutes, 
and  increasing  it  again  to  5000  yards  in  the  next  if 
minutes. 

To  do  this  would  be  an  extremely  difficult  task, 
even  if  the  aeroplane,  while  flying  past,  made  itself 
the  easiest  possible  target;  that  is  to  say,  if  it  flew 
steadily  at  one  level,  all  the  time,  and  moved  directly 
across  in  front  of  the  guns.  But  an  airman  would, 
naturally,  seek  to  make  himself  as  difficult  a  target 
as  possible.  He  would,  therefore,  constantly  alter 
his  altitude  by  movements  of  his  elevating  plane; 
and  he  would,  in  addition,  steer  erratically  from  side 
to  side. 

How  confusing  this  would  be  for  the  gunner  may 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     195 

easily  be  imagined.  Apart  from  the  speed  of  the 
aeroplane,  which  would,  as  shown,  only  permit  him 
a  brief  opportunity  of  firing  at  it,  he  would  be  faced 
with  the  fact  that  range,  elevation,  and  direction  of 
the  elusive  target  would  constantly  be  altering.  In 
addition,  he  would  probably  be  called  upon  to 
make  allowance  for  a  wind,  when  aiming  at  the 
machine. 

Apropos  the  rapidity  with  which  a  modern-type 
machine  will  come  into  the  range  of  a  gun,  and  dis- 
appear again,  an  incident  in  some  minor  manoeuvres 
held  in  France  is  of  interest.  On  this  occasion,  a 
special  gun,  designed  to  shoot  at  aircraft,  and 
mounted  upon  a  motor-car,  was  taken  out  with  the 
troops.  Suddenly,  an  aeroplane  appeared  in  sight. 
It  was  flying  straight  towards  the  troops,  which  were 
on  the  march.  The  special  gun  was  called  for ;  but, 
before  it  could  be  brought  into  action,  and  trained 
upon  the  aeroplane,  the  latter  had  gone  completely 
out  of  range.  This  illustration  shows  what  an  un- 
satisfactory and  elusive  target  an  aeroplane  is  bound 
to  be. 


II 

Shrapnel  shell — Question  of  hitting  a  vital  part  of  the 
aeroplane — Difficulty  of  identifying  friend  or  foe. 

It  is  generally  agreed,  among  artillery  experts, 
that  shrapnel  shell  should  form  a  suitable  projectile 
to  be  fired  against  an  aeroplane.  The  shrapnel  is, 
indeed,  a  particularly-deadly  missile.  This  shell 
consists  of  a  metal  case,  containing  a  sufficient 
amount   of   explosive   to   burst   it,  when   the    fuse 


196      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

explodes  the  charge.  This  fuse  can,  of  course,  be  set 
so  that  the  shell  explodes  at  any  given  distance  from 
the  gun  which  fires  it. 

Inside  the  metal  case,  or  shell,  is  a  charge  of 
bullets.  When  the  shell  bursts,  these  bullets  fly  out 
from  it,  ready  to  spread  destruction  over  an  appreci- 
able area.  Should  a  shell  burst  in  close  proximity 
to  an  aeroplane,  for  instance,  the  scattering  charge 
would,  it  is  anticipated,  break  struts  and  stays,  and 
possibly  hit  the  pilot,  or  some  vital  part  of  his 
machine. 

But,  granting  the  deadly  nature  of  a  well-aimed 
shrapnel  shell,  there  are  several  points  to  be  con- 
sidered, before  we  can  imagine  it  bringing  an  aero- 
plane to  the  ground.  In  the  first  place,  there  is  the 
question  of  the  timing  of  the  fuse.  This  must  be 
done,  of  course,  with  absolute  accuracy;  and  the 
gunner  must  aim  his  weapon  at  a  point  in  front  of  the 
aeroplane,  as  it  flies  across  his  view.  This  represents 
a  matter  for  nice  calculation,  being  determined  by 
the  speed  of  the  aeroplane  aimed  at,  the  speed  of 
the  shell,  and  the  distance  of  the  aircraft  from  the 
gun. 

Thus,  when  he  is  firing  at  a  sixty-mile-an-hour 
monoplane,  passing  swiftly  through  the  air,  several 
thousand  feet  away,  a  gunner  must  obtain  his  range 
without  delay,  set  his  fuse  accurately,  and  aim  his 
gun  with  the  greatest  care.  And,  all  the  time,  his 
target  will  be  moving  as  fast  as  an  express  train,  and 
perhaps  making  erratic  twists  and  turns  in  the  air. 

It  is  not  surprising,  in  view  of  such  circumstances, 
that  one  of  the  greatest  of  military  experts  has  de- 
clared that  an  aeroplane,  flying  at  sixty  miles  an 
hour,  and  at  an  altitude  of  from  3000  to  4000  feet, 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     197 

will  present  an  exceptionally-difficult  mark,  even  to 
the  most  skilled  of  gunners,  equipped  with  special 
weapons. 

It  does  not  follow,  even  should  a  shrapnel  shell  be 
exploded  successfully  in  the  vicinity  of  an  aeroplane, 
that  the  machine  will  be  brought  to  the  ground. 
There  is  still  the  question  as  to  striking  a  vital  part 
of  the  aircraft.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the 
greater  portion  of  the  target  which  a  machine 
exposes  to  gun-fire  is  represented  by  its  planes ;  and 
these  could  be  pierced  by  many  bullets  before  their 
efficiency  was  affected. 

Thus,  a  number  of  bullets  from  a  shrapnel  shell 
might  strike  an  aeroplane  without  producing  any 
result.  What  would  be  necessary,  would  be  to  hit 
the  airman,  or  place  a  shot  in  some  vital  part  of  his 
machine.  Damage  to  a  working  part  of  the  engine 
would,  for  example,  bring  the  machine  down.  So 
would  injury  to  radiator,  petrol  tank,  or  propeller. 
A  bullet  might,  also,  break  an  important  stay — or 
cut  a  controlling  wire.  In  such  a  case,  the  machine 
might  fall,  and  be  wrecked. 

The  point  to  be  made,  which  is  of  importance,  is 
this :  it  does  not  follow  that,  even  if  an  aeroplane  were 
hit,  it  would  be  brought  to  the  ground.  Many  bullets 
from  a  shrapnel  shell  might,  as  has  been  shown, 
strike  a  machine  in  flight,  without  having  any  effect 
upon  it  at  all.  This  is  certainly  a  factor  in  favour 
of  the  aeroplane. 

A  fact  to  be  considered,  also,  when  the  problem 
of  aeroplanes  and  gun-fire  is  under  review,  is  the 
distance  at  which  aircraft  are  visible  from  the  ground. 
In  ordinary  weather,  and  under  normal  conditions, 
it  is  generally  estimated  that  a  reconnoitring  aero- 


198      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

plane  should  be  sighted  when  it  is  about  three 
miles  away. 

But,  even  in  clear  atmospheric  conditions,  the 
aircraft  is  an  elusive  object  to  locate.  Even  when 
one  is  expected  to  appear,  from  a  certain  direction, 
and  all  eyes  are  fixed  upon  the  sky,  awaiting  its 
advent,  it  is  frequently  almost  at  its  destination 
before  anyone  locates  it. 

More  difficult,  as  can  be  imagined,  is  the  task  of 
sighting  an  aeroplane  when  it  is  not  known  from 
what  point  of  the  compass  it  is  likely  to  appear. 
And  yet  this,  of  course,  will  be  the  position  of  the 
gunner  in  war-time.  A  hostile  aircraft  may  loom  up 
from  anywhere — even  from  over  his  own  troops.  It 
will  be  possible  for  a  reconnoitring  machine  to 
ascend  to  a  great  height,  and  conceal  itself  in 
low-lying  clouds.  From  these  it  will  be  able  to 
descend  swiftly,  effect  a  rapid  reconnaissance,  and 
then  "  climb  "  again  until  lost  to  sight. 

In  such  circumstances,  the  artilleryman  will  need 
to  be  phenomenally  handy  with  his  gun  if  he  is  to 
note  the  approach  of  so  cunning  a  scout,  and  "  wing  " 
him  before  he  has  slipped  out  of  range. 

A  point  which  has  been  referred  to  before — but 
which  artillery  experts  are  prone  to  ignore — is  the 
skill  a  military  pilot  will  be  able  to  exercise,  in  avoid- 
ing fire  from  below.  In  many  cases,  during  a  recon- 
naissance, the  observer  should  be  able  to  obtain 
all  the  information  he  seeks  without  once  coming 
within  range  of  the  enemy's  guns. 

Naturally,  the  aeroplanist  will  never  fly  inten- 
tionally over  artillery,  or  court  infantry-fire.  Long- 
distance observations  will  often  be  possible,  giving 
the  gunner  no  chance  of  using  a  shell;  or,  if  it  is 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     199 

necessary  to  come  fairly  close  to  troops,  for  a  detailed 
piece  of  reconnaissance,  the  airman  will  swoop  down, 
and  as  speedily  get  clear  again. 

When  he  knows  he  is  likely  to  be  within  range  of 
any  of  the  enemy's  guns,  he  will  pursue  an  erratic 
course.  Therefore,  the  gunner,  when  he  does  obtain 
a  chance  of  firing  at  a  machine,  will  find  his  target 
darting  about  in  disconcerting  fashion. 

A  point  arises  as  to  establishing  the  identity  of  an 
aircraft,  when  it  is  sighted  during  time  of  war. 
Machines  will  fly  flags,  indicating  their  nationality, 
but  these  flags  are  not  likely  to  be  seen  at  any  great 
distance.  Therefore,  if  an  artilleryman  detects  an 
aeroplane,  approaching  at  an  appreciable  altitude,  it 
will  frequently  be  impossible  for  him  to  determine 
whether  it  is  friend  or  foe. 

That  it  is,  obviously,  a  machine  of  a  particular 
type,  or  make,  will  not  help  the  artilleryman,  because 
aeroplanes  of  all  forms  of  construction  will  be  em- 
ployed, in  connection  with  the  various  armies.  The 
fact  that  it  may  be  flying  over  from  behind  him,  as 
though  it  had  risen  from  his  own  lines,  will  prove 
nothing,  as  a  hostile  scout  might  have  made  a  wide 
detour,  and.  so  approached  the  enemy  from  the  rear. 

This  difficulty  as  to  identifying  friend  or  foe  is 
likely  to  prove  a  real  one  in  time  of  war,  particularly 
when  a  large  number  of  machines  are  in  the  air ;  and, 
exactly  how  it  will  be  met,  is  not  easy  to  see. 

Having  reviewed  the  position,  so  far  as  the  aero- 
plane and  gun-fire  are  concerned,  it  is  possible  to 
form  more  or  less  definite  conclusions  concerning 
the  subject.  In  the  first  place,  one  point  is  clear: 
extreme  views  are  unwise  in  regard  to  such  a  problem 
as  this.     What  tests  so  far  carried  out  have  proved, 


200      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

if  they  have  proved  anything,  is  that  there  are  two 
points  of  view. 

Artillery  experts,  who  declare  that  every  recon- 
noitring aeroplane  will  be  blown  to  pieces  before  it 
can  carry  out  its  work,  are  obviously  wrong ;  so,  too, 
is  the  enthusiast  who  affirms  that  guns  will  be  alto- 
gether useless  when  directed  against  airmen. 

What  it  is  possible  to  deduce,  from  the  generally- 
inconclusive  experiments  recorded,  is  that  the 
balance  of  testimony — so  far  as  it  can  be  estimated 
— is  in  favour  of  the  aeroplane.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  reasonable  view  to  take  is  that,  when  a  squadron 
of  aeroplanes  deliberately  sets  forth  to  reconnoitre 
an  enemy's  position,  a  certain  percentage  of 
machines  will  be  hit  by  gun-fire,  and  brought  to  the 
ground. 

Exactly  what  that  percentage  will  be  is  a  moot 
point;  experience  alone  can  tell.  But  the  tests 
already  described  suggest,  very  plainly,  that  the 
percentage  should  be  low. 

The  skill  of  the  pilot  in  avoiding  fire  will  be 
an  important  factor  in  the  question — as  already 
mentioned.  An  over-daring  airman  may  quickly 
find  himself  in  danger ;  a  careful,  cautious  man  may 
do  all  the  work  required  of  him  without  giving  hos- 
tile artillery  a  chance  to  get  in  a  shot. 

Level-headed  officers,  who  have  practical  experi- 
ence in  military  flying,  do  not  anticipate,  for  a 
moment,  that  the  aeroplanes  which  ascend  in  time 
of  war  will  escape  scot-free. 

"  Casualties  there  are  bound  to  be."  The  words 
are  those  of  an  expert  of  international  repute.  "  Risks 
will  be  taken  knowingly,  according  to  the  value  of 
the  information  which  is  required.     War  is  not  a 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     201 

kid-glove  affair.  Large  squadrons  of  aeroplanes 
will  be  used ;  and,  apart  altogether  from  the  question 
of  the  loss  of  life,  the  destruction  of  a  small  propor- 
tion of  machines  will  not  affect  the  utility  of  a  corps. 
The  position,  in  a  nutshell,  is  this :  the  news  that  an 
aeroplane  can  obtain  is  so  vitally  important  that  the 
risk  of  men,  and  machines,  will  be  considered  amply 
justified." 

This  much  appears  certain.  No  artillery-fire,  how- 
ever skilfully  directed,  is  likely  to  nullify  the  effects 
of  aeroplane  reconnoitring.  Machines  will  be  hit; 
lives  will  be  lost.  But  the  value  of  the  aeroplane's 
work  will  lie  in  the  number  of  machines  employed. 
If  fifty  are  sent  out  upon  a  reconnoitring  flight,  and 
if  some  of  them  fall  victims  to  the  enemy's  gun-fire, 
a  sufficient  number  will  return  to  impart,  to  a  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, the  information  he  seeks  to  obtain. 

The  only  sensible  poHcy,  for  any  nation,  is  to 
do  what  France  and  Germany  are  doing.  Both 
these  countries  are  developing  war  aeroplanes; 
and  they  are  also  building,  and  experimenting  with, 
special  guns  for  the  destruction  of  aircraft.  While 
you  cannot  destroy  an  enemy's  air-fleet,  the  obvious 
poUcy  is  to  cripple  it  as  much  as  possible;  and, 
recognising  that  no  gun-fire  can  altogether  prevent 
the  aeroplane  from  doing  its  work,  the  equally 
obvious  thing  to  do  is  to  obtain  an  efficient  fleet  of 
machines,  as  well  as  batteries  of  guns. 


THIRTEENTH    SECTION 

DESTRUCTIVE     POTENTIALITIES     OF     WEIGHT- 
CARRYING    AEROPLANES 

I 

What  a  modern-type  machine  can  raise — Load  of  two 
men,  and  explosives. 

In  previous  sections,  the  reconnoitring  capabilities 
of  the  war  aeroplane  have  been  dealt  with ;  but  there 
is  now  another,  and  an  increasingly-significant 
aspect  of  its  work.  This  lies  in  its  power  of 
destruction. 

In  its  early  stages,  the  aeroplane  could,  only  with 
difficulty,  raise  its  pilot  from  the  ground;  any 
weight-lifting  was  out  of  the  question.  But,  with 
the  development  of  engines,  and  the  efficiency  of 
machines  generally,  the  carrying  of  appreciable 
burdens  has  come  within  the  range  of  practical 
politics. 

A  biplane  can  be  constructed,  at  the  present  time, 
which  is  capable  of  raising  a  pilot,  an  engineer,  and 
a  load  of  explosives,  and  of  flying,  thus  loaded,  for 
several  hours  without  descending. 

Not  long  ago,  it  was  predicted  that  a  fleet  of 
weight- carrying  aeroplanes  might  be  able  to  leave 
foreign  soil  one  day,  fly  over  London,  drop  a  quan- 

202 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     203 

tity  of  explosives  on  the  city,  and  return — by  way 
of  the  air — whence  they  came. 

When  this  prediction  was  first  made,  it  was 
generally  considered  in  the  nature  of  an  impossible 
dream.  But,  nowadays,  it  has  ceased  to  be  a  wildly- 
improbable  undertaking.  With  aeroplanes  such  as 
could  be  built  at  the  present  time,  an  expedition 
of  this  character  could,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  be 
carried  out. 

But  the  aeroplane  must  first  be  perfected  as  a 
scouting  machine.  Afterwards,  may  come  its  appli- 
cation as  an  offensive  weapon.  To  ignore  the 
destructive  aspect  of  military  flying  is,  however, 
foolish. 

Foreign  countries  realise  such  possibilities; 
already,  tentative  experiments  are  being  made. 
When  reckoned  singly,  aeroplanes  have  an  insignifi- 
cant value  as  engines  of  destruction ;  but,  when 
bomb-dropping  machines  are  employed  in  large, 
well-organised  squadrons,  a  different  situation  arises. 
It  is  in  regular  fleets  that  attacking  machines  of  the 
future  will,  almost  certainly,  be  employed. 

It  was  in  1909,  after  his  cross-Channel  flight, 
that  M.  Louis  Bleriot  declared :  "  Before  long, 
military  and  naval  aeroplanes  will  he  able  to  carry 
explosives  of  the  deadHest  nature."  This  shrewd 
man  saw  what  lay  in  the  future.  At  the  time  he 
spoke,  a  flight  of  an  hour's  duration,  by  a  machine 
carrying  only  one  man,  was  an  achievement;  but, 
nowadays,  a  heavily-laden  machine  can  remain  aloft 
for  a  number  of  hours. 

Bomb-dropping  mechanism,  to  facilitate  the  dis- 
charge of  a  missile  from  an  aeroplane,  has  been 
devised.     The  bombs  are  contained  in  a  chamber 


204      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

beneath  the  aeroplane,  and  pass  thence  into  a  tube, 
which  is  pointed  towards  the  ground.  By  pressing 
a  button,  conveniently  close  to  his  driving-seat,  the 
airman  is  able  to  release  a  series  of  bombs  over  a 
given  point.  Missiles  in  the  form  of  carefully- 
weighted  arrows  have  also  been  employed — the  ex- 
plosive forming  the  head  of  the  arrow,  and  the 
projectile  being  released  from  a  special  form  of 
sighting  mechanism.  With  this  apparatus,  fairly 
good  practice  has  been  made,  from  heights  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  500  feet. 

The  experiments  so  far  made,  in  connection  with 
dropping  bombs,  show  that  considerable  practice  is 
necessary  before  accurate  aim  is  possible.  In  actual 
attacks  in  warfare,  however,  absolute  precision  would 
not  always  be  an  essential.  A  detachment  of 
machines  would  probably  pass,  one  after  another, 
over  a  given  position,  raining  down  missiles  as  they 
swept  by.  The  aim  would  be  made  as  accurate  as 
possible,  of  course ;  but  the  teUing  nature  of  the 
attack  would  He,  not  in  the  chance  of  individual 
bombs  reaching  any  precise  mark,  but  in  the  fact 
that  a  large  percentage  of  the  missiles  would  be  cal- 
culated to  do  damage  over  a  given  area. 

Among  experts  in  France  and  Germany,  who  are 
now  paying  keen  attention  to  this  question  of  a 
destructive  war  aeroplane,  it  is  considered  that  an 
incendiary  bomb  would  work  great  havoc  in  war- 
time. The  possibility  of  employing  some  such  bomb 
as  this  was  suggested  by  Lord  Charles  Beresford, 
after  he  had  witnessed  the  demonstration  organised 
by  the  Parliamentary  Aerial  Defence  Committee  in 
May,  191 1.  He  foresaw  that  aeroplanes  might  be 
able  to  drop  cylinders  of  some  highly-inflammable 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN   WAR     205 

spirit,  ignited  by  a  sensitive  fuse,  and  calculated  to 
cause  an  instant  and  violent  conflagration. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  has  already  been  realised  that 
several  types  of  bomb  are  likely  to  be  employed  in 
aerial  warfare,  according  to  the  targets  which  are 
aimed  at.  In  an  attack  upon  supply  stores,  for  ex- 
ample, an  incendiary  bomb  may  be  used,  so  that  the 
contents  may  be  set  on  fire,  and  destroyed ;  and  the 
same  kind  of  missile  will  probably  be  dropped  upon 
dockyards,  arsenals,  and  magazines. 

For  the  destruction  of  bridges,  for  the  attack  upon 
troops  on  the  march,  and  for  the  bombarding  of  en- 
campments, some  special  form  of  explosive  shell  may 
be  used.  Definite  choice  of  such  a  shell  has  not 
yet  been  made ;  but  here,  again,  experimental  work 
has  already  been  commenced  abroad. 

In  England,  realising  the  importance  of  this 
question.  Sir  Hiram  Maxim  has  recently  been  en- 
gaging himself  with  the  production  of  a  lOO-lb. 
aerial  projectile  likely  to  create  a  maximum  amount 
of  damage  when  striking  the  ground. 

Aerial  bombardment,  if  systematically  carried  out, 
will  certainly  add  another  terror  to  modern  war ;  and 
the  question  is  sometimes  asked  whether  nations 
have  a  right,  according  to  the  agreements  of  the 
Hague  Convention,  to  employ  such  a  means  of 
attack.  The  position,  so  far  as  the  last  convention 
was  concerned,  was  that  certain  nations,  notably 
France  and  Germany,  did  not  become  signatories 
to  a  rule,  proposing  that  aerial  bomb-dropping  should 
be  disallowed. 

Such  a  practical  airman  as  M.  Vedrines  is  enthusi- 
astic regarding  the  offensive  powers  of  a  modern 
aeroplane,  when  skilfully  handled.     His  view  is  that 


206      THE  AEEOPLANE  IN  WAR 

a  large  and  well-organised  squadron  of  weight- 
carrying  machines  should  be  able  to  render  almost 
useless  a  fleet  of  ships. 

Naval  men  would,  no  doubt,  regard  such  a 
statement  as  being  an  exaggeration.  The  aim  of 
an  aeroplanist,  when  directing  his  bomb  against  a 
moving  ship,  would  frequently  be  inaccurate,  they 
claim ;  and  they  also  affirm  that  an  aeroplane  would 
not  be  able  to  carry  bombs  sufficiently  large  and 
deadly  to  do  much  damage,  even  if  one  did,  occa- 
sionally, reach  its  mark. 

But  here  the  argument  is  based  upon  the  possible 
use  of  one  machine,  and  not  of  a  fleet.  One  aero- 
plane, dropping  a  few  bombs  on  a  fleet  of  ships, 
would  naturally  produce  an  insignificant  result.  But 
what  of  the  results  achieved  by  several  hundred,  and 
perhaps  of  a  thousand  ?  In  such  a  case,  there  would 
not  be  one  bomb  to  contend  against,  but  a  volley  of 
missiles. 

M.  Vedrines,  whose  opinion  was  quoted  above, 
is  a  believer  in  the  speed  of  the  aeroplane,  as  aiding 
its  powers  of  attack.  In  regard  to  a  possible  war 
between  France  and  Germany,  he  has  declared  that, 
within  an  hour  of  the  declaration  of  such  a  war,  a 
corps  of  French  airmen  could  be  over  the  frontier, 
attacking,  with  their  bombs,  all  great  railway  junc- 
tions and  forts  on  German  soil. 

The  rapidity  with  which  an  aeroplane  onslaught 
can  be  made  should,  indeed,  prove  one  of  the  most 
important  features  of  aerial  warfare.  Destructive 
machines  may  fly  from  their  Headquarters,  deliver 
an  attack  fifty  or  a  hundred  miles  away,  and — their 
ammunition  exhausted — return  quickly  to  their  base 
for  more,  and  so  be  ready  to  renew  the  attack. 


II 

Effect  of  aerial  bombardment  upon  cities  and  troops — 
German  tests. 

It  was  after  a  seven  years'  study  of  military 
aviation,  as  Commandant  of  the  British  Government 
Balloon  School,  that  Colonel  J.  E.  Capper  declared 
emphatically :  "  The  necessity  has  arisen  for  every 
warlike  nation  to  have  a  sufficient  aerial  fleet,  armed 
and  equipped  for  offensive  warfare." 

His  advice,  however,  was  not  adopted — at  any 
rate,  not  by  the  War  Office.  No  steps  have  yet  been 
taken  to  estimate  the  value  of  an  aeroplane  as  a  de- 
structive instrument,  despite  the  fact  that  France  and 
Germany  are  keenly  alive  to  the  possibiHties  of  a 
large  number  of  weight-carrying  machines. 

In  Germany,  at  the  present  time,  secret  tests  and 
experiments  are  being  made,  and  the  construction 
of  special  machines  undertaken.  Meanwhile,  we 
fumble  along.  If  a  war  broke  out  to-morrow,  it  is 
true  that  destructive  work  by  aeroplanes,  on  anything 
like  a  large  scale,  would  not  be  undertaken. 

But  what  about  the  day  after  to-morrow — or  rather 
next  year?  Every  day,  the  general  efficiency  of  the 
aeroplane  is  being  improved,  and  its  radius  of  action 
increased.  Practically  every  day,  also,  foreign 
nations  are  adding  to  their  air-fleets.  Already  the 
art  of  employing  aircraft  in  fairly  large  numbers  has 
been  learned.  Machines  for  destructive  work  can 
now  be  built — and  are  being  built;  and  yet  we  are 
content,  as  yet,  to  do  nothing. 

207 


208      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

Sufficient  warning  has  been  given.  Colonel 
Templer,  an  officer  identified  with  the  first  Govern- 
ment aeronautical  work  undertaken  in  England,  has 
declared :  "  It  is  conclusively  proved  that  the  aero- 
plane is  a  machine  for  carrying  out  attacks  in 
warfare.  We  must,  therefore,  be  prepared  not  only 
for  defence  against  bomb-dropping  aeroplanes;  we 
must  be  prepared,  if  necessary,  to  use  them." 

Another  military  expert  of  high  repute,  speaking 
of  the  havoc  that  a  hostile  air-fleet  might  work,  by 
an  attack  upon  the  Thames  Valley  between  Ham- 
mersmith and  Gravesend,  has  observed :  "  This 
whole  fifty  miles  of  concentrated  essence  of  Empire 
lies  at  the  absolute  mercy  of  an  aerial  machine,  which 
could  plant  a  dozen  incendiary  missiles  in  certain 
pre-selected  spots." 

The  point  to  be  considered,  in  this  connection, 
is  this:  such  an  aerial  attack  is  no  longer  a  vague 
possibility.  It  was  only  the  other  day,  while 
discussing  the  destructive  capabilities  of  modern- 
type  aeroplanes,  that  a  famous  constructer  showed 
how — if  a  large  fleet  of  machines  was  marshalled 
together — it  would  be  possible  for  an  enemy  to  drop 
a  couple  of  hundred  tons  of  explosive  matter  upon 
London,  suddenly  appearing  from  across  the  Chan- 
nel by  air,  and  as  flying  quickly  back  agam. 

What  such  an  aerial  attack  as  this  would  mean 
has  been  pictured  by  Lord  Montagu  of  Beaulieu. 
Suppose  London  was  thus  assailed,  from  the  air,  at 
the  beginning  of  a  war,  he  says:  What  would  the 
result  be?  Imagine  the  Stock  Exchange,  the  chief 
banks,  the  great  railway  stations,  and  our  means  of 
communication  destroyed.  "  Such  a  blow  at  the  very 
heart    of   the    Empire,"    declares    Lord    Montagu, 


•     »  t^    ) 


«    •      •  ^ 


-^         <-: 


8 
-  P 
II 

h 

o  *" 


Q  o 


CI  tyZ 
O 

C 


THE  AEROPLANE   IN  WAR     209 

"  would  be  like  paralysing  the  nerves  of  a  strong 
man,  with  a  soporific,  before  he  had  to  fight  for  his 
life :  the  muscular  force  would  remain,  but  the  brains 
would  be  powerless  to  direct." 

When  delivering  an  attack  upon  a  city,  a  squa- 
dron of  aeroplanes  engaged  in  such  work  would,  de- 
clare military  experts  who  have  specially  studied  the 
problem,  probably  sweep  over  the  principal  buildings 
in  a  long  line,  dropping  bombs  as  they  flew.  Then 
they  would  wheel  round,  and  return  over  the  same 
area,  again  releasing  a  certain  number  of  missiles. 
The  disastrous  effect  of  such  an  aerial  bombardment, 
carried  out  systematically  by  a  large  number  of 
machines,  may  readily  be  imagined. 

Although,  as  has  been  mentioned,  German  experi- 
mental work,  regarding  the  value  of  aeroplanes  for 
punitive  work,  has  been  kept  very  secret,  the  result 
of  one  interesting  test,  at  least,  has  become  known. 
In  this  case,  a  squadron  of  dragoons  was  specially 
employed  to  give  realism  to  the  experiment. 

The  squadron  was  directed  to  move  a  certain  dis- 
tance away  from  one  of  the  German  air-stations,  and 
then  camp  for  the  night.  This  was  done.  Then 
two  army  airmen,  flying  biplanes,  set  off  to  deliver 
a  night  attack  upon  the  encampment.  Beneath 
their  machines,  they  carried  a  bomb-dropping 
apparatus  such  as  has  already  been  described. 

Locating  the  bivouac  by  its  fires,  the  two  airmen 
stopped  their  engines,  and  planed  down  silently  from 
a  considerable  altitude.  Neither  of  the  aeroplanes 
was  seen,  by  the  dragoons,  until  it  was  right  over 
them.  Then  the  attacking  airmen  released  a  stream 
of  dummy  bombs,  which  fell  all  about  the  camp-fires. 
Immediately    they   had   done    so,    and    before   the 


210      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

dragoons  had  recovered  from  their  surprise,  the 
pilots  started  their  engines,  and  disappeared  again 
into  the  darkness. 

Seeing  that  it  was  purely  experimental,  and  that 
neither  officer-airmen  was  skilled  in  such  work,  the 
result  of  this  mock  attack  was  surprising.  Had 
actual  war  conditions  prevailed,  and  had  the  bombs 
been  real  ones,  death  would  have  been  scattered 
through  the  bivouac,  the  horses  would  probably 
have  stampeded,  and  a  general  scene  of  confusion 
would  have  ensued. 

And  this  is  a  most  important  point:  so  swift  and 
unexpected  was  the  night  attack  that  the  machines 
only  came  into  view  just  at  the  moment  they  were 
releasing  their  bombs.  This  would  probably  have 
meant  that,  in  warfare,  they  would  have  escaped 
without  an  effective  shot  being  fired  at  them. 

By  such  tests  as  these,  regarding  which,  as  a 
general  rule,  nothing  becomes  pubHc,  the  German 
military  authorities  are  obtaining  data  that  is  invalu- 
able concerning  the  destructive  potentialities  of  the 
war  aeroplane.  Apart  from  the  actual  damage  done 
by  such  a  night  attack  as  has  been  described,  there 
is  its  moral  effect  to  be  considered — and  this  point  is 
regarded  as  an  important  one  by  foreign  experts. 

Nothing,  they  think,  could  be  more  harassing  or 
wearying  for  troops,  during  a  hard  campaign,  than 
to  be  attacked,  night  after  night,  by  squadrons  of 
aeroplanes.  Incessant  watchfulness,  and  conse- 
quent loss  of  rest,  would  be  involved,  and  a  general 
feeling  of  uneasiness  would  be  occasioned. 

It  is  now  considered  feasible  to  carry  a  light 
machine-gun  upon  an  aeroplane,  and  to  use  it  effec- 
tively.      With   such  guns,   skilfully  handled,   it  is 


THE   AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     211 

considered  that  attacks  could  be  delivered  upon  re- 
serve troops,  upon  artillery  trains,  upon  the  horses 
of  guns  in  action,  and  upon  troops  when  on  the 
march. 

Considerable  experience,  in  handling  a  machine- 
gun  on  an  aeroplane  will,  probably,  be  necessary 
before  accuracy  can  be  obtained ;  but  military  men, 
who  are  most  competent  to  speak,  see  no  difficulty  in 
equipping  an  aeroplane  with  such  a  gun,  and  in 
obtaining  satisfactory  results. 

In  conclusion,  it  may  be  taken  that  the  offensive 
possibilities  of  the  aeroplane  grow,  from  day  to  day. 
Machines  are  built  to  fly  faster,  and  to  carry  heavier 
weights.  In  future,  so  far  as  the  question  of  this 
destructive  work  of  machines  is  concerned,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  reckon  air-fleets  not  in  hundreds,  but  in 
thousands. 

At  the  moment,  as  has  been  said,  the  reconnoitring 
machine  is  engaging  most  attention ;  but  an  aero- 
plane for  destructive  use  is  being  kept  well  in  mind, 
none  the  less.  Its  appearance,  as  a  weapon  of  war, 
is  merely  a  matter  of  time. 

What  may  be  accomplished,  by  a  fleet  of  aero- 
planes bent  upon  destruction,  has  only  been  hinted 
at  in  this  section ;  but  it  should  serve  its  purpose — 
which  is  to  show  that  no  country  can  afford  to  ignore 
what  the  future  promises  in  this  respect. 


FOURTEENTH    SECTION 

WAR   IN   THE   AIR   BETWEEN   HOSTILE   AEROPLANES 

I 

Certainty  of  a  combat  between  aeroplanes  in  actual  war- 
fare— Air-scouts  protected  by  aerial  ''  cruisers." 

"  The  duty  of  an  aerial  fleet,  armed  and  equipped 
for  offensive  warfare,  will  be  to  put  out  of  action 
an  enemy*s  aerial  force  before  it  can  carry  out  its 
role  of  reconnoitring — or  attacking  vital  points  of 
communication." 

In  these  words,  a  military  authority  of  international 
repute  indicates  the  war  in  the  air  which  will,  in- 
evitably, take  place  in  connection  with  any  future 
European  campaign. 

His  view  is  endorsed  by  another  famous  expert, 
who  declares :  "  It  is  certain  that  the  consequences 
of  the  use  of  aerial  navigation  will  be  to  bring  about, 
at  the  very  outset  of  hostilities,  a  fight  to  the  death 
between  opposing  aerial  fleets." 

The  point  that  miHtary  authorities  have  come  to 
recognise,  of  course,  is  this :  if  the  flying  machine 
is  of  vital  importance  to  one  side,  it  will  prove  equally 
valuable  to  the  other.  Therefore,  the  aim  of  one 
Commander-in-Chief  will  be  to  take  steps  to  prevent 

212 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     213 

his  opponent  from  deriving  full  benefit  from  his 
aerial  scouts. 

Artillery-fire  has  been  quoted,  previously,  as  a 
means  of  combating  the  aeroplane,  and  destroying 
reconnoitring  craft.  But  this  method  has  been 
shown  to  be  uncertain.  What  is  considered  a  far 
more  efficacious  way  of  hampering  the  operations  of 
an  enemy's  air-scouts,  is  to  send  up  machines  to  meet 
them  in  the  air,  and  either  drive  them  off,  or  put  them 
out  of  action. 

This  suggests  an  actual  contest,  in  mid-air, 
between  two  hostile  craft;  and  such  aerial  battles 
are  bound  to  occur.  The  most  efficacious  weapons, 
for  such  fighting,  experience  alone  will  indicate ; 
but  it  is  obvious  that  the  ramming  of  one  machine 
by  another  will  not  be  resorted  to.  Were  one  aero- 
plane to  charge  an  enemy's  vessel,  the  result  would 
be  the  fall  and  destruction  of  both  aircraft.  Such 
an  expedient  might,  of  course,  be  resorted  to  as  a 
last  desperate  move,  say  in  the  case  where  a  hostile 
aircraft  was  escaping  with  very  valuable  information. 

What  is  anticipated,  in  the  way  of  a  fighting 
aeroplane,  is  a  machine  which  will  carry  two  men,, 
a  pilot  and  a  marksman,  and  be  armed  with  some 
form  of  small  quick-firing  gun  or  rifle. 

One  of  the  experts  of  the  French  army  air- 
corps  thinks  that  a  war  aeroplane,  in  the  immedi- 
ate future,  will  carry  a  pilot,  observer,  and  combatant. 
This  combatant,  in  his  opinion,  should  be  armed 
with  a  light  repeating  rifle,  ready  to  ward  off  the 
attacks  of  other  machines. 

This  suggests  that  a  reconnoitring  aeroplane 
should  be  a  fighting  unit  as  well;  but  other  views 
entertained  are  that  a  scouting  aircraft  should  be 


214      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

accompanied  by  one  or  more  fighting  aeroplanes,  the 
duties  of  which  would  be  to  protect  it  from  attack. 

It  seems  probable,  in  fact,  that  armed  aeroplanes 
will  accompany  each  reconnoitring  machine  when  it 
is  about  to  set  out  over  the  enemy's  position.  These 
armed  craft,  or  aerial  cruisers,  will  most  likely  circle 
round  the  scouting  machine,  so  as  to  open  fire  upon 
any  hostile  aeroplanes  which  approach. 

In  such  an  arrangement  as  this,  the  reconnoitring 
machine  would  probably  be  a  slow-flying,  rehable 
biplane,  equipped  exclusively  for  its  work  of  observa- 
tion. The  fighting  machines,  on  the  other  hand,  would 
be  built  for  speed.  Fast-flying,  strongly-built  mono- 
planes would  most  likely  be  used  ;  and  one  prominent 
constructer  suggests  that  such  fighting  units  should 
be  fitted  with  a  gun  firing  a  small  explosive  shell, 
something  hke  a  "  pom-pom."  Such  a  form  of  arma- 
ment would  certainly  be  effective ;  and  such  an  aerial 
cruiser  is  likely  to  prove  a  formidable  opponent. 

In  connection  with  the  carrying  of  guns  upon  an 
aeroplane,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  a  light  machine- 
gun  has  already  been  fitted  to  a  biplane;  but  little 
has  been  said  about  such  tests,  and  nothing  definite, 
in  the  way  of  experiments,  has,  as  yet,  been  recorded. 

In  connection  with  the  aerial  battles  that  are 
certain  to  precede  the  land  actions  of  the  future,  it 
is  difficult  to  foresee,  exactly,  what  method  will  be 
pursued  by  the  Commanders  of  two  rival  Air  Bat- 
talions. It  is  fairly  clear,  however,  that  each  will 
seek  to  prevent  a  hostile  aeroplane  from  coming 
within  observation  distance  of  his  forces ;  and,  at  the 
same  time,  by  such  strategy  as  wide  detours,  each 
will  endeavour  to  slip  reconnoitring  craft  through 
the  enemy's  lines. 


THE  AEROPLANE   IN  WAR     215 

In  the  elaboration  of  any  such  plans  of  campaign, 
it  is  obvious  that  the  fighting  units  of  the  air-fleet — • 
the  fast  "  cruisers  "  which  will  carry  machine-guns — 
will  come  into  speedy  conflict.  Combat,  probably, 
will  resolve  itself  into  a  question  of  manoeuvring  for 
position ;  then  the  opponents  will  open  fire.  Marks- 
manship and  skill  in  handling  a  machine  will  spell 
all  the  difference  between  victory  and  defeat.  After 
a  preliminary  exchange  of  shots,  two  machines  will 
sweep  into  closer  range,  and  then  one  of  them, 
"  winged  "  by  well-directed  fire,  will  be  put  out  of 
action,  and  will  flutter  away  earthwards. 

It  is  obvious  that  an  exceptionally  fast,  high- 
powered  aeroplane,  capable  of  rising  at  a  maximum 
speed,  will  be  most  suitable  for  hostile  work  against 
other  machines. 

The  question  has  been  discussed  as  to  protecting, 
with  some  form  of  armour,  the  vital  parts  of  aircraft 
for  offensive  work.  It  seems  likely  that  some 
such  plan  will  be  adopted. 


II 

An  encounter  in  the  air — Importance  to  an  army  of  an 
aerial  victory. 

It  was  the  late  Captain  Ferber — one  of  the  first 
military  enthusiasts  in  France  upon  the  subject  of 
the  aeroplane — ^who  was  asked  the  question :  "How 
will  a  fight  take  place  between  aeroplanes  ?  "  In 
reply,  this  famous  pioneer  said: — 

"  In  the  same  way  as  all  fights  between  birds 
have  ever  taken  place.     When  a  falcon,  for  in 


216      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

stance,  wants  to  attack  a  raven,  it  first  pursues  it ; 
and,  as  soon  as  the  raven  finds  itself  overhauled, 
it  ascends  slowly,  in  spirals,  and  the  falcon  starts 
to  rise  in  a  parallel  fine.  If  the  raven  can  rise 
higher  than  the  falcon,  it  is  saved;  if  it  cannot, 
its  resource  is  to  drop  to  earth,  although  during 
the  descent  it  is  liable  to  be  hemmed  in  by  the 
falcon.  Every  time  the  falcon  darts  upon  the 
raven,  the  latter  will  try,  by  means  of  a  clever 
side-slip,  to  avoid  the  impact.  If  the  falcon  has 
been  dodged,  there  is  a  respite,  for,  carried  beyond 
its  aim,  the  falcon  loses  an  elevation  which  it  must 
painfully  regain.  The  race  for  altitude  may  re- 
commence, but  now  the  flight  is  no  longer  doubt- 
ful ;  the  raven  will  finally  come  to  the  ground,  and 
will  be  vanquished.  In  a  like  manner,  will  aerial 
craft  struggle." 

An  abiHty  to  "  climb  "  rapidly,  combined  with  high 
speed  will,  indeed,  prove  invaluable  to  the  fighting 
aeroplane.  If  it  can  do  so,  it  will  undoubtedly  seek 
to  rise  above  an  antagonist,  and  destroy  it  with  a 
well-directed  missile.  If  two  machines  are  equally 
well-matched  in  the  matter  of  rapid  soaring  and 
speed,  their  pilots  will  then  exercise  all  possible  skill 
in  manoeuvring  for  position  for  an  effective  shot  from 
whatever  form  of  light  machine-gun  is  carried. 

The  certainty  that  aerial  fighting  will  precede  any 
future  battle  in  which  aeroplanes  are  employed, 
indicates  the  necessity  to  build  an  air-fleet  comprising 
several  types  of  machines.  In  the  first  place,  there 
will  be  need  for  an  aircraft,  either  a  large  mono- 
plane, or  an  exceptionally  fast  biplane,  which  will 
carry  a  machine-gun,  or  a  gun  throwing  an  explosive 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     217 

shell.  This  machine  should  act  purely  as  an  offensive 
unit,  going  in  advance  of  other  craft,  and  meeting 
the  enemy's  "  air  cruisers  "  in  combat. 

Then  may  come  a  machine  to  carry  out  the  impor- 
tant work  of  detailed  reconnoitring.  This,  as  has 
already  been  suggested,  should  be  a  biplane,  carry- 
ing if  necessary  a  "  crew  "  of  three — pilot,  engineer, 
and  observer.  This  machine  would  have  one  object 
only — to  obtain  full  and  accurate  information  con- 
cerning an  enemy's  movements. 

Protected  by  one  or  more  "cruisers,"  it  would 
probably  ascend  to  a  great  height,  and  seek  to  slip 
by  the  enemy's  aerial  line  of  defence,  or  make  a  wide 
detour  and  approach  the  foe  from  an  unexpected 
direction. 

A  third  type  of  machine  should,  it  is  held,  be 
used  for  swift,  comprehensive  survey  work.  This 
machine,  carrying  merely  its  pilot,  would  be  a  mono- 
plane so  speedy  that  it  would  frequently  be  able  to 
elude  the  pursuit  of  any  armed  craft,  and  so  escape 
destruction. 

This  problem  of  aerial  warfare  is  now  very  much 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  are  concerned  in  the  mili- 
tary flying  work  of  France,  Germany,  and  Russia. 
Quite  recently,  for  example,  one  of  Russia's  chief 
advisers,  in  the  matter  of  war  aeroplanes,  declared: 
"  It  is  now  clear  that  future  wars  will  be  begun  in 
the  air,  and  that  nations  will  be  best  prepared  that 
are  well-equipped  with  miHtary  aeroplanes."  This 
statement,  bearing  out  others  previously  quoted, 
shows  how  general  is  the  view  that  aerial  fighting 
will  play  a  prominent  part  in  any  application  of  the 
aeroplane  to  actual  war  conditions. 

Apart  from  the  "cruiser"  type  of  machine,  pre- 


218      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

viously  described,  it  is  suggested  by  many  experts 
that  a  fighting  aeroplane,  carrying  a  heavier  gun  or 
guns — a  sort  of  aerial  "  Dreadnought,"  in  fact — 
should  be  constructed.  The  aim  of  such  a  machine 
would  be  to  attack  antagonists  at  long  range. 

Provided  that  they  could  vanquish  aerial  foes, 
these  armed  aeroplanes  would,  no  doubt,  turn  their 
attention  to  the  bombardment  of  fortifications,  and 
land  forces;  and,  the  resistance  of  an  enemy  being 
crushed,  the  air-scouts  would  be  free  to  fly  where 
they  pleased. 

Thus  a  reverse  in  the  air  would  prove  a  very  serious 
matter  indeed,  for  any  army.  The  Commander-in- 
Chief  would  have  all  his  plans  laid  bare  by  the  un- 
hampered movements  of  the  enemy's  aeroplanes; 
and,  at  the  same  time,  he  would  be  unable  to  obtain 
any  data  concerning  his  antagonist's  dispositions. 
This,  of  course,  would  be  apart  from  the  damage 
that  attacking  aeroplanes  might  effect  by  bomb- 
dropping  and  machine-gun  firing. 

Many  experts,  indeed,  are  found  to  declare  that 
a  defeat  in  the  air  would  be  followed  by  a  reverse 
on  land.  It  is  clear,  at  any  rate,  that  great  impor- 
tance will  attach  to  this  aerial  fighting. 

A  machine  regularly  equipped  for  aerial  warfare 
has  yet  to  be  introduced — but  it  is  merely  a  question 
of  time,  and  probably  a  short  time  at  that,  before  such 
a  machine  is  built  and  tested. 

The  handling  of  such  fighting  aircraft  will  have 
to  be  learned,  also  the  best  modes  of  approaching 
and  attacking  a  hostile  aeroplane.  Experimental 
machines  will  have  to  be  built,  and  flown,  and  as 
effective  manoeuvres  as  possible  carried  out.  But  it 
will  be  a  great  war,  of  course,  which  will  teach  the 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     219 

real  lessons  concerning  the  offensive  possibilities  of 
the  aeroplane. 

Until  then,  of  course,  much  must  remain  more 
or  less  theoretical.  But  it  behoves  great  nations 
to  beware  of  these  grim  potentialities  of  the  new 
"  arm." 


FIFTEENTH    SECTION 

VALUE  OF  THE  AEROPLANE  IN  NAVAL  WARFARE 

I 

Machines   for  coastal  and  high-seas  work — Question  of 
flying  in  winds. 

The  work  of  the  aeroplane,  when  co-operating 
with  land  forces,  is  all-important,  as  has  been  shown ; 
and  another  field,  just  as  useful,  Hes  in  the  utiHsation 
of  air-scouts  in  naval  warfare. 

The  possibilities  of  the  aeroplane  in  this  direction 
are,  however,  only  just  being  realised.  To  the  credit 
of  France  goes  the  first  definite  steps.  At  Toulon, 
the  French  naval  authorities  are  keenly  alive  to  the 
value  of  aerial  scouting  over  the  sea.  Plans  have 
been  made  for  dispatching  aeroplanes  from  the  decks 
of  cruisers ;  and  reconnoitring  flights  from  the  land, 
over  the  sea,  are  now  being  undertaken. 

During  the  present  year  France  will  spend 
/"  40,000  upon  naval  aviation,  quite  apart  from  her 
disbursement  in  other  respects. 

Germany  is  training  naval  airmen,  and  experiment- 
ing with  aeroplanes  for  use  at  sea.  Austria  has 
established  an  experimental  station.  In  England — 
since  Lieutenant  (now  Commander)  Samson  rose 
from  the  deck  of  a  warship  at  Sheerness — the  Admi- 
ralty is  credited  with  an  ambitious  programme.     In 

220 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     221 

America,  highly-practical  work  has  been  done  in  the 
way  of  building  aircraft  to  rise  from  the  water;  and, 
in  France,  the  Voisins  have  built  a  machine  that  Hfts 
itself  from  the  surface  of  the  Seine.  Farman,  too,  is 
building  successful  hydro-aeroplanes. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  their  work  in  naval 
warfare,  a  very  important  future  lies  before  the  aero- 
plane. So  far  as  can  be  judged  at  the  present  time, 
it  is  possible  to  divide  naval  aeroplanes  into  two  cate- 
gories: I,  coastal  aeroplanes;  and  2,  aeroplanes  for 
use  on  the  high  seas. 

The  former  should  be  stationed  at  harbours  and 
other  sea-coast  points  of  strategetic  importance.  The 
latter  would  be  carried  to  sea  with  a  fleet,  and  sent 
up,  when  desired,  from  the  deck  of  a  ship. 

The  coastal  aeroplane  would  be  invaluable  in 
locating  the  approach  of  some  attacking  fleet.  A 
machine  would  be  sent  up  from  a  harbour  and,  flying 
high  and  at  a  great  pace,  would  be  able  to  scour 
a  wide  area  of  water  in  a  surprisingly  short  space 
of  time.  Upon  sighting  an  enemy's  fleet,  the  air- 
scout  would  be  able  to  gauge  its  strength,  and 
then  dash  back  to  its  Headquarters  at  astonishing 
speed. 

A  fast-flying  monoplane,  acting  as  an  observing 
craft,  would  be  able  to  perform  the  work  which  would 
otherwise  need  the  services  of  several  cruisers,  or 
a  number  of  torpedo-boat  destroyers. 

As  regards  the  aeroplane  for  work  on  the  high 
seas,  this  should  operate  in  conjunction  with  a 
specially-built  fast  steamer,  or  an  auxiliary  cruiser. 
Such  a  vessel,  with  one  or  more  aeroplanes  on  board, 
would  accompany  a  fleet.  When  an  air-scout  was 
wanted,  it  would  be  brought  on  deck  and  assembled, 


222      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

and  would  then  be   launched  into  the   air  from  a 
special  platform  on  the  vessel's  deck. 

After  making  a  reconnoitring  flight,  the  machine 
would  return  to  the  parent  ship,  and  alight  upon  the 
deck.  By  means  of  such  air-scouts,  the  position  of 
an  enemy's  fleet  could  first  be  detected,  and  then  a 
careful  watch  kept  upon  its  subsequent  movements. 

The  results  gleaned  would  be  more  trustworthy 
than  those  obtained  from  the  look-out  of  a  warship ; 
and  the  field  of  vision  would,  also,  be  infinitely  wider. 
What  would  be  of  great  importance,  of  course,  in 
connection  with  such  aerial  observations,  would  be 
for  the  pilot  of  the  machine  to  report  what  he  saw  by 
means  of  wireless  telegraphy.  There  is  no  reason 
why  this  should  not  be  done.  A  well-organised 
service  of  naval  aeroplanes,  fitted  with  long-distance 
wireless,  should,  indeed,  prove  of  vital  importance. 

The  point  has  been  made,  by  critics  of  the  aero- 
plane for  naval  use,  that  the  high  winds  often  en- 
countered at  sea  would  limit  the  uses  of  aircraft. 
But,  in  reply  to  that,  experienced  airmen  point  out 
that,  although  winds  at  sea  are  high,  they  are  also 
steady — far  steadier,  in  fact,  than  those  which  blow 
over  the  land,  and  are  broken  up  into  eddies  by  pass- 
ing over  uneven  ground. 

A  thirty-mile-an-hour  wind,  over  the  land,  repre- 
sents to-day  quite  as  much  as  any  airman  would  care 
to  contend  against,  in  the  ordinary  way ;  but  it  should 
be  possible,  with  a  high-speed  monoplane  of  existing 
type,  to  carry  out  reconnoitring  work,  over  the  sea, 
in  a  wind  blowing  at  the  rate  of  forty  miles  an  hour. 
The  even  force  of  the  sea  wind  would  make  all  the 
difference. 

It  may  be  anticipated,  also,  that  this  wind-flying 


THE   AEROPLANE   IN   WAR     223 

capacity  of  the  aeroplane,  for  work  at  sea,  will  rise 
from,  say,  forty  to  fifty  mil^s  an  hour,  as  the  speed 
of  machines  is  increased.  There  is,  indeed,  every 
chance  that  a  naval  aeroplane  will  be  able  to  give 
a  good  account  of  itself — even  under  adverse  weather 
conditions. 


II 

Interesting  tests — Machines  for  rising  from  water,   and 
landing  on  a  ship's  deck. 

In  America  a  number  of  interesting  tests  have 
been  made  with  aeroplanes  for  naval  use.  It  was  in 
this  country  that  Mr  Eugene  Ely,  a  skilled  airman — 
who  has  since,  unfortunately,  met  with  his  death — 
first  demonstrated  the  practicability  of  alighting  upon, 
and  rising  from,  the  deck  of  a  battleship. 

At  the  time  the  test  was  made,  the  American 
cruiser  Pennsylvania  was  lying  about  twelve  miles 
off  San  Francisco.  For  the  purpose  of  the  experi- 
ment, a  wooden  platform  was  erected  at  the  cruiser's 
stern,  upon  which  the  airman  expressed  his  intention 
of  descending. 

Ely,  flying  a  Curtiss  biplane,  left  the  shore  in  a 
slight  mist,  being  guided  as  he  approached  his 
destination  by  the  syren  blasts  of  the  Pennsylvania. 
When  sighted  by  those  on  the  cruiser,  he  was  flying 
low,  quite  close  to  the  surface  of  the  water. 

The  airman  steered  past  the  Pennsylvania's  bow. 
Then  he  rose  a  little,  and  made  a  half-circle  in  the 
air.  Smoothly  approaching  the  vessel's  stern,  he 
stopped  his  engine,  and  settled  with  absolute  pre- 
cision upon  the  platform. 


224      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

After  a  short  rest,  Ely  added  to  the  practical 
interest  of  his  performance  by  rising  from  the 
cruiser's  deck,  and  flying  back  to  his  starting-point, 
a  field  on  the  outskirts  of  San  Francisco. 

American  naval  men  were  naturally  impressed  by 
this  performance,  and  also  by  a  series  of  experiments 
which  were  carried  out  by  Mr  Glen  H.  Curtiss,  the 
builder  of  the  biplane  which  bears  his  name. 

Mr  Curtiss  designed  a  biplane  which  would  float 
upon  the  water  on  pontoons,  and  also  rise  from  the 
surface  of  the  water  when  it  moved  forward  at  a 
certain  speed. 

Considerable  ingenuity  was  exercised  in  the  con- 
struction of  this  machine.  The  pontoons  upon  which 
it  was  mounted,  and  which  took  the  place  of  ordinary 
land  wheels,  were  hollow  boxes  with  pointed  ends, 
made  out  of  wood,  and  sheathed  with  thin  steel. 

A  large  pontoon,  under  the  centre  of  the  biplane, 
bore  the  greater  part  of  the  weight,  and  a  smaller 
pontoon  was  set  under  the  front  of  the  machine; 
while  a  third  pontoon,  smaller  still,  was  placed  at 
the  extreme  forward  end  of  the  aeroplane,  to  tilt  it 
upward  when  it  began  to  move  across  the  water. 

First  tests  with  this  machine  were  entirely  suc- 
cessful. When  forced  forward  by  its  propeller,  at 
a  speed  of  thirty  miles  an  hour,  the  hydro-aeroplane 
skimmed  along  with  only  its  main  pontoon  on  the 
water.  Then,  at  a  slight  acceleration,  it  rose  easily 
into  the  air,  and  flew  off.  Descents  upon  the  surface 
of  the  water  were  made  with  equal  facility. 

After  satisfying  himself  that  his  machine  answered 
expectations,  Curtiss  carried  out  an  instructive  test 
in  conjunction  with  an  American  battleship.  Flying 
from  a  point  on  shore,  he  made  a  successful  descent 


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THE   AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     225 

upon  the  water  close  beside  the  vessel.  Then  his 
machine  was  hoisted  on  board,  by  means  of  special 
tackle. 

To  complete  the  test,  the  biplane  was  subsequently- 
lowered  into  the  water  again ;  and  Curtiss  rose  with- 
out difficulty,  flying  back  to  the  shore. 

The  objection  to  such  a  scheme  as  this,  of  course, 
would  lie  in  the  probable  roughness  of  the  sea  under 
many  conditions  of  work.  Were  a  high  sea  running, 
it  is  generally  admitted  that  an  aeroplane  could  not 
possibly  rise  from,  or  land  upon,  the  surface  of  the 
water.  Therefore,  the  sound  plan,  at  any  rate  on 
the  high  seas,  would  seem  to  be  for  an  air-scout  to 
be  launched  from  the  deck  of  a  ship. 

An  aeroplane  on  pontoons  should,  however,  find 
many  uses  for  coastal  work.  It  could,  for  example, 
be  housed  in  a  shed  on  the  water.  It  could  then 
leave  harbour  on  a  reconnoitring  flight,  and  return 
again,  when  alighting,  to  the  smooth  water  inside 
the  harbour.  An  involuntary  descent,  when  over 
the  water,  would  not  cause  it  injury. 

Apart  from  the  work  which  it  could  perform  as  a 
scout,  using  wireless  telegraphy  to  flash  back  its 
news  to  a  parent  ship,  there  are  also  the  destructive 
possibilities  of  a  naval  aeroplane  to  be  considered. 
In  this  regard,  however,  many  experts  do  not  con- 
sider that  the  potentialities  of  a  naval  aircraft  would 
be  so  important  as  those  of  a  machine  operating  with 
land  forces. 

An  attack  upon  a  warship  by  aeroplane  would 
not,  it  is  held,  do  much  damage  to  the  sea-craft,  the 
contention  being  that  the  aeroplane  would  not  be 
able  to  carry  bombs  sufficiently  powerful  to  effect 
any  appreciable  damage.     Another  point  made  is 


226      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

that  it  would  be  exceedingly  difficult  for  an  aero- 
planist  to  make  good  practice  with  his  bombs,  from 
the  height  at  which  he  would  have  to  fly  in  order  to 
be  comparatively  safe  from  gun-fire,  and  also  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  both  he,  and  his  target,  would  be 
moving. 

In  this  connection,  however,  there  is  much  to  be 
learned.  It  is  not  known,  as  yet,  how  powerful  a 
bomb  may  be  devised  for  the  use  of  a  destructive 
aeroplane  ;  and,  from  the  point  of  view  of  marksman- 
ship with  such  missiles,  types  of  releasing  apparatus 
are  now  being  devised  which  may  ensure  greater 
accuracy  of  aim  than  is  at  present  considered  possible. 

A  use  for  the  naval  aeroplane  would  be  to  co- 
operate with  warships  in  attack  upon  land  defences. 
A  number  of  machines  could  be  launched  from  the 
deck  of  the  parent  ship,  and  fly  over  docks  and 
harbours,  dropping  incendiary  and  explosive  bombs, 
and  effecting  considerable  damage. 

Another  effective  field  for  the  use  of  naval  aero- 
planes should  be  in  detecting  the  approach  of  sub- 
marines; but,  in  this  regard,  more  data  is  certainly 
required. 

Primarily  for  scouting,  both  from  the  land,  and 
from  a  ship  at  sea,  and  also  as  a  weapon  of  offence — 
if  used  in  sufficient  numbers — the  aeroplane  merits 
the  careful  attention  of  all  naval  authorities.  In 
England,  at  the  time  of  writing,  very  little  has  been 
done.  A  few  naval  officers  have  had  an  opportunity 
of  learning  to  fly,  owing  to  private  generosity,  and 
unimportant  experiments  have  been  made. 

A  very  large  sum  of  money  has,  however,  been 
expended  by  the  Admiralty  upon  a  huge  dirigible 
baloon,   500  feet  long,  which,   after  undergoing  a 


THE   AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     227 

tedious  period  of  construction  and  alteration  at 
Barrow,  met  with  the  untimely  end  of  being  wrecked 
by  wind-gusts  before  it  had  ever  taken  the  air. 

In  January,  however,  it  was  stated,  more  or  less 
officially,  that  the  Admiralty  intended  to  devote 
serious  attention,  during  191 2,  to  the  question  of 
naval  airmanship ;  but,  beyond  arranging  for  another 
party  of  officers  to  learn  to  fly  at  Eastchurch,  Isle  of 
Sheppey,  nothing  definite  has,  at  the  time  of  writing, 
been  done — save  that  it  is  understood  that  the 
Admiralty  has  committed  itself  to  the  construction  of 
a  smaller,  rigid-type  airship. 

For  naval  work,  beyond  doubt,  the  powerful,  high- 
speed aeroplane,  capable  of  making  progress  against 
very  strong  winds,  and  sufficiently  portable  to  be 
carried  in  appreciable  numbers  upon  a  specially- 
designed  parent  ship,  is  the  ideal — with  another 
type  of  aircraft,  larger,  and  with  a  greater  radius  of 
action,  to  act  as  a  scout  from  land  defences. 


NOTE 

Since  the  above  was  ivritten,  our  Naval  authorities 
have  decided  to  train  forty  airmen^  and  to  purchase  a 
dozen  experimental  machines,  including  hydro-aero- 
planes  of  various  makes. 


SIXTEENTH    SECTION 

AERIAL    WORK    IN    THE    FRENCH    AND    GERMAN 
AUTUMN    MANOEUVRES,     I91I 

I 

French  successes— Proof  of  the  value  of  organisation- 
Flights  in  high  winds. 

Previously  we  have  dealt  with  the  remarkable 
results  obtained,  from  the  first  use  of  aeroplanes,  in 
the  autumn  manoeuvres  in  France,  in  1910.  Now 
we  have  an  opportunity  of  describing  the  fruits  of  a 
year's  progress,  as  shown  in  the  triumphs  achieved 
during  the  autumn  operations  in  1911.  Nothing 
could,  indeed,  be  more  encouraging  to  the  French 
authorities  than  this  one  year's  work. 

By  the  time  the  autumn  manoeuvres  of  191 1  came 
along,  there  were  eighteen  military  air-stations  in 
various  parts  of  France,  and  a  preliminary  organisa- 
tion of  much  interest  had  been  created.  It  was 
decided,  therefore,  to  make  a  far  more  thorough  and 
drastic  test  of  the  value  of  the  aeroplanes  in  war  than 
had  been  attempted  in  19 10.  Thirty  machines,  com- 
prising biplanes  and  monoplanes,  and  representing 
aircraft  of  the  principal  makes,  were  detailed  to 
co-operate  with  the  manoeuvring  forces.  They  were 
divided  into  equal  corps,  and  were  instructed  to 
operate  with  the  Commanders-in-Chief  of  the  two 
forces. 

228 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     229 

The  importance  of  the  results  obtained  lay,  very 
largely,  in  the  successful  use  of  the  adjuncts  to  the 
air  service,  which  had  been  organised  during  the 
flying  season  of  191 1.  The  military  aeroplanists 
established  their  camps  near  the  Headquarters  of  the 
troops  they  were  serving,  and  collapsible  sheds,  for 
their  machines,  were  brought  up  on  special  motor- 
lorries. 

A  striking  feature  of  the  organisation,  also,  was 
the  travelling  "  atelier,"  or  workshop.  These  vehicles, 
huge  motor-vans,  with  a  skilled  staff  in  attendance, 
were  here,  there,  and  everywhere.  Their  equipment 
included  tools  capable  of  deahng  with  any  break- 
down, large  or  small. 

All  the  practice  work  carried  out  during  the 
summer,  at  the  various  military  schools,  bore  fruit. 
The  airmen  knew  their  work  and  their  machines; 
the  observers  had  made  themselves  thoroughly  pro- 
ficient in  their  duties ;  and  the  mechanics  were  quick 
and  competent.  And  it  is  such  details  as  these,  as 
has  been  said,  that  spell  success  in  aerial  work. 

Naturally  the  question  arises,  "  What  did  the  air- 
men do  ? "  The  answer  may,  truthfully,  be  made 
comprehensive.  They  did  everything — everything, 
that  is,  that  was  asked  of  them.  The  officers  of  both 
manoeuvring  forces  were  amazed  at  the  accuracy  of 
the  reconnoitring  reports  brought  in. 

Another  feature  of  the  military  airmen's  work  was 
represented  by  the  adverse  weather  conditions  in 
which  they  flew.  Here  was  a  distinct  and  unmis- 
takable evidence  of  progress.  In  19 10,  at  the 
autumn  manoeuvres,  a  wind  of  from  twenty  to 
twenty-five  miles  an  hour  had  been  the  limit  in 
which  pilots  had  cared  to  ascend.    But,  in  the  191 1 


230      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

manoeuvres,  reconnoitring  machines  were  boldly 
taken  up  in  winds  of  as  great  a  velocity  as  thirty 
and  thirty-five  miles  an  hour;  and,  in  one  or  two 
cases,  machines  were  reported  to  have  weathered 
winds  blowing  at  the  rate  of  forty  miles  an  hour. 

From  the  mihtary  point  of  view,  the  actual  demon- 
stration of  this  wind-flying  capacity  of  the  modern 
aeroplane  was  of  the  utmost  value.  It  meant  that 
there  was  practically  no  delay  in  carrying  out  instruc- 
tions. Instead  of  waiting,  as  he  would  have  been 
obliged  to  do,  occasionally,  the  previous  year,  before 
carrying  out  a  reconnoitring  flight,  the  airman  was 
promptly  in  his  machine,  and  away — despite  the 
fact  that  a  strong  and  gusty  wind  might  be  blowing. 

Another  point  demonstrated,  beyond  question, 
was  the  reliability  of  aeroplane  engines.  Pilot  after 
pilot  returned  from  aerial  journeys  without  any 
mechanical  trouble  whatever;  engine  failure,  at  first 
so  common  a  fault,  was  proved  to  have  been  almost 
eliminated. 

It  was  not  merely  a  case  of  engine  improvement ; 
the  careful  work  of  the  mechanics,  in  "  tuning  up  " 
the  motors,  had  a  great  deal  to  do  with  this  immunity 
from  breakdown.  Such  a  proof  of  reliability  was,  as 
may  be  imagined,  of  great  significance  to  those  who 
were  gauging  the  work  of  the  aeroplane  purely  from, 
the  military  point  of  view. 

Practice,  as  has  been  said,  permitted  the  ob- 
servers in  the  reconnoitring  aeroplanes  to  obtain 
significant  results.  A  test  which  was  carried  out, 
purely  to  determine  the  accuracy  of  aerial  observa- 
tion, is  worth  describing.  In  this  case,  a  fortified 
position,  some  little  distance  away  from  one  of  the 
aeroplane  camps,  had  been  largely  redesigned.    The 


THE   AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     231 

officer  in  charge  of  the  aeroplanes  decided  to  call 
upon  three  observers,  who  knew  nothing  of  the 
alterations  to  the  position  which  had  been  carried 
out,  to  make  a  reconnoitring  flight  over  the  spot,  and 
prepare  rough  maps  showing  the  location  of  the 
defences.  This,  he  thought,  would  provide  a  severe 
test  of  the  accuracy  of  each  officer's  observation. 

Previous  to  sending  away  the  three  machines  upon 
their  errand,  the  officer  had  obtained,  from  the 
Commander  of  the  fortifications,  an  exact  plan  of  the 
new  defences;  he  was,  therefore,  in  a  position  to 
check,  even  in  details,  the  maps  furnished  by  the 
air-scouts. 

The  three  airmen  who  set  out  upon  this  special 
reconnoitring  mission,  each  carrying  an  observer 
with  him,  approached  their  destination  by  different 
routes.  Each,  as  he  came  near  the  fortified  position 
he  was  to  reconnoitre,  flew  at  an  altitude  of  more 
than  3000  feet — the  height  specified  as  being  fairly 
safe  from  artillery-fire. 

All  three  observers  did  their  work,  making  brief 
notes,  and  rough  maps,  as  they  flew  over  the  forti- 
fications. One  of  them,  using  a  special  camera  with 
a  telephoto  lens,  secured  a  series  of  photographs 
from  a  height  of  4000  feet. 

But  the  point  of  the  test  was  this :  when  the  three 
observers  had  returned  safely  to  their  starting-point, 
their  reports  and  maps  were  compared  with  the  exact 
details  of  the  fortifications,  which  were  in  the  hands 
of  the  Commander  of  the  air-corps. 

The  result  was  instructive.  Without  any  previous 
knowledge  of  the  changes  which  had  been  made  in 
the  fortifications  reconnoitred,  the  three  observers  had 
been  able  to  indicate,  with  clearness,  the  position 


232      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

of  all  the  defences.  From  their  material,  indeed,  it 
was  found  possible  to  prepare  a  map  which  corre- 
sponded with  that  previously  provided  by  the  officer 
in  charge  of  the  fortifications. 

The  test  was  considered  a  very  effective  one.  It 
showed  that  an  aerial  observer  could — even  when 
at  a  considerable  altitude — carry  out  a  reconnaissance 
with  accuracy,  and  prepare  maps  which  could  com- 
pare favourably  with  those  drawn  up  at  leisure,  and 
as  a  result  of  detailed  survey  work  carried  out  on 
the  spot. 

As  regards  the  reconnoitring  flights  carried  out 
by  the  officer-airmen  during  the  manoeuvres,  there 
is  not  a  great  deal  to  be  said,  for  the  reason  that 
they  were  uniformly  successful.  The  Commanders- 
in-Chief  stated  what  they  required,  and  the  airmen 
carried  out  their  orders. 

With  the  information  thus  provided  for  them, 
both  Commanders-in-Chief  found  it  necessary,  more 
than  once,  to  alter  their  plans. 

Not  one  day,  but  practically  every  day,  the  airmen 
were  able  to  carry  out  their  appointed  tasks,  and  their 
work  of  reconnaissance  became  an  adjunct  which 
could  be  definitely  reUed  upon. 


II 

Work  in  the  German  manoeuvres — An  instance  of  the 
utility  of  air-scouts — Reconnoitring  from  high 
altitudes. 

In  the  German  autumn  manoeuvres,  191 1,  the 
aeroplane  may  be  said  to  have  made  its  first  practi- 
cal appearance  in  connection  with  military  opera- 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     233 

tions  in  this  country;  and,  here  again,  complete 
success  marked  the  tests.  One  instance,  regarding 
these  German  manoeuvres,  is  forthcoming  of  the 
manner  in  which  vitally-important  information  may 
be  obtained  by  reconnoitring  airmen. 

The  Commander  of  the  Red  forces,  suspecting 
some  definite  move  on  the  part  of  his  enemy  on  a 
certain  morning,  sent  out  several  aerial  observers. 
They  performed  a  successful  flight,  and  returned 
quickly  with  the  information  that  a  large  body  of  the 
Blue  troops  was  beginning  to  advance  against  the 
Red  right. 

Taking  instant  action,  upon  the  receipt  of  this 
intelligence,  the  Red  Commander  pushed  forward  a 
very  large  body  of  men  to  a  point  of  strategic  impor- 
tance, and  so  was  able  to  checkmate,  very  neatly, 
the  advance  of  the  Blue  troops. 

The  German  military  authorities,  although  led  to 
expect  much  from  scouting  aeroplanes,  were  sur- 
prised by  the  results  which  were,  in  actual  practice, 
obtained.  One  after  another,  in  fact,  the  military 
experts  who  were  following  the  manoeuvres  were 
forced  to  declare  that  it  would  be  almost  hopeless, 
in  future  operations,  to  hide  the  movements  of  troops 
from  the  air-scouts  of  an  enemy. 

It  was,  of  course,  recognised  that  this  only  applied 
to  fairly  clear  weather,  in  which  the  observers  could 
obtain  their  bird's-eye  view  of  the  land  below  them. 
In  thick  mist,  or  fog,  it  would  admittedly  be  useless 
to  send  out  air-scouts.  But  such  weather  conditions, 
although  encountered  with  some  frequency,  do  not, 
as  a  rule,  last  for  long.  After  a  few  hours'  delay, 
while  waiting  for  a  fog  or  mist  to  clear,  the  airmen 
should  be  able  to  carry  out  their  work. 


234      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

What  actually  happened,  in  the  German 
manoeuvres,  was  this:  by  8  a.m.  on  the  morning  of 
the  first  day  of  the  operations,  each  side  had  sent  up 
its  observing  aeroplanes,  and  had  obtained  a  con- 
cise report  as  to  the  position  of  the  enemy's  forces. 
This  result  was,  naturally,  claimed  to  be  a  complete 
triumph  for  the  aeroplane,  particularly  seeing  that 
such  traps  as  sham  entrenchments  had  been  pre- 
pared to  deceive  the  airmen — but  without  succeeding 
in  their  object. 

Here,  indeed,  lay  another  illustration  of  the  grow- 
ing skill  of  aerial  observers.  In  the  manoeuvres  of 
1 910,  when  observation  officers  were  new  to  their 
work,  they  had  been  deceived,  on  several  occasions, 
by  dummy  entrenchments;  but  in  191 1 — a  year  later 
— they  made  no  mistakes  of  this  kind.  Their  obser- 
vation powers  had  been  perfected  by  innumerable 
practice  flights — proof  of  the  value  of  constant  work 
at  the  flying  schools. 

Another  feature  of  the  work  achieved  in  these 
autumn  manoeuvres  of  191 1  was  particularly  worthy 
of  note,  also.  This  was  the  altitudes  at  which  the 
reconnoitring  aeroplanes  carried  out  their  observa- 
tions. In  1910,  the  criticism  had  been  freely  passed 
that  the  machines  would  have  been  blown  to  pieces, 
in  actual  war,  had  they  passed  over  troops  while 
flying  so  near  the  ground. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  being  so  new  to  their  work,  and 
not  having  great  experience  in  the  difficult  duties  of 
aerial  reconnaissance,  some  of  the  airmen  in  the  19 10 
manoeuvres  were,  undoubtedly,  flying  too  near  the 
ground.  A  height  of  a  little  over  1000  feet,  which 
they  maintained,  would,  almost  surely,  be  perilous  in 
times  of  war. 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     235 

But,  in  the  191 1  operations,  this  was  changed. 
The  minimum  height  at  which  any  of  the  scouting 
aircraft  flew,  when  near  the  enemy,  either  in  the 
French  or  German  manoeuvres,  was  2000  feet. 
Generally  speaking,  the  altitudes  maintained  were 
from  2500  to  3000  feet;  and,  in  some  cases,  the 
airmen  flew  even  higher  than  this. 

This  increase  in  altitude,  so  necessary  in  escaping 
an  enemy's  gun-fire,  did  not  in  any  way  affect  the 
accuracy  of  the  news  obtained  by  the  air-scouts. 
It  was,  indeed,  proved  beyond  question  that  reports 
of  complete  reliability  might  be  obtained  from  the 
altitudes  mentioned. 

Opinion  was  naturally  divided  as  to  the  question 
of  the  vulnerabiHty  of  the  aeroplanes  to  gun-fire. 
But  unbiased  observers,  noting  the  height  at  which 
the  aeroplanes  flew,  and  the  speed  at  which  they 
came  into  range  and  disappeared  again,  were  found 
to  declare  that  special  artillery,  however  cleverly 
handled,  would  have  its  work  cut  out  to  make  any- 
thing like  effective  practice. 

The  destructive  possibilities  of  the  aeroplane  were 
not  demonstrated  in  these  manoeuvres  of  191 1. 
That,  perhaps,  will  be  left  to  the  operations  to  be 
held  in  the  autumn  of  191 2.  And,  still  remaining 
unsolved,  of  course,  is  the  question  of  war  in  the 
air  between  rival  air-fleets. 

In  the  case  of  the  191 1  German  manoeuvres,  for 
instance,  this  problem  of  offensive  work  has  parti- 
cular interest.  Both  manoeuvring  forces  sent  out  their 
scouts,  and  each  side  obtained  detailed  reports  con- 
cerning the  doings  of  the  other  side.  The  two  Com- 
manders-in-Chief were,  therefore,  upon  an  equality, 
so  far  as  their  aerial  observations  were  concerned. 


236      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

In  actual  warfare,  probably,  this  would  not  have 
been  the  case.  The  two  air-fleets  would  have  come 
into  contact;  and  it  is  probable  that  one  of  them 
would  have  suffered  more  severely  than  the  other, 
with  the  result  that  its  subsequent  reconnoitring  work 
would  have  become  inferior  to  that  of  the  squadron 
which  had  triumphed  in  the  fighting. 


Ill 

Aeroplanes  in  actual  warfare — What  Italian  airmen 
accomplished  in  Tripoli — Scouting  and  bomb- 
dropping  under  service  conditions. 

While  referring  to  the  operations  carried  out 
during  the  autumn  of  191 1,  it  is  certainly  necessary 
to  refer  to  the  first  war  test — made  by  the  Italians  in 
their  Tripoli  campaign — of  the  aeroplane  as  a  recon- 
noitring instrument. 

What  was  done  in  TripoH,  although  not  on  a 
large  scale,  was,  none  the  less,  instructive ;  and 
there  is  little  doubt  but  that  the  success  achieved  by 
the  Italian  military  airmen,  under  arduous  service 
conditions,  had  much  to  do  with  the  decision  of  the 
authorities  in  England  to  make  a  definite  move  with 
regard  to  airmanship. 

The  circumstances  in  Tripoli  were  these:  the 
Itahans  held  the  town,  with  their  troops  in  a  sort  of 
half-moon  formation,  and  with  unknown  forces  of 
Turks  and  Arabs  moving  about  on  the  desert,  in- 
land, and  threatening  unexpected  attacks  at  all  points. 

Obviously,  the  business  of  the  air-scouts  was  to 
reconnoitre   as  wide  a  tract  of  desert  as  possible. 


THE   AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     237 

and  endeavour  to  obtain  news  as  to  the  movements, 
and  particularly  the  numbers,  of  the  enemy  which 
menaced  the  Italian  position. 

Several  Bleriot  monoplanes,  and  an  Etrich  mono- 
plane, were,  at  first,  at  the  disposal  of  the  Italian 
Commander-in-Chief.  Later  on,  quite  a  large 
number  of  machines,  many  of  them  handled  by 
civiHan  volunteers,  were  on  the  scene.  The  scout- 
ing machines  were  employed  to  the  best  possible 
advantage.  Trouble,  it  is  interesting  to  note,  was 
at  first  experienced  in  connection  with  the  engines. 
Sand  from  the  desert  worked  into  valves  and  bear- 
ings. This  was  one  of  those  Httle  practical  difficulties 
which  are  only  encountered  under  actual  service 
conditions. 

The  courage  of  the  officer-airmen,  in  carrying  out 
scouting  flights,  was  marked.  They  flew  over  the 
Turkish  and  Arab  lines.  Had  their  engines  failed 
them  at  a  critical  moment,  and  they  had  descended 
among  a  horde  of  wild  Arabs,  there  is  little  doubt 
but  that  their  plight  would  have  been  uncommonly 
awkward. 

Working,  generally,  soon  after  dawn,  the  airmen 
made  wide,  sweeping  half-circles  over  the  enemy's 
positions,  and  brought  back  detailed  and  practical 
reports  concerning  the  disposition,  and  movements, 
of  all  the  bodies  of  men  they  saw.  More  than  once 
they  were  able  to  provide  the  Italian  Commander 
with  accurate  and  very  valuable  information  regard- 
ing the  sudden  moving  up,  and  massing,  of  large 
bodies  of  the  enemy.  The  Italians  were,  in  conse- 
quence, ready  for  an  attack  when  it  was  delivered. 

Hurriedly  sent  to  the  front,  and  working  under  a 
good  many  difficulties,  it  was,  indeed,  remarkable 


238      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

what  the  military  pilots  were  able  to  do.  They  made 
a  large  number  of  flights  without  any  untoward 
incident — beyond  that  of  being  fired  on,  spasmodi- 
cally, by  Turkish  and  Arab  foemen. 

The  effect  of  this  fire  was,  it  is  interesting  to  note, 
practically  nil.  The  wings  of  the  monoplanes  were, 
it  was  reported,  pierced  more  than  once  by  bullets, 
but  this  had  no  adverse  effect  upon  the  machines; 
although,  in  one  instance,  an  observer  was  reported 
to  have  been  slightly  wounded. 

There  was,  of  course,  no  artillery,  with  special 
guns,  to  test  its  ability  in  bringing  down  the  scout- 
ing machines.  Practical  data,  concerning  w^hat  a 
specially-made  aerial  gun  can  do,  will  only  be 
forthcoming  when  an  army  with  more  up-to-date 
equipment  than  that  of  Turkey  is  circled  over  by 
reconnoitring  machines. 

In  connection  with  the  Etrich  monoplane  used  in 
Tripoli  a  test  was  made,  on  one  occasion,  with 
bombs.  A  number  of  small  explosive  bombs  were 
carried  up  in  the  machine,  and  the  officer-pilot 
dropped  them  over  some  parties  of  the  enemy.  The 
report,  regarding  these  tests,  was  that  damage  had 
been  done  by  the  bombs ;  but  exact  details  are 
wanting.  The  experiment  cannot  be  regarded  as 
a  conclusive  one,  or  as  one  illustrating  in  any 
striking  way  the  destructive  capabilities  of  the 
aeroplane. 

The  value  of  the  lesson  taught  by  the  Tripoli 
operations  cannot,  however,  be  overestimated. 
Sent  out  to  the  front  like  any  other  part  of  the 
army's  equipment,  the  aeroplanes  were  assembled 
quickly,  and  flown  successfully  by  their  pilots — 
amply  justifying  their  inclusion  in  the  scheme  of 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     239 

affairs  by  the  extremely  valuable  work  they  were  able 
to  accomplish. 

What  the  Tripoli  flying  certainly  demonstrated 
was  the  value  of  the  scouting  aeroplane  when  used 
in  difficult,  or  inaccessible  country.  In  the  future, 
when  a  force  has  to  penetrate  some  awkward  and 
hostile  region,  in  which  land  scouting  is  almost  im- 
possible, and  a  lurking  enemy  has  to  be  located,  the 
work  of  an  aerial  reconnoitring  officer  will  be  of  out- 
standing importance. 

Rather  more  from  this  point  of  view,  than  from 
that  of  any  lesson  as  to  the  value  of  aeroplanes  in 
operations  between  two  scientifically-armed  Euro- 
pean nations,  should  the  use  of  machines  in  the 
Tripoli  campaign  be  regarded. 


IV 

A  final   word — Conclusions  to  be  arrived   at — Problems 
outstanding. 

In  view  of  the  most  recent  tests  which  may  be 
described,  the  war  aeroplane  stands  in  the  following 
position:  for  scouting  work  it  has,  both  in  1910,  and 
again  with  far  greater  force  in  191 1,  proved  its  value 
in  a  way  that  cannot  be  denied.  Its  destructive 
potentiaHties,  although  clearly  apparent,  have  not 
yet  been  demonstrated  in  a  practical  way.  That,  as 
has  been  said,  should  remain  a  matter  for  definite 
experiment  in  191 2. 

There  remain  two  problems  which  may  be  said  to 
be  outstanding.  One  of  them  is  the  effect  which 
gun-fire  will  have  upon  the  aeroplane ;  and  the  other 


240      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

concerns  the  result  of  the  actual  fighting  which  must 
inevitably  take  place,  between  hostile  aircraft,  when 
they  meet  under  conditions  of  war. 

As  to  the  former,  a  reader  may  be  able  to  judge, 
more  or  less,  from  what  has  been  written  in  previous 
sections.  Experiments,  for  what  they  are  worth, 
have  been  in  favour  of  the  aeroplane.  In  the  future, 
too,  it  will  have  increasing  speed  to  help  it.  That 
it  can  fly  3000  feet  high,  and  carry  out  its  recon- 
noitring work  efficiently,  has  been  demonstrated. 

The  wise  view  to  take  of  this  question,  in  con- 
sideration of  the  most  recent  data,  is  that  a  certain 
percentage  of  war  aeroplanes  will  fall  victims  to  gun- 
fire, but  that  this  percentage  will  be  a  very  small 
one,  and  that  it  will  be  in  no  way  sufficient  to  mar 
the  success  of  the  work  that  a  squadron  of  air-scouts 
will  be  able  to  undertake. 

The  suggestion  is  now  made  that,  in  order  to 
secure  some  conclusive  results,  power-driver  aero- 
planes, without  occupants,  should  be  made  to  ascend, 
and  be  directed  on  a  pre-arranged  course,  while 
subjected  to  artillery-fire.  Such  a  method  would 
be  costly,  however;  but  it  might  certainly  yield 
remarkably  interesting  data. 

Then  there  is  the  question  of  hostilities  between 
aircraft,  to  which  several  references  have  been  made. 
Here,  again,  theory  has  to  take  the  place  of  practice. 
It  is  perfectly  certain  that,  as  machines  cross  from 
their  own  lines  to  those  of  the  enemy,  engagements 
will  take  place  between  them  and  hostile  craft — 
which  will  seek  to  check  them  in  their  aerial 
spying. 

That  special  fighting  machines  will  be  built  is 
practically  certain,  also;  and  it  is  probable  that,  in 


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THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     241 

wars  of  the  future,  engagements  between  these  aerial 
opponents  will  precede  reconnoitring  work.  How 
such  flights  in  the  air  will  end  it  is,  however,  difficult 
to  predict.  If  some  form  of  light  explosive  shell  is 
fired,  one  well-placed  shot  will  probably  wreck  a 
machine,  or  render  it  unmanageable.  An  aerial  duel 
promises  to  be  over  quickly.  The  skill  will,  no 
doubt,  lie  in  getting  in  the  first  shot,  and  in  making 
that  an  accurate  one. 

Although,  in  some  respects,  the  future  is  ob- 
scure, there  is,  upon  one  important  point,  most 
definite  data  to  proceed  upon.  This  is  that  the 
aeroplane  is  an  instrument  which  will  entirely  change 
military  reconnaissance. 

"  We  are  in  the  presence  of  a  new  and  formidable 
science  that  will  revolutionise  warfare."  So  spoke 
Colonel  Seely,  ParHamentary  Under-Secretary  of 
State  for  War,  at  a  special  gathering  of  the  Aero- 
nautical Society  on  i8th  December,  191 1. 

At  the  moment,  all  other  problems  are  subservient 
to  this:  whatever  its  destructive  powers  may  prove 
to  be,  and  whatever  may  be  the  result  of  well-directed 
artillery-fire  upon  aerial  scouts,  no  great  nation  can 
afford  to  neglect  this  new  weapon. 

If  any  country  dare  to  do  so,  and  others  go  ahead, 
then  the  nation  which  lags  behind  will  stand  in  im- 
minent peril  in  war-time.  It  may  have  a  fine  army, 
or  a  great  fleet,  but  if  it  does  not  possess  aeroplanes, 
and  its  opponent  has  them,  it  will  be  at  a  very  serious 
disadvantage. 

This  point  is  no  longer  a  matter  of  any  supposi- 
tion. It  has  been  proved,  beyond  all  question.  It 
was,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  proved  in  19 10,  and  it  was 
proved  again  in  191 1.     It  needs  no  further  proof. 

Q 


242      THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR 

The  aeroplane  has  shown  what  it  can  do,  not  in  easy 
experiments,  but  under  rigorous  test  conditions. 

If  our  War  Office  buys  a  few  more  foreign 
machines,  and  makes  a  small  stir  at  our  military 
school  on  Salisbury  Plain,  that  cannot  be  regarded 
as  any  serious  step  towards  making  up  our  leeway. 
The  whole  problem  needs  taking  in  hand  in  a  way 
that  England  has  not  yet  done. 

Military  flying  is  not  a  thing  to  be  trifled  with,  or 
played  at;  France  and  Germany  realise  this.  In 
191 2  they  will  be  spending  far  more  money  upon 
aviation  than  they  did  in  191 1.  Germany,  as  an 
instance  of  determined  purpose,  intends  to  amplify, 
to  the  extent  of  ^100,000,  the  grant  for  military 
aviation.  They  will  be  increasing  their  air-fleets, 
gaining  in  experience,  and  preparing  themselves  for 
that  use  of  aircraft,  on  a  very  large  scale,  which  so 
many  experts  are  ready  to  predict  will  be  the  ultimate 
development. 

So,  with  each  improvement  that  the  aeroplane 
makes,  the  peril  of  inactivity  grows.  Not  only  the 
action  of  foreign  nations,  but  the  warnings  of  far- 
seeing  military  experts  in  our  own  country,  have 
pointed  to  the  danger  of  a  policy  of  "  wait  and  see." 

Aeroplanes,  and  men  constantly  using  them — that 
is  what  we  need.  Money  must  be  spent,  not  ex- 
travagantly, but  ungrudgingly.  There  must  be 
practical  encouragement. 

Both  in  the  Army  and  Navy  it  has  been  shown 
that  we  have  men,  ready  and  eager  for  air  work, 
who  win  compare  favourably,  in  point  of  skill  and 
resource,  with  the  pick  of  the  air-corps  of  foreign 
countries. 

We  spend  millions,  willingly,  upon  other  forms 


THE  AEROPLANE  IN  WAR     243 

of  armament.  All  that  is  required  is  that  we 
should  spend  thousands — in  the  right  way — upon 
aeroplanes. 

Finally,  it  is  possible  to  summarise,  briefly,  such 
points  and  suggestions,  concerning  the  use  of  war 
aeroplanes,  as  represent  the  most  recent  pronounce- 
ments of  international  experts  upon  this  difficult 
problem. 

It  is  now  urged  that  machines  would  need  to  re- 
connoitre at  night,  seeing  that  important  movements 
of  troops  are  made  under  cover  of  darkness.  In  this 
regard,  although  it  is  probable  that  an  airman  would 
be  able  even  at  night,  by  flying  low,  to  detect  large 
bodies  of  men,  further  data  is  necessary  in  the  way 
of  practical  tests. 

For  a  scouting  expedition  of  unusual  importance 
— in  which  the  safe  return  of  the  aeroplane  is  a  point 
subservient  to  all  others — it  is  held  that  a  machine 
equipped  with  a  dual  engine-plant  ought  to  be  used, 
so  that,  should  one  motor  fail,  the  pilot  could 
fly  on  with  the  power  of  the  other.  Experiments 
with  machines  so  equipped  have  already  been  under- 
taken. 

A  subsidiary,  but  practical  use  of  a  weight-carrying 
machine,  during  the  course  of  an  action,  is  suggested 
in  the  carrying  of  ammunition,  when  urgently  re- 
quired, from  point  to  point. 

The  silencing  of  engines — previously  referred  to 
— and  the  fitting  of  all  machines  with  dual  control, 
so  that,  should  the  pilot  be  wounded,  the  observer 
can  instantly  assume  control  of  the  machine,  are 
points  now  urged  as  being  essential. 

Protecting  the  vital  parts  of  a  fighting  machine, 
with  some  form  of  light  armour,  is  advocated ;  and  it 


y 


2U      THE  AEEOPLANE  IN  WAR 

is  emphasised  that,  for  a  scouting  craft,  flexibility  of 
speed  would  be  invaluable,  seeing  that,  with  an  aero- 
plane capable  of  reducing  its  pace,  the  scouting 
officer  should  be  able  to  amplify  the  detail  of  his 
observations. 

By  way  of  a  final  word,  this  much  may  be  said: 
the  flying  season  of  191 2  will,  beyond  all  doubt,  yield 
results  of  the  utmost  significance  in  the  further  devel- 
opment of  aircraft  for  military  and  naval  use. 


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